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Abstract 
While a party system reflects both competitive and co-operative interactions, academic 
research has largely focused on the competitive interactions of parties. In British politics, 
while the notion of a solely two-party system is increasingly contested, there has not been 
sufficient consideration given to party co-operation. However, the party system has changed 
to the extent that it no longer accurately reflects two-partism, but something more resembling 
moderate pluralism. This suggests implications for how parties interact. In particular, it 
suggests that parties might need to contemplate co-operation alongside competition. 
Alongside this contemporary debate, there has long been a compelling case for studying the 
manner of interaction between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, who have a lengthy and 
complicated history of competition and co-operation. This thesis explores these issues, and 
questions the contemporary nature of competition and potential for co-operation between the 
Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. It proposes a theoretical framework of party co-
operation to help understand why Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation may or may not take 
place. In doing so, it suggests a series of incentives and obstacles that need to be considered 
by party leaderships based on electoral, ideological and organisational considerations. The 
thesis then operationalises the framework by examining in detail the contemporary case of the 
British Labour Party and British Liberal Democrats. While there are incentives for the two 
parties to consider co-operation, and these incentives have increased in recent years, 
significant obstacles remain, and despite the changing party system, the potential for co-
operation between the two parties remains limited without changes in each party’s strategy.   
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Summary 
 
This thesis analyses the potential for co-operation between the British Labour and Liberal 
Democrat parties. Following the context of why co-operation is a pressing question to be 
understood in British politics through an examination of the party system, it provides a 
theoretical framework of co-operation that draws from both rational choice and institutional 
considerations, permitting an in-depth study of each party’s organisation and their effect on 
co-operation. It then analyses the incentives and obstacles to co-operation between the two 
parties using a wealth of primary and secondary quantitative and qualitative data. Finally, this 
is brought together to highlight the challenges that political parties face in a changing system, 
and the opportunities and problems that co-operation provides in response. The findings raise 
a number of concerns about each political party in the case study, and the potential for co-
operation between the two. 
The main findings of the thesis are: 
 That a more nuanced and flexible theory of co-operation between political parties is 
necessary to understand how and why parties interact in the way they do. Frameworks 
of co-operation need to go beyond coalitions and other individual forms of co-
operation. Applying a framework of co-operation to the British Labour and Liberal 
Democrat parties, both parties have many incentives as to why they should co-operate.  
 The two parties have long been closer in terms of ideology and policy than either party 
is with the Conservatives. Had the 2015 general election brought about a hung 
parliament, there was little in the way of ideology and policy that would have 
prevented a full coalition. However, this was not the case at the 2017 general election. 
Each party is influenced by different ideological histories and identities, which might 
limit the potential for co-operation in the future.  
 A key consideration for both parties is their electoral position. While Labour gained 
votes and seats in the 2017 general election, they largely returned to their 2010 
position. The Liberal Democrats remain fundamentally weak. Their electoral positions 
have been exacerbated by competition between the two since 2010. Labour-minded 
supporters switched from the Liberal Democrats back to Labour between 2010 and 
2017, but this served primarily to help the Conservatives.  
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 However, co-operation is not a panacea to solve each party’s problems. Co-operation 
between the two parties might yield some electoral reward, but the reward is likely to 
be small, and could cost each party more votes and seats as their current and potential 
supporters choose to go elsewhere. 
 Both parties also need to take into account their organisations. Analysis of each 
party’s organisational structure shows that the Liberal Democrats’ grassroots have 
more influence over party matters than Labour’s. This holds for matters relating to co-
operation: Liberal Democrat members and activists currently have more influence 
over coalition negotiations and other forms of co-operation than Labour. Neither 
party’s grassroots appear especially keen on co-operation with each other but Liberal 
Democrat activists are more positive than Labour’s.  
 Neither party’s recent leaderships have helped the potential for co-operation between 
the two parties. Gordon Brown and Ed Miliband only saw the benefits of potential co-
operation with the Liberal Democrats when it was too late to do anything about it, and 
Clegg was more open to co-operation with the Conservatives than any previous leader 
in the party’s recent history. Corbyn and Farron’s leaderships took the parties even 
further apart. 
 Politics remains primarily competitive between the two parties, and neither party 
seems willing to co-operate unless it provides means to other competitive ends, such 
as winning office. Should a general election provide a hung parliament and suitable 
numbers for coalition or parliamentary agreement, then there is potential for co-
operation. However, formal pacts or significant cross-party working appears less 
likely.  
 
Word count: 93981
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In 2010, the first national coalition in the post-war period was formed in Britain. It was the 
result of a series of changes in how parties interact. As Webb (2000: 1) argues, a party system 
is ‘a particular pattern of competitive and co-operative interactions displayed by a given set of 
political parties’. However, academic research of British politics has largely focused solely on 
the competitive interactions of political parties. Over time the party system in Britain has 
changed from being two-party, strongly dominated by competition between Labour and the 
Conservatives, to resembling something more moderately pluralist. This has consequences for 
how parties interact. In other more pluralist party systems, often with different electoral 
systems, political parties tend to place emphasis on co-operation as well as competition, and 
certainly more emphasis on co-operation than has been typically placed in Britain. In light of 
a changing party system, it is important to consider to what extent parties in Britain should 
consider co-operation as well as competition.  
This thesis focuses particularly on the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. While the 
question of competition and co-operation between political parties is an interesting one in 
British politics generally, the interaction of the Labour and Liberal/Liberal Democrat parties 
has been a topic of academic and practical interest for over a century. As Joyce (1999: 1) 
writes, ‘progressive views have been principally associated with the ideas expressed by… the 
Liberal Party/Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party’. Labour and the Liberal Democrats’ 
occasional reliance upon each other throughout the 20th century has often been argued to form 
a ‘progressive alliance’ of the centre-left, with a commitment to harmonise social democracy 
and social liberalism within the confines of parliamentary democracy (Clarke, 1978, 
Marquand, 1991, Robinson, 2012). Marquand (1991) argues that the struggle to defeat 
conservative politics amounts to a ‘progressive dilemma’. However Labour and the Liberal 
Democrat/Liberal parties have been in competition throughout their histories, sometimes 
viscerally, and it is not the case of two parties united against conservatism (Crewe and King, 
1995). As such, this thesis questions the nature of competition and the potential for co-
operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats.  
There have been instances of co-operation between the two parties. The ‘Gladstone-
Macdonald’ pact facilitated the Labour Party’s primary development as a parliamentary party, 
and the 1924, 1929 and 1974 Labour governments all relied on the support of Liberal MPs in 
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some form, the latter later forming an explicit ‘Lib-Lab’ pact. Following the 1979 election, 
some within the Labour Party argued for a Lib-Lab coalition that would unite against the 
Conservative Party, whilst others advocated various forms of co-operation, either formally or 
informally, with the Liberal/SDP Alliance, later arguing for the same with the Liberal 
Democrats. This continued into the 1990s, as the arguments for coalition between Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats were advanced, resulting in the Cook-Maclennan agreement, which 
established areas of common ground in policy terms between the two parties. Private 
discussions between party leaders Tony Blair and Paddy Ashdown also advanced the issue of 
co-operation: the idea became known as The Project. New Labour’s electoral victory made 
co-operation unnecessary from their point of view, and Liberal Democrats at all levels of the 
party’s organisation became actively hostile to co-operation with Labour over time, with 
policy co-ordination eventually petering out after the 2001 general election. Nevertheless, 
both parties entered into coalitions with each other in Scotland and Wales, and the argument 
for greater co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats has continually 
simmered, neither quite coming to the boil, nor entirely going cold. 
Debates surrounding Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation thus warrant greater analysis 
generally, but they are particularly interesting the context of a changing party system, which 
provides different opportunities and challenges for the two parties to consider. As such, this 
thesis assesses the viability of co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. In 
doing so, it aims to build on existing studies of each individual party (Russell and Fieldhouse, 
2005, Russell, 2005b, Seyd and Whiteley, 2002), as well as applying arguments from the 
comparative literature about competition and co-operation between political parties to an 
interesting and original context.  
The two parties’ current weak positions, themselves not independent from the change in the 
party system, also make this case study particularly timely and interesting.  As will be 
discussed in greater detail later in the thesis, Labour were already in a weak electoral position 
after the 2010 general election, fell back further in 2015, and have only partially recovered 
since. They currently have 262 seats, 64 short of a majority in the House of Commons. They 
have little appeal with the electorate on the salient issues of the economy, immigration, 
welfare and leadership. Curtice (2015) estimated that Labour would need a nine per cent 
swing to them from the Conservatives at the next general election, a fate not achieved by 
either party since the 1997 general election. As it happened, Labour managed a two per cent 
swing at the 2017 general election. However, then, Labour was committed to overcoming 
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negative perceptions on salient issues to win votes in marginal constituencies; Jeremy 
Corbyn’s Labour Party does not yet appear to share the same preoccupation (Bale, 2016). 
The Liberal Democrats are also in a dire position. At the 2015 general election, they received 
just 7.9 per cent of the vote and won just 8 MPs, a drop from 23 per cent of the vote and 57 
MPs at the 2010 general election. The 2015 general election showed the weakness of the 
Liberal Democrat vote. While they increased their share of seats from 8 to 12 at the 2017 
general election, they remain fundamentally weak. Much of their former vote is gone for the 
foreseeable future, and while they are still in a position to benefit from a multi-party arena, 
the challenges for small parties contemplating co-operation are significant, as they have found 
out to their cost since 2010. Their primary task is to regain pockets of support and increase 
their meagre parliamentary representation. 
The events of the 2015 general election and its aftermath have also had some important 
consequences. Electoral geography has changed in Britain in a manner that it now benefits the 
Conservatives much more than it does Labour. While Labour improved its vote between 2010 
and 2015, this was mostly in seats in which it was already winning, and so had little benefit in 
terms of seats. The Conservatives also bolstered their vote in seats where it was already 
winning, making it harder for Labour to win those seats back in future. Curtice’s (2015: 39) 
analysis of the current boundaries shows that any result between a Conservative lead in vote 
share of 5.8 percentage points over Labour and a Labour lead in vote share of 12.5 percentage 
points over the Conservatives will result in a hung parliament. As such, the 2017 general 
election resulted in a hung parliament. This is wider than in any previous general election, and 
the previous record was in 2010. Even ignoring the problem of a future boundary review for 
Labour, the only time Labour has enjoyed a larger than 12.5 percentage point lead over the 
Conservatives was in 1997, when very different electoral geography meant that a 12.8 
percentage point lead in the vote gave Labour a House of Commons majority of 177 (Curtice, 
2016).  
Another key consequence of a Conservative victory in the 2015 general election was the 
resulting referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union. Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats both campaigned to remain in the European Union, but the British public voted to 
leave. This has important consequences for both parties. It is easier for the Liberal Democrats: 
their stance prior to the referendum was one of wholehearted support for the European Union, 
and Tim Farron maintained that stance strongly after the vote. While some of the Liberal 
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Democrats’ former electoral support is less disposed to the European Union and immigration, 
those voters largely left the party after they joined the Conservatives in coalition government 
in 2010. With the Liberal Democrats polling less than eight per cent in the 2015 general 
election, and 48 per cent voting to remain in the European Union, the Liberal Democrats 
made fighting ‘Brexit’ their key platform at the 2017 general election. It originally appeared 
to be having some moderate success: while their national poll ratings remained stubbornly 
low, they made impressive gains in local by-elections. More notably, they performed 
impressively well in David Cameron’s former Witney constituency, before going on to win 
the Richmond Park by-election from Zac Goldsmith. However, the 2017 general election 
resulted in just four net gains for the Liberal Democrats. While modest, they might be pleased 
just to survive for now.  
The vote to leave the European Union presents a much more challenging situation for Labour, 
as their votes and seats are spread throughout ‘remain’ and ‘leave’ areas. To have a strategy to 
not only respond to the huge policy challenges that leaving the European Union brings, but to 
make it a strategy appealing to such a broad cross-section of voters will be a continually 
difficult task. While some in Labour have sought to provide arguments appealing to Labour’s 
broader electorate (Denham, 2016, Kinnock and Reynolds, 2017), there is little evidence of 
the leadership adequately responding to some of the challenges Labour faces in light of the 
referendum. However, the party made gains at the 2017 general election, and it remains to be 
seen if their current electoral coalition can hold.  
This context suggests that Labour could win a majority government at the next general 
election, but it is not necessarily likely. Curtice (2016: 7) suggests that ‘if a hung parliament is 
indeed the best that the party [Labour] can hope for, it might be thought wise for it to consider 
how it would handle such a scenario next time around’. For Labour to not even contemplate 
co-operation with other parties would appear foolishly naïve. For the Liberal Democrats, 
while they are enjoying the very early signs of what might be a small revival in their electoral 
fortunes, they have no chance of winning office without other parties. Given the disastrous 
effects of co-operation with the Conservatives, they should at least be considering co-
operation with Labour. Indeed, there is evidence in both parties that such considerations are at 
least tentatively taking place (Harrop, 2017, McTague, 2016). 
5 
 
It is these issues that the thesis aims to address. In tackling the primary research question – 
what is the nature of competition and the potential for co-operation between Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats – the thesis will answer the following sub-questions: 
 How can we theoretically understand the potential for co-operation between political 
parties? 
 What role does the party system play in affecting party interaction, and where does 
this leave Labour and the Liberal Democrats? 
 What are the ideological incentives and obstacles to co-operation between Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats? 
 What are the electoral imperatives that will promote or inhibit co-operation between 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats? 
 How do different levels of party organisation impact upon the potential for co-
operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats? 
 What constraints are there upon Labour and Liberal Democrat leaders, and how do 
their attitudes affect co-operation between the two parties? 
 
To carry out this study, and contribute to the broader literature on party interaction, this thesis 
draws on different understandings of co-operation to bring together a descriptively and 
analytically rich framework. Such a study necessitates incorporating some of the key 
literatures on political parties and their interaction: electoral, ideological, policy, 
organisational and leadership literatures must all be addressed. While the study is informed by 
each party’s history, it focuses primarily on the contemporary potential for co-operation 
between the two. Particularly since 2010, a lively debate regarding co-operation and 
competition within and across political parties has existed in both Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats (Grayson, 2010, Sowemimo, 2011, Tall, 2014). 
However, understanding co-operation is not an easy task. A wealth of analysis has been paid 
to the issue of co-operation, but most analysis focuses on individual forms and types of co-
operation, rather than the broader interaction between parties. For example, a great deal of 
literature focuses on coalitions and governmental co-operation (Muller et al., 2008b). Another 
literature focuses on pre-electoral pacts (Golder, 2005). A developing literature also looks at 
confidence and supply agreements, or ‘contract parliamentarianism’ (Bale and Bergman, 
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2006). There is another on parliamentary votes, and another on tactical voting, and so on. In 
their own literatures, they provide a wealth of data and analysis on individual forms and types 
of co-operation. However, a revised approach that recognises the multi-faceted nature of co-
operation can better illuminate how and why parties interact in the way they do.  
It will also help illuminate what might be considered the ‘paradox’ of Labour-Liberal 
Democrat co-operation: this issue has been discussed in and outside of each party for a long 
period at time, and some of the literature would suggest that the two parties should co-operate 
more than they do. Co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats is widely 
discussed as evidently more likely than co-operation between either party with the 
Conservatives. For example, ahead of the 2010 general election, Bale (2010) argued that 
‘politics can be boiled down to… ideas, institutions and individuals… and all of them point… 
to a Labour-Lib Dem coalition’. Indeed, from the Liberal Democrats’ point of view, he argued 
that ‘logically, at least, it is obvious which they should choose’. That Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats should discuss and contemplate co-operation is a proposition based on supposedly 
sound reasoning, yet in practice it has rarely occurred. It is important to identify the reasons 
behind this paradox.  
A detailed study of the two parties can thus illuminate the failure of each party to co-operate. 
Alongside rational choice considerations of party behaviour, this thesis also analyses some of 
the institutional factors that might affect Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. In particular, 
it analyses each level of each party’s organisational structure, from the electorate through to 
the grassroots through to the leadership. In considering party competition, most studies focus 
on the electorate and the leadership, but the differing organisational structures can often be 
ignored. This is important: for example, May (1973) argues that political party activists are 
more ideologically radical than both the party leadership and the wider electorate. Norris 
(1995) and Kitschelt (1989) challenge this to offer that activists are more likely to sit between 
the two. If a party’s grassroots have different views to the leadership, this could impact on co-
operation. Also important is the power that the grassroots have in the party. Katz and Mair 
(1995) point to the stratarchic nature of modern political parties, increasingly centrally 
organised and autonomous of member control. However, they still require their local activists 
to be involved in order to encourage public participation (Seyd and Whiteley, 2002). Such 
research demonstrates the necessity of studying political parties at the differing leadership, 
activist, membership and electoral levels. This allows analysis to address not just inter-party 
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factors but intra-party factors affecting the potential for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
operation.  
This introductory chapter outlines the thesis. It begins by discussing the context of party 
interaction, and why studying the nature of and potential for co-operation between political 
parties, and Labour and the Liberal Democrats in particular, is a pressing question for scholars 
of political parties to consider. It then discusses the mixed methods approach that will be 
deployed throughout the thesis to answer the main research questions. It then outlines the 
structure of the thesis. Next, it presents a summary of the key findings of this research, and 
the contribution it makes both to the academic literature but also the practical reality of 
political parties and elections.  
 
1.1 Research methods and data 
This thesis argues that the UK is an interesting and useful case study. The UK has previously 
being regarded as a very good example of a two-party system and, as such, a very good 
example of a system providing incentives to compete rather than co-operate (Quinn, 2013). 
The broader literature has reflected this, with previously little focus on party co-operation in 
the UK, save for work on one specific example such as the Lib-Lab pact (Kirkup, 2016), 
descriptive historical work (Joyce, 1999), or academic analysis combined with the author’s 
individual prescriptions (Marquand, 1991). This changed in 2010, when that year’s general 
election delivered a hung parliament and subsequently the first Westminster coalition 
government since 1945. A number of academic works followed (Bale, 2011b, Bale, 2012, 
Jones, 2013, Lees, 2011). However, they largely focused on one very limited period, the days 
immediately before and after 6th May 2010, and focused solely on why the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition formed, rather than the consequences for how parties interact.  
This presents an opportunity to reflect on these issues. This thesis focuses both on the recent 
and contemporary potential for co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 
There is detailed analysis of Labour and Liberal Democrat interaction between 2010 and 
2017. During this period, three general elections delivered a hung parliament, a tiny 
Conservative majority and another hung parliament, providing ample discussion of Labour 
and Liberal Democrat co-operation that, in the end, resulted in nothing. This thesis examines 
why. However, in doing so, it also seeks to provide a useful context from which to understand 
the current and future positions of Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The nature of future 
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interaction between the two parties will not just depend on future events, but events taking 
place in up to and including 2017.  As such, the analysis and conclusions presented in this 
thesis will hopefully also be of interest to audiences interested in the future of these parties.  
As shown above, analysing the nature of interaction between political parties through an in-
depth case study requires analysis that draws from a series of literatures in political science: 
elections, public opinion and parties, ideologies, policy, party organisation and leadership are 
all analysed in this thesis. To provide a comprehensive account of the potential for co-
operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, this thesis employs a mixed-method 
approach to analyse each level of each party’s organisational structure, from the electorate to 
the leadership. This necessitates collecting a large amount of both primary and secondary 
quantitative and qualitative data.  
The main primary data collection was a postal survey sent to Labour and Liberal Democrat 
constituency party organisation chairs. This data collection was necessary on the basis that 
there is ‘no practical alternative to collecting the information from those directly involved’ 
(Denver and Hands, 1997: 247). Chairs were surveyed as they were the most obtainable 
group, and perhaps best placed to give the perspective of their local organisation. While the 
relevant chapter analyses each party’s local organisational structure to ascertain the levels of 
grassroots influence in each party, this is not a replacement for but a complement to the 
attitudes of the individuals directly involved.  Primary data collection here was necessary due 
to the continuing dearth of data on the attitudes of local parties and their activists, with only 
limited data collected of Britain’s local party organisations (see Clark, 2008, Fisher, 2000). 
More recent studies are studying party memberships as a whole, with impressive and 
comprehensive data collection (Bale et al., 2016), but the full data is not yet publicly 
available, and also does not provide questions particularly relevant to co-operation between 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats.  
A copy of the survey sent to each constituency party can be found in Appendix 1. The survey 
focused on the perceptions of influence by each party’s grassroots within their organisation. It 
then asked about each party’s grassroots attitudes to co-operation between the two parties, 
alongside a range of questions about attitudes to intra and inter-party interaction. In total, the 
surveys provided data for 101 individual variables analysing different aspects of party 
competition and co-operation. Where possible, this survey data was complemented by 
secondary data on seat marginality and local party strength.  
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The resulting data has limitations: it is not a representative survey of party members and 
activists. This data, rightly, is private and the only realistic way to do survey them would be 
with YouGov and their database of party members in the UK. However, while some studies 
are beginning to make use of these, such as Webb and Bale (2014), the expense conducting 
these polls far outweighs the budget for this research. While party chairs have their own 
biases, and asking them to reflect and convey their local members and activists’ attitudes is 
not an ideal approach, it remains the best available given the resources at hand, and a 
nonetheless valuable means of understanding structure of opinion within Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats. 
Another limitation is that the survey does not cover the population or a representative sample 
of party chairs in both parties. Ideally, the survey would have been sent out with both central 
parties’ consent and assistance. However, neither party’s central office offered this, despite 
repeated efforts to obtain it. The Liberal Democrats did not reply to requests for assistance, 
and Labour insisted that they were too focused on winning an overall majority at the 2015 
general election to warrant assisting research on hung parliaments and co-operation. Instead, 
contact information was collected by the researcher from constituency party websites and 
social media. Some local party websites included a contact address for their organisation or 
their chair. Others included an email address. Those with an email address were contacted to 
request a postal address.  
In total, surveys were sent to 230 Constituency Labour Parties and 247 Liberal Democrat 
local parties. To try and maximise response rates, the front page of the survey was a covering 
letter explaining the objectives of the research, and the benefits of their participation to their 
study. A stamped address return envelope was included, and a second wave was sent out to 
anybody that did not respond to the first wave. Piloting was not possible due to the small 
numbers of participants, but drafts were sent for review to supervisors and colleagues with 
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expertise in survey research and the fields of party organisation and political behaviour.1 No 
major problems were identified by respondents who returned the survey. 
One of the main decisions relating to the survey was when to send it. Sending it after the 2015 
general election risked catching respondents during a summer period and on holiday, and also 
meant that data collection would be going further into the PhD study than would be ideal. The 
survey was therefore sent in advance of the 2015 general election, when a hung parliament 
was deemed likely and potential Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation a distinct possibility. 
As such, the data cannot reflect potential subsequent changes in party organisational 
composition and attitudes. This is a particular problem in the current context, as the data was 
collected prior to the significant changes in both parties’ memberships in 2015-2016. 
However considering time, contacts and resources it is the best data available, and still 
provides valuable insight into the organisational imperatives affecting Labour-Liberal 
Democrat co-operation. The first wave of the survey was sent out in November 2014 and the 
second wave in January-February 2015. Each survey was marked with a Press Association 
constituency code number so they could be subsequently matched with the constituency’s 
electoral characteristics. 
Of the surveys posted out, 101 (44 per cent) were returned by Labour participants, and 121 
(49 per cent) by Liberal Democrat participants.2 Given the lack of support from each party’s 
central office and the sketchy availability of local party contact data online, the participant 
recruitment and subsequent response rate is argued to be satisfactory, and compares well with 
other studies of party memberships and activists (Clark, 2008, Fisher, 2000, Seyd et al., 1994, 
Seyd and Whiteley, 2002, Whiteley et al., 2006). A range of constituency parties responded, 
both in strong and weak areas, in areas with and without an incumbent party MP, and across 
the different British regions. Further information on this can be found in Appendix 2. The 
                                                   
 
1 Alongside the general acknowledgements at the start of this thesis, I would like to express my gratitude to 
Alistair Clark, Nick Randall, Emily Clough and Nick Vivyan for their comments on drafts of the survey. 
Responsibility for any errors lies with the author.  
2 It is not known how many local parties there are for both parties in Britain, so impossible to calculate the 
overall response rate. There are certainly fewer than the number of constituencies in Britain (632) as many 
local parties join forces, but given the lack of data, the exact figure is unknown.  
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survey data is predominantly used in the chapter addressing organisational imperatives, but 
elsewhere as well where relevant. 
Other primary data collected was largely qualitative, and the main method here was 
interviews with Labour and Liberal Democrat current and former MPs and advisers. This data 
is primarily used in the chapters addressing electoral imperatives and constraints upon party 
leaders in relation to co-operation. Interview data was considered important for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, data on party elites’ attitudes to co-operation would be very difficult to 
collect using quantitative methods, and in Britain (such as through the British Representation 
Study) has often yielded poor response rates. Secondly, interviewing elites allows the 
researcher to investigate actors’ subjective interpretations of relevant events and decisions. 
Such interpretations are often not shared with the public. In particular for this research, much 
of the thesis is focused on events not yet recorded in diaries, memoirs or journalistic and 
academic accounts.3 Interviews are thus a very useful way of obtaining otherwise unavailable 
data.  
Interviewees were sought after and contacted on the basis of their knowledge of key events 
and decisions related to the research questions. This may have been in relation to coalition 
negotiations in 2010, or attitudes to each party between 2010 and 2015, and beyond. As 
expected, party leaders and those in senior cabinet/shadow cabinet positions were mostly 
unavailable. Where this was the case, some of their advisers kindly participated. In total, 13 
interviews were conducted. To allow participants the scope to reveal the breadth and depth of 
their relevant knowledge, interviews were conducted in a semi-structured fashion, recorded, 
transcribed, and quoted where necessary throughout the thesis. With one or two exceptions, 
interviews were conducted in person in London in February 2016. Those interviewees who 
were happy for their names to be shared are cited and included in the reference list; those who 
were not and who are quoted in the thesis are cited as ‘private interview’.  
Constituency election results are utilised to look at the electoral incentives and obstacles to 
co-operation. Particular focus is on the Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative shares of 
                                                   
 
3 Where records have been published, the thesis makes use of them (for instance, see Adonis, 2013, Cowley 
and Kavanagh, 2015, Laws, 2016a) 
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the vote in relevant constituencies over time, in order to show whether or not co-operation 
between Labour and the Liberal Democrats would electorally benefit either party. This data is 
collected from a variety of sources, including the British Election Study, Pippa Norris’s 
elections dataset, and the BBC website. Alongside this, the thesis uses secondary survey data 
to analyse public opinion to co-operation between political parties generally, as well as 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats specifically. Where data is used it is cited individually, but 
the most used sources in the thesis are the British Election Study and surveys carried out by 
YouGov ahead of the 2015 general election. British Election Study data is publicly available, 
and YouGov kindly provided the researcher with the full datasets from two surveys on party 
co-operation carried out in March and April 2015.  
Further secondary quantitative data was utilised in the form of manifesto data collected by the 
Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) project (formerly the 
Comparative Manifestos Project), which has collected manifesto data since 1945. This data 
was used to map out party policy positioning by the Labour, Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat parties between 1992 and 2015. This was complemented by qualitative analysis of 
policy documents and manifestos ahead of the 2015 and 2017 general elections. This data is 
shown in the chapter addressing ideological and policy considerations.  
 
1.2 Key findings and original contribution 
The theoretical and empirical analysis over the coming chapters yields a number of findings 
and contributions to the British and comparative literature on political parties and their 
interaction. First, the thesis develops a more nuanced understanding of how co-operation 
between political parties might be considered. Currently, discussion of it as a concept rarely 
goes beyond its individual forms and types. This limits the applicability of literatures to 
practical case studies. This framework seeks to address the most important incentives and 
obstacles to party competition and co-operation, and in particular address salient issues that 
might have been previously neglected or understudied. The framework offers three main 
conclusions. First, co-operation relies on there being compatible interests to be jointly 
pursued. Most of the incentives to co-operation in this chapter relate to it being a helpful 
means to other ends of political competition, such as achieving office or defeating a shared 
opponent. Politics remains primarily competitive, and parties will usually look to co-operate if 
it provides means to other ends. Second, even in those circumstances, co-operation is 
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dependent upon a range of incentives and obstacles. Electoral, ideological and organisational 
considerations affect the decisions made by leaders in political parties. Finally, if co-operation 
between parties is difficult to achieve because it relies on a balance of various incentives and 
obstacles, it is ultimately difficult because it relies on there being a balance in more than one 
party. There is a co-ordination problem to party co-operation. 
The substantive analysis in later chapters also offers key findings. Each party’s ideological 
and policy platform also provides many incentives to co-operation. Labour’s overlap and 
often acquiescence with social liberalism has been evident throughout the 20th century, and its 
interpretations of socialism have predominantly been in an evolutionary, reformist form. Even 
the Liberal Democrats’ economic liberals have social liberalism as their primary objective. 
The Liberal Democrats’ policies are arguably more aligned with the Conservatives than at any 
point since their inception, but they still remain closer to Labour. While there are 
disagreements between both parties, particularly on home affairs issues and certain policy 
issues arising from the Liberal Democrats’ participation in coalition with the Conservatives, 
there is little that presents an obstacle to co-operation. The difficulty comes when co-
operation needs to be sustained over a period of time, or advanced to a more significant level. 
Here, ideological differences between the parties are likely to be more of an obstacle. 
Alongside this, if ideology and policy considerations present such an incentive for co-
operation, that the two parties have co-operated as little as they have suggests other 
considerations may be more important.  
There are electoral incentives to co-operation for both parties: co-operation might bring about 
an opportunity to prevent a Conservative majority government, and subsequently a potential 
Labour-Liberal Democrat or Labour-led government. Labour will be competing against a 
weakened Conservative Party if the Liberal Democrats are stronger. If the Liberal Democrats 
can count on the support of Labour supporters in Conservative-Liberal Democrat marginals 
then there is potential for the party’s electoral prospects to significantly improve, which is 
crucial for the party’s survival in the coming years. However, the electoral obstacles are 
numerous too. Most Liberal Democrat supporters willing to vote Labour tactically probably 
already did so in 2015 and 2017, and there are not many other Liberal Democrats left in 
Labour-Conservative marginal seats. For Labour to co-operate with the Liberal Democrats 
would be to spend political capital on a move that could achieve very little electoral benefit in 
Labour seats, or potentially backfire by haemorrhaging further support to other parties. 
14 
 
Electorally, each party focusing on addressing their individual electoral issues, while not 
completely closing the door to co-operation, might be the best course of action. 
Each party’s organisation provides different incentives and obstacles to co-operation for each 
party. Formal organisational structures permit the Liberal Democrats’ grassroots more 
influence in their party than Labour’s do.4 When applied to grassroots’ perception of their 
own influence, the same findings apply: Liberal Democrat activists feel they have more 
influence in their own party than Labour activists do. Applied to co-operation, the Liberal 
Democrats’ grassroots had much more influence over co-operation in 2010 than Labour’s 
would have done, and this presently remains the case. The data collected also provides 
findings regarding grassroots’ attitudes to co-operation: Liberal Democrat respondents were 
more supportive of Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation than Labour respondents, and 
events between 2010 and 2015 appeared to make Labour respondents less supportive of co-
operation with the Liberal Democrats.  
Finally, each party’s leaderships also reveal important considerations for the potential for 
Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. Leaders and their individual actions are not as 
important as the electoral factors that might affect co-operation. However, decisions taken by 
each party’s leaders are still important. Between 2007 and 2010 or 2010 and 2015, the Labour 
and Liberal Democrat leaderships constructed their interests in a fashion that inhibited co-
operation between the two. Gordon Brown was never able to convince the Liberal Democrats 
that his idea of co-operation was ever going to advantage anybody but the Labour Party. Nick 
Clegg was never as keen as previous Liberal Democrat leaders on Labour-Liberal Democrat 
co-operation. Ed Miliband saw the Liberal Democrats as a goldmine of voters that would help 
him become Prime Minister in 2015, and not as a party with which he should seek to co-
operate. For both Brown and Miliband, co-operation seemed an option that appeared as a last 
resort. While this is often the case for most party leaders, it meant that when they actually 
came around to realising the benefits of co-operation, they operated from a position of 
weakness rather than a position of strength. It also meant that the Labour leaders faced greater 
                                                   
 
4 There may be the prospect of this changing with a Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Party, but at the time of 
writing the Liberal Democrats afford much more formal influence to their members and activists than 
Labour.  
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hostility from their parliamentary party: while co-operation has always been the end-game for 
a Liberal Democrat leader, it has not for a Labour leader. This fundamental question may 
need to be addressed by Labour leaders in future. For now, neither Corbyn nor Cable is 
showing much interest in co-operation, but this may change.  
Together, the findings throughout the thesis suggest that there are many incentives to Labour-
Liberal Democrat co-operation, but parties have tended to consider them outweighed by 
obstacles. This is perfectly reasonable, as to co-operate with another party brings with it a 
great deal of risk and uncertainty. Nevertheless, the party system has changed over time in a 
manner that should encourage greater co-operation between political parties. Partisan 
identification is at historically low levels (albeit on the increase again recently), and co-
operation between parties potentially has greater incentives than it did previously. Co-
operation is now commonplace throughout the British party system, with coalitions and 
confidence and supply agreements now common in local and sub-national parliaments, 
assemblies and councils, and hung parliaments still likely nationally. The two party’s electoral 
weaknesses might facilitate action. As Panebianco (1988), and Harmel and Janda (1994) 
argue, electoral failures can ‘shock’ a party into changing. The continued existence of a party 
system encouraging co-operation and weak Labour and Liberal Democrat parties might 
incentivise co-operation.  
However, the party system remains primarily competitive and adversarial, and it will likely 
take more than continued electoral defeat to encourage co-operation over competition. Both 
parties are primarily led by elites influenced by a series of factors and constraints. Many of 
those factors and constraints provide an obstacle to co-operation, and leaders are unlikely to 
risk their own position to overcome them. Both party leaderships would likely face strong 
opposition to co-operation from their parliamentary party, and both parties to some extent 
would face opposition from their grassroots. This is particularly the case for the Labour 
leadership, but also the Liberal Democrats. While electoral factors provide some incentive, 
co-operation is not some panacea for a party’s problems with the electorate.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Following this introduction, Chapter Two introduces a theoretical framework of party co-
operation. It draws on a series of literatures to discuss how Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
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operation is to be understood, and the incentives and obstacles that might promote or 
constrain it are specified. This framework forms the structure for the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter Three provides the context from which Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation is to 
be discussed, by charting the evolution of the party system and interaction to the present day. 
It begins by theorising how we might understand a party system, and how it helps us further 
understand the nature of interaction between political parties. It argues that the notion of 
Britain as a two-party system is inaccurate. While the two-party system persisted for a period 
of the 20th century, it has otherwise not existed or it has only existed in the national 
parliamentary arena. The hung parliament following the 2010 general election, the small 
majority for the Conservatives following the 2015 general election, and a hung parliament in 
the 2017 general election suggests that the influence of smaller parties is not going away from 
British politics anytime soon. As such, it provides a platform from which to understand the 
potential for co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 
Chapter Four begins the substantive analysis of the extent to which there are incentives and 
obstacles to co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. This chapter assesses 
ideological and policy considerations in each party, and how they affect the potential for co-
operation. The first section focuses on the ideological compatibility between each party, 
focusing on the core issues of the individual, society and the state. The second section 
analyses the policy compatibility of each party, examined within the spatial and salience 
structures of party interaction. This is done through qualitative analysis of manifestos, policy 
documents and speeches for recent election campaigns, and quantitative analysis of manifesto 
data between 1945 and 2015 to provide a longer term perspective. The fourth section provides 
a contemporary analysis of policy developments in each party in light of their 2015 and 2017 
general election performances.  
Chapter Five focuses on electoral considerations and public opinion to co-operation. First, it 
provides the theoretical foundations from which to understand the electoral incentives and 
obstacles to co-operation between the two parties. The chapter then focuses on pre-electoral 
co-operation, analysing the differing incentives and obstacles in Labour-Conservative seats 
and Liberal Democrat-Conservative seats. It then analyses public opinion towards co-
operation in Britain, between political parties generally and in particular between Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats.  
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Chapter Six applies the organisational element of the thesis’s theoretical framework, and 
focuses on two key questions: to what extent can each party’s grassroots influence their 
party’s approach to co-operation, and to what extent do each party’s grassroots’ attitudes 
differ from their party’s elites? First, the chapter applies arguments from the comparative 
literature regarding the extent of grassroots influence to analysis of Labour and Liberal 
Democrats. This is done by analysing each party’s formal and informal organisational 
structures, as well analysing party activists’ perception of influence within their party. 
Second, the chapter assesses opinion structures within each party’s organisation, by 
measuring ideological positioning, what the most important issues are in each party, and the 
importance of policy, office and vote-seeking theories to the grassroots. Third, the chapter 
analyses the attitudes of each party’s grassroots to co-operation with each other and other 
parties. The chapter concludes by assessing the extent to which each party’s grassroots is able 
to provide incentives or obstacles to co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats.  
Chapter Seven focuses on the final key aspect of understanding political parties and their 
interaction: leadership. How can we understand party leadership in relation to party co-
operation? In particular, the chapter addresses three key questions. First, to what extent have 
Labour and Liberal Democrat leaders sought to co-operate with each other? Second, to what 
extent have they been influenced and constrained by institutional and structural factors? 
Third, how does this affect the contemporary potential for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
operation? The first section introduces the ‘leadership capital’ framework proposed by 
Bennister et al. (2015) as a useful guide from which to understand how each party leadership 
has approached co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The second section 
examines the period 2007-2010 and the leaderships of Gordon Brown and Nick Clegg. The 
third section examines the period 2010-2015 and the leaderships of Ed Miliband and Nick 
Clegg. The fourth section briefly discusses the positions of Jeremy Corbyn and Tim Farron. 
The concluding section brings this together to assess the role of leadership in understanding 
the incentives and obstacles to co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The 
final chapter concludes the thesis, bringing together the arguments made throughout to 
discuss the contributions it makes both to domestic and comparative understandings of 
political parties and their interaction. It also discusses the implications for both Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats, and the implications for further academic research.  
The vast majority of research conducted in this thesis was carried out well in advance of the 
2017 general election. While it has been updated throughout to reflect the 2017 general 
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election result and its aftermath, much of the substantial research reflects findings gathered 
beforehand, and it remains too early to draw anything other than tentative conclusions from 
the events of the 8th June.  
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Chapter 2: A theoretical framework of co-operation between political 
parties 
 
This chapter sets out how co-operation and competition will be understood throughout the 
thesis, and the different issues that affect Labour-Liberal Democrat interaction. In doing so, it 
aims to address a ‘paradox’ of co-operation: much of the literature would expect parties to co-
operate more often than they do. Indeed, specific studies of Labour and the Liberal/Liberal 
Democrat parties remark on the surprising and, for those who support such objectives, 
disappointing lack of co-operation between the two. Joyce (1999) writes of the realignment of 
the left, while Marquand (1991) writes of the progressive ‘dilemma’. The existing literature 
does not adequately explain why party interaction veers at various points between competitive 
or co-operative interactions. The paradox as discussed here is understood as a UK 
phenomenon: it is less obvious that this paradox applies across Western democracies, and this 
thesis is specifically focused on two political parties within a national party system.  
One of the primary considerations of political science in the 20th and 21st centuries has been 
political parties and the competition between them. Schumpeter (1942) thought it the most 
important consideration in understanding democracies. Key works in the 20th century 
considered voters and parties in a similar fashion to the role played by consumers and 
companies in an economic market (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953, Downs, 1957). Social 
democratic theories of party competition understood voters as giving a mandate to political 
parties to enact policy programmes (Birch, 1971). More recently, theories have sought to 
combine rational choice and simple assumptions about voter objectives with more 
organisational and institutional considerations of party competition (Muller and Strøm, 1999, 
Strøm, 1990, Ware, 2009).  
One issue is that there is ambiguity in the very idea of party competition, in that the situations 
in which parties interact are not always strictly competitive (Ware, 1989). Rational choice 
theories alone tend to be more interested and better equipped to understand party competition, 
but less so to understand party co-operation. For example while in some situations, such as in 
definitively two-party systems, competition should theoretically be predominantly zero-sum 
and conflictual in character, this is not the case in other party systems. More competitors 
(parties) contesting elections may not only alter the nature of competition, but might provide 
situations in which parties do not necessarily look to solely compete.  
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Such situations involve co-operative elements as well as competitive ones. However, co-
operation remains an ambiguous term too. It is often referenced within the academic 
literature, but is often used to refer to a narrow range of types and examples. The most 
common of these remains multi-party cabinet coalitions (Debus, 2008, Laver and Schofield, 
1990, Muller et al., 2008a). It is now a vast literature, often drawing on data from many cases 
in many countries. However, other literatures also exist, covering examples such as legislative 
co-operation that does not include cabinet coalitions, and pre-electoral co-operation. The 
literature on co-operation generally covers three broad ‘arenas’. First, co-operation is 
understood in the governmental arena through the formation of coalitions (Muller et al., 
2008b). Second, co-operation is understood through the legislative arena through the process 
of confidence and supply arrangements (Boston and Bullock, 2012). Third, co-operation is 
understood through the electoral arena by the process of pre-electoral pacts or public 
campaigns (Golder, 2005).  
This chapter looks to bring together some of these theories to help better understand the 
nature of competition and co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. To this 
end the chapter first sets out how co-operation is to be understood, and then the incentives and 
obstacles that might promote or constrain co-operation between the two parties.  
 
2.1 Three arenas of co-operation 
This thesis operationalises as co-operation in the executive (coalition), co-operation in the 
legislature (confidence and supply agreements, and parliamentary votes), and co-operation in 
the electorate (formal or informal electoral pacts). Competition is operationalised as efforts 
which hinder those outcomes. This is set out in more detail in the following sections. 
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2.1.1 Co-operation in government 
In parliamentary democracies, when a single party does not command a legislative majority, 
some co-operative arrangement usually takes place.5 One of the most common arrangements 
is a coalition: that is, a governing agreement between two or more parties. Muller et al. 
(2008b: 6) define a coalition as follows:  
A government coalition refers to the sharing of executive office by 
different parties. More precisely, a coalition party is a party that has at 
least one designated representative that enjoys voting rights in the 
country’s top executive policy-making body (which we generically refer 
to as the cabinet). 
 
Their shape and size depend upon context and decisions, ranging from coalitions that seek to 
act in as similar a fashion to single-party governments, to coalitions where special provisions 
are made for parties to disagree on certain issues.  Coalitions have received a wealth of 
analysis in the comparative literature (Debus, 2008, Laver and Shepsle, 1990, Martin and 
Stevenson, 2001, Muller et al., 2008a). While they remain an unusual phenomenon in post-
war national British politics, coalitions were a reasonably common form of government 
before 1945 (Bogdanor, 2004). The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government that 
formed after the 2010 general election was the culmination of change in the British party 
system since 1970 (Curtice, 2010). Coalitions are also common in sub-national and local 
government.  
 
2.1.2 Co-operation in the legislature 
The first form of co-operation in the legislature is a ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement, 
where a minority government relies on the support of one or more parties that are outside of 
the executive. This could be an informal arrangement of co-operation, or a more explicit form 
of ‘contract parliamentarism’ (Bale and Bergman, 2006). The fusion of executive and 
                                                   
 
5 Securing a majority, either alone or with other parties, is not always crucial: although rare, minority 
governments are not unheard of in western democracies (Gallagher et al., 2005). 
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legislative powers often confuses analysis. As Boston and Bullock (2012: 363) argue, ‘simple 
distinctions between executive and legislative coalitions or between government and non-
government coalitions fail to do justice to the diversity now apparent in multi-party 
arrangements’. Confidence and supply arrangements, like coalitions, can have a variety of 
formal and informal structures. Like governmental co-operation, legislative co-operation has 
received less attention in Britain – with most of the political science literature covering 
examples from New Zealand (Boston and Bullock, 2012). However, there are examples from 
Britain: the Lib-Lab pact of 1977-1978 was a legislative arrangement between the Labour 
government and the Liberal Party. While the Liberal Party did not join Labour in government, 
the pact represented a formal cross-party understanding. The Conservative-Democratic 
Unionist Party parliamentary agreement following the 2017 general election also falls under 
this section.  
Another form of legislative co-operation can take place via parliamentary votes: parties can 
vote together on a single issue, or side more generally with another party’s position over a 
long period of time. Co-operation may also take place away from parliamentary votes but in 
Select Committees, although the relative weakness of the second chamber and the committee 
system compared to other democratic parliamentary systems can often make analysis of 
parliamentary actions in British politics difficult (Dowding, 2006). However, as Cowley and 
Stuart (2003: 401) argue, ‘a party’s parliamentary wing is one of its most public 
manifestations’. It gives party parliamentarians a voice that is denied to others, and has an 
impact upon the overall platform that a political party displays to the electorate. 
 
2.1.3 Co-operation in the electorate 
Parties can co-operate in the electorate by establishing an electoral pact, or a ‘pre-electoral 
coalition’ (Golder, 2005). This involves one or more parties reaching agreement ahead of an 
election, and signalling to voters that they intend to govern together after the election. They 
clarify a party’s intentions, and signal clearly their objectives following a vote. Depending on 
the electoral system, this might result in encouraging voters to support one party/candidate as 
their first preference and the coalescing party as their second preference, or parties might 
enter into a pact in order to further the chances of another party or candidate winning. There 
are examples of this both in Britain and internationally, and can happen over one or a series of 
elections. In Britain, the Co-operative Party stands officially as a separate entity, but presents 
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candidates for election only in conjunction with the Labour Party. The Liberal Party joined 
with the Social Democratic Party to form the ‘Alliance’ in the 1983 and 1987 general 
elections. Internationally, Golder (2005) shows that between 1946 and 2002, 186 pre-electoral 
coalitions formed across 19 West European countries. 
Pacts and agreements can also take place much more informally, with no formal signal or 
suggestion of co-operation in government. In Britain, again there are examples, such as in the 
parliamentary constituency of Tatton in 1997, when Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
withdrew their candidate to boost the chances of the independent candidate, Martin Bell. Bell 
subsequently defeated the Conservative candidate. There are also failed attempts: the Liberal 
Democrats urged Labour to stand down their candidate in the 2016 Richmond Park by-
election to beat the de facto Conservative candidate,6 and some Labour MPs agreed. Three 
Labour MPs argued that ‘the Lib Dems are far from perfect but… it may be time for Labour 
to put the national interest first’ (Nandy et al., 2016b). Labour eventually decided to stand a 
candidate, finishing a distant third.   
 
2.2 A broader understanding of co-operation 
There is thus a vast literature on party co-operation, but this literature tends to focus on 
individual forms of co-operation, such as cabinet coalitions, legislative agreements or 
electoral pacts (Debus, 2008, Gschwend and Hooghe, 2008, Muller et al., 2008b). This 
extensive literature has aided our understanding of the dynamics of co-operation: we know 
more about how offices might be distributed, the policy-payoffs for each actor, and the 
potential costs and benefits that might result from bargaining.  
However, we know less about the parties involved and the reasons for, and consequences of, 
their interaction with each other. Regarding the potential for co-operation between Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats, it is one thing to analyse why the two parties did not enter into 
coalition following the 2010 general election, but the relationship between the two parties 
                                                   
 
6 Zac Goldsmith officially stood as an Independent, but was formerly the Conservative MP and was heavily 
backed by the local Conservative association.  
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during the 2010 parliament was affected by decisions at the previous general election. Those 
decisions had an effect on the two parties’ interaction ahead of the 2015 general election, and 
all had an effect on their interaction in the present. A longer-term, more coherent analysis of 
party interaction, rather than just focusing on one-event in time, has been theorised and 
modelled before in the comparative literature (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988, Schofield, 
1993, Strøm, 1990). Analysing events, their effects, and the role of political parties within 
them provides an opportunity for an in-depth analysis of a single case study, which can then 
better inform our understanding of Labour and the Liberal Democrats.  
More broadly, the purpose of research on co-operation should not be just to better understand 
the structures of coalitions and the payoffs of bargaining, but to also understand the 
motivations of political parties and actors involved in the process, and the considerations they 
make about co-operation as a means of achieving their objectives. Political parties – often 
party elites but this depends on their organisation – have decisions to make which affect how 
they interact with other parties. As Michels ((1915) 1959: 130) argues, ‘different 
individualities react differently to the same environment’. Such choices might depend on the 
potential costs and benefits that might follow a course of actions, or other organisational 
factors. How co-operation is understood and addressed by political parties is an important 
question to be answered.   
The thesis thus draws from different understandings of co-operation to hopefully provide a 
descriptively and analytically rich framework. This raises the understandable objection that 
bringing together different understandings of co-operation fails to adequately understand each 
form of co-operation individually. Each arena of co-operation has received dedicated and 
specific attention in its own right (see Boston and Bullock, 2012, Fisher, 2004, Golder, 2005, 
Muller et al., 2008a: as examples). However, they are all forms of co-operation, and a revised 
approach that recognises the multi-faceted nature of co-operation can better illuminate how 
and why parties interact in the way they do. Many of the challenges parties face in making 
decisions about one form of co-operation can apply in another form as well. Indeed, parties 
are often choosing between a variety of potential forms of competition or co-operation. For 
instance, a pre-electoral pact suggests a clear signal of co-operation between two parties that 
strongly signals the possibility of further co-operation after an election (Golder, 2005). 
Legislative co-operation does not necessarily have different incentives and obstacles to 
governmental co-operation (Boston and Bullock, 2012, Strøm, 1990). Together, the sheer 
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diversity of co-operation and academic analysis of it suggests that a revised approach that 
recognises this is required.  
As a starting point, it is useful to consider co-operation as a form of party interaction, 
alongside party competition. From Ostrogorski’s (1902) work on the British and American 
party systems through to more contemporary analysis of Western democracies, rational choice 
models of competition remain the dominant prism through which to understand party 
interaction. Downs’ (1957) spatial vote-maximising models assumed that voters were rational 
and individualistic, and introduced an economic approach to the study of party competition 
along a largely left-right ideological scale. Stokes (1963) later argued that certain ‘valence’ 
issues could not be explained by spatial models of competition. However, the two are not 
entirely discrete interactions. As Schattschneider (1960: 71) argues, ‘the crucial problem in 
politics is the management of conflict’. Competition and co-operation provide the means of 
doing so.7  
To understand a party’s objectives, Muller and Strøm’s (1999b) triad model of office-seeking, 
policy-seeking and vote-seeking is a helpful starting point. The office-seeking model argues 
that parties seek to maximise their control over political office: that is, governmental or sub-
governmental appointments or portfolios (Leiserson, 1966, Riker, 1962). These theories were 
argued to give insufficient attention to policy, and policy-seeking theories thus were put 
forward, with their supporters arguing that political parties look to have maximum influence 
on public policy and achieving their policy objectives (Axelrod, 1970, De Swaan, 1973). The 
vote-seeking model, although now often connected with the office-seeking model, suggests 
that parties are vote-maximisers, and that policies are primarily the means to that goal 
(Downs, 1957). These three models of party behaviour, or more specifically party elite 
behaviour, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, Downs recognised that a party’s 
policy programmes involved understanding the preferences of the electorate. Party elites may 
seek votes as a means of winning office or implementing policy. They could implement 
                                                   
 
7 Franzmann (2011) makes a persuasive case that competition should be used more to describe the 
structures and conditions in which parties interact, and that the two described types of interaction should 
not be competition and co-operation, but contest and co-operation. However, I argue that abiding by the 
most recognised terms of competition and co-operation provides the most useful platform from which to 
understand party interaction.  
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policy to win votes to then win office. However, they can impact each other in both positive 
and negative ways. Just as being in office could lead to implementing vote-seeking policies, it 
could also generate electoral costs due to unpopularity or perceived incompetence. Each 
action has consequences that will affect the other.  
Competition and co-operation thus provide a means for political parties to achieve these 
objectives. However, they remain different in their operation. Parties look to win office: to do 
so requires a majority or coalition potential. One competitive means of achieving this 
objective would be to put candidates forward in every seat available in an election, attempting 
to defeat other parties in as many seats as possible to win an electorally relevant share of seats 
that grants them office. One co-operative means of achieving this objective would be to 
support another party’s candidates (and/or vice versa) in order to defeat what they see as a 
greater opponent(s). In light of an election, should no one party have a legislative majority, 
parties may need to form alliances of some sort in order to pass legislation.  
The overarching objective – winning office – remains the same. The means of doing so - 
competition or co-operation - differ. Competition and co-operation can run alongside each 
other. For example, should two parties co-operate in any manner short of a merger, it 
necessarily follows that they will still be competing in some shape or form. Two parties 
joining forces in a coalition may still contest elections against each other. Two parties 
operating in an electoral pact in some constituencies may still compete in others, and they 
may not then co-operate in a coalition or legislative agreement. It is not necessarily the case, 
and indeed in practice very unlikely, that parties solely co-operate but not compete. Different 
aspects of party interaction are thus somewhat autonomous of each other (Ware, 2009). 
Nonetheless, the two forms of interaction are sufficiently different to warrant analysis of their 
respective characteristics. Co-operation is a fundamentally different action from competition. 
Co-operation might involve two parties maximising organisational resources to defeat an 
opponent in a constituency, or collaboration over the course of a parliament, be that in 
coalition or a looser arrangement. It sets about a process of working together that, even if it is 
a means of satisfying office, policy and/or vote-seeking objectives, involves coordination and 
collaboration in a manner not necessarily witnessed in competition.  In doing so, it recognises 
the importance of another party to achieve your objective. Co-operation might therefore be 
understood as the collective pursuit of compatible interests by two or more political parties, 
with the recognition that those interests cannot necessarily be achieved alone.  
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This understanding is slightly different to that proposed by Bartolini (1999: 439), who argues 
that, in co-operative relationships, ‘actors may still be considered as pursuing individual 
interests, but they must accept at least some partial subordination of such interests to a 
collective, all-actors’ goal’. Co-operation need not always involve a collective interest. For 
example, co-operation between Labour and the Liberals predominantly rested on Labour 
wanting to accelerate its political development and the Liberals wanting to form a 
government. There may be situations where interests remain distinct but co-operation still 
takes place. The crucial point is that interests are compatible.  
It is proposed here that there may be multiple motives for co-operation. Although co-
operation might involve sharing, collaboration and co-ordination, that does not make it an 
ideal for party elites to engage in. Political parties, whether co-operating or competing, are 
concerned with their own interest. In this sense, actors within political parties are rational 
actors: that is, they are motivated by ‘private’ desires, such as power and reputation (Laver, 
1997). Co-operation, for the most part8, is the means of achieving it. It is the recognition that 
interests might still be distinct, but are nonetheless compatible, and might be most readily 
achieved by some form of co-operative action. 
Parties need to take into account to what extent co-operation can help them achieve their 
interests and objectives, be those office, policy or vote-seeking. As argued by Koole and 
subsequently by Carty (Carty, 2004, Koole, 1994), how a party organises itself will shape and 
affect the manner of the actions that it takes (in this case, co-operation and competition 
between parties). Whether party elites take decisions in their own personal interest or in their 
party’s interest, the consequences remain. A useful way of breaking down the various 
interests within a political party with regard to competition and co-operation is to think of 
incentives and obstacles to party co-operation. If co-operation increases a party’s coalition 
potential, or electorally weakens a competitor, or increases the chance of maximising votes or 
implementing policy, then this presents an incentive to co-operation. If on the other hand, co-
                                                   
 
8 In some cases, co-operation could be an end in itself, i.e. to promote a less adversarial political system. 
Examples of this objective, particularly in the context of British politics, are rare.  
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operation has negative consequences for these considerations, it presents an obstacle. The 
same applies to decisions surrounding competition.  
Incentives and obstacles can also apply to actors within each party. As will be argued 
throughout this thesis, actors within both Labour and the Liberal Democrats have faced and 
continue to face these decisions. Co-operation could have consequences for actors within 
parties. For example, a party leader could see their support within their party or the country 
eroded if they co-operate with another party. Party members might not countenance their 
party co-operating with another. Actors at every stratum of a political party make these 
decisions freely, and they shape the structure they are in, but it is a reciprocal process. The 
next section outlines the incentives and obstacles to co-operation that this thesis will consider.  
 
2.3 Incentives and obstacles to co-operation 
A broader theory of co-operation between political parties necessitates an explanatory 
framework of different incentives and obstacles that parties should consider. As will be shown 
in the later chapters of this thesis, the incentives and obstacles will differ depending on 
context, be that the form of co-operation, the size and nature of the party, and the 
organisational and institutional structures in which the party operates. However, some broad 
areas of interests can be outlined.  
 
2.3.1 Ideology and policy 
There are any number of definitions of ideology and policy. Alexander (2015: 982) argues 
that an ideology is ‘a view about what ought to be thought, said and done about politics’. 
Freeden (1996: 140) defines ideologies as ‘combinations of political concepts’. Griffiths 
(2014: 24-29) adds that ideologies are a series of ‘concepts, values, aspirations and even 
aversions’. To inform analysis of party competition and co-operation, ideologies can be 
understood as the structured sets of ideas and values that guide political action. Particularly in 
relation to policy, ideologies can be used to summarise often detailed and complex policy 
programmes in a manner that voters can understand (Webb, 2000). This might be in relation 
to a party’s approach to the state and market, or the individual and society.  
Policies can be understood as the contemporary expressions that realise the values and ideas 
of an ideology. For instance, a liberal ideology might be expressed through home affairs 
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policies that prioritise liberty over security. A conservative ideology might be expressed 
through more restrictionist immigration policy. A social democratic or socialist ideology 
might be expressed through a state-financed and state-run education or health care system. As 
such, ideology and policy are interdependent. Both are concepts that influence the definitions 
and understandings of each other.  
Coalition theory has already noted some of the incentives and obstacles to co-operation 
between parties presented by ideology and policy. The ‘policy-seeking’ theories of Axelrod 
(1970) and De Swaan (1970) argue that the more policy-aligned parties are, the more likely 
they are to form a coalition, suggesting incentives for broader party co-operation. If a party 
cannot be in government without co-operating with another party, this provides an 
opportunity to work with a like-minded party to co-ordinate ideologically agreeable policy 
programmes. Connecting ideology and policy concerns with voters’ perception, comparative 
evidence suggests that voters perceive the senior party to bear the greatest responsibility for 
the policy successes and failures of a coalition government (Duch et al., 2015, Fisher and 
Hobolt, 2010, Johnson and Middleton, 2016). This appears to often be the case in practice: 
Boston and Bullock (2012) show in their study of New Zealand parties that junior parties 
struggle to influence and criticise their senior partners.  
Considering ideology and policy incentives and obstacles in a broader context than coalition, 
parties express ideologies that evolve over time, and co-operation across parties can be based 
on ideology. How ideological and policy considerations affect the potential for co-operation 
between Labour and the Liberal Democrats reflects the trade-offs between ‘policy, office and 
votes’ highlighted by Muller and Strøm (1999). Co-operation between political parties with 
more compatible ideologies might facilitate greater collaboration in office. For instance, 
Diamond and Kenny (2012: 8) argue that there is a ‘compelling case’ for greater co-operation 
between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, based on the broader relationship between social 
democracy and social liberalism. However, British liberalism remains more complex than 
social democracy combined with more liberal understandings of freedom, and a significant 
proportion of the Liberal Democrats remain just as aligned with ideas more commonly 
associated with the Conservative Party (Astle and Bell, 2008, Astle et al., 2006). Similarly for 
Labour, its ideological tradition is much more than just a liberal conception of social 
democracy (Geary and Pabst, 2015). The two parties are not necessarily ideologically aligned.  
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Co-operation also relies on more than just ideology and policy-alignment between parties 
(Lees et al., 2010). In a context still dominated by competitive party interaction, small policy 
differences can be exaggerated and emphasised at the expense of party co-operation. 
Considerations of history and identity are also important: to what extent can parties overcome 
traditional identities that might be more tribal, and does co-operation with other parties 
challenge those identities (Dunphy and Bale, 2011)? This potentially represents an obstacle to 
greater co-operation between parties. While co-operation allows the opportunity to debate 
policies with like-minded parties, it could also potentially undermine a party’s ideological 
principles. Olsen (2007) found that the merger to form the German ‘Left Party’ (die Linke) 
resulted in policy conflict for the different groups involved. Parties could be accused of 
‘selling-out’ should they co-operate with other parties, and lose voters as a consequence 
(Bale, 2012). Lees et al. (2010) argue that greater co-operation between parties relies on the 
establishment of trust between key agents in each party. Trust might generally be built, 
maintained and lost by the actions of party leaders. Policy differences between parties could 
potentially also undermine trust, and present an obstacle to greater co-operation.  
While some parties derive their policy programmes and positions from ideologies with roots 
in articulated political philosophies, others are more committed to programmatic 
commitments based on a particularly defined constituency of supporters (Gunther and 
Diamond, 2003: 171). Incentives to stress or ignore the role of ideology also relates to 
electoral context, and the extent to which party politics is ideologically convergent or 
divergent. How much stock a party places in its policy platforms, and how they differ from 
another party, will help to determine the impact of incentives and obstacles to the broader 
potential for co-operation with other parties. 
 
2.3.2 Electoral 
Assuming that parties are office-seeking, co-operation presents an electoral incentive if it 
furthers that objective. For example, coalition theory generally assumes that parties look to 
hold office and power with as few partners as possible. The most likely coalition to form 
would be that with the minimum number of seats required to form a majority, in order to 
provide its members with the optimal division of governmental reward (Riker, 1962). This is 
known as the ‘minimum winning coalition’ or ‘cheapest winning coalition’. Leiserson (1966) 
adapts this argument, arguing that it is not the minimum number of seats to form a majority 
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that is decisive, but the minimum number of parties: the most likely coalition to form would 
be that with the minimum number of parties required to form a majority. Austen-Smith and 
Banks (1988) argue that the strongest party in parliament, the ‘formateur’, is the decisive 
party most likely to form a government. Co-operation is also a consideration for political 
parties prior to an election. If two parties can find a number of seats where one of them 
stepping down would heavily improve the other’s chances of winning, and vice versa, then 
both parties could have more representatives in parliament, and further their coalition and 
blackmail potential. In each instance, co-operation presents an incentive in that it furthers this 
office-seeking objective. 
A key consideration of whether competition or co-operation will favour the office-seeking 
objectives of political parties is the institutional electoral environment in which they interact, 
and in particular the electoral system and electoral laws. Duverger (1954) argues that there is 
a strong association between a single member simple plurality system and two-party 
competition, firstly at the constituency level and then at the national level. More recently, 
research has suggested that Duverger’s ‘law’ does not always function as expected, and the 
single member simple plurality system can often produce multi-party systems (Clough, 2007). 
Nonetheless, there is a relationship between the type of electoral system and the proportional 
nature of the outcome, with distortions generally larger in single member systems (Farrell, 
2001). This has often meant, despite electoral results suggesting multi-party politics, 
parliamentary representation in Britain has often remained somewhat two-party, to the extent 
that it has become embedded in British political culture (Bardi and Mair, 2008, Webb, 2000). 
Distortions within the electoral system can also produce heavy victories for one party at the 
expense of others. It is from this basis that Strøm et al. (1994: 316) argue that the more 
disproportional the electoral system, the greater the incentive for electoral pacts and alliances. 
This is on the basis that parties that do not benefit from a disproportionate electoral system 
should want to balance the rules of the game. On this basis, the UK should be a prime 
example of pre-electoral pacts. However, as will be discussed in the following chapter, pre-
electoral pacts are a rarity in the UK. The main reason for this is that disproportional electoral 
systems only provide incentives to co-operation where there are a sufficient number of parties 
(Golder, 2005).The single member simple plurality system favours parties with concentrated 
geographical support. This has mostly benefited either the Labour or Conservative parties. If 
Labour and the Conservatives are going to benefit from the electoral system, then there is 
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little incentive for them to look at co-operation with the smaller parties in the system, as they 
would not provide enough electoral benefit.  
Therefore, it may be more the case that disproportional systems only provide pre-electoral 
incentives to co-operation when larger parties within a system are negatively affected, 
although identifying a specific threshold is tricky. As will be discussed throughout the thesis, 
the Labour Party might be becoming such a party. The UK party system is beginning to 
accommodate more parties, such as the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish National Party, UKIP, 
the Green Party, and Plaid Cymru. Indeed, the electoral system heavily benefitted the Scottish 
National Party in the 2015 general election (they won 95 per cent of the seats in Scotland with 
50 per cent of the votes), and to a lesser extent in the 2017 general election (they won 59 per 
cent of the seats in Scotland with 37 per cent of the votes). As the party system changes, the 
incentives for co-operation and competition might change.  
The discussion so far suggests that the electoral incentives and obstacles to co-operation can 
be different depending upon the size of a party. Smaller parties may have more incentives to 
co-operate with other parties, but their reasons for co-operating often also mean they have 
little to offer as a consequence. A small party might only have a handful of voters in 
constituencies: while these voters might be crucial in swaying an outcome, the ability of the 
party to sufficiently influence their voters’ actions is more doubtful. This gives them little 
bargaining power with any potential co-operating parties.  
A smaller party on a more extreme wing of a political spectrum, be that left/right/ or 
authoritarian/liberal, may also alienate any potential co-operating parties’ supporters. For 
example, the Greens and UKIP present very different options to a larger party than the Liberal 
Democrats. Smaller parties can also face difficulties following co-operation. The comparative 
literature on coalitions suggests that junior parties struggle to get credit for their participation 
(Duch et al., 2015, Dunphy and Bale, 2011). For a larger party, this might provide incentives 
for co-operation to shield themselves from scrutiny, and for a smaller party this might provide 
an obstacle. Related to this, parties look to fight elections as distinct entities – they seek votes 
by offering a different programme of policies and agenda to the electorate than their 
competitors. The ‘crowded centre’ of party competition, with parties all vying for the centre 
ground, has already made this increasingly difficult (Green, 2015). The prospect of co-
operation with other parties would undermine this even further. 
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Another particular circumstance that might incentivise co-operation is to avoid or delay 
electoral defeat in the hope of securing electoral advantage in the future. The Lib-Lab pact of 
1977-1978 came about, in part, so that the Labour government could remain in office and not 
face an immediate election (Hazell and Paun, 2009). The Liberals did not want an election at 
that point either. The Liberal Democrats also knew that if they did not go into coalition with 
the Conservatives following the 2010 general election, a second election was a potential 
outcome, which would have been financially unaffordable for the party (Evans and 
Sanderson-Nash, 2011). In certain circumstances, preventing an election might amount to an 
incentive to co-operate. 
Co-operation also relies on successful party strategy. Taylor (1973) argues that the decline of 
the Liberal Party in the 1920s was due primarily to poor decisions made in electoral pacts 
with the Labour Party. As Franklin et al. (1994) note, people do not always vote rationally. 
This makes it difficult for parties to know exactly how to plan their strategy. Should parties 
signal to voters in certain constituencies that they should vote tactically? If they do not at all, 
then it is unlikely to have a great effect. Yet how might they signal? One way is for a party to 
publicly state that their chances of winning this seat are nil, and they should consider voting 
for another like-minded candidate. Another, more subtle way is for a party to reduce the 
amount of campaigning that it does in a seat, hoping that voters will go to their preferred 
alternative candidate. Without party signalling however, this is primarily sensible 
management of scarce resources than articulated co-operation.  
Ultimately, there will always be electoral trade-offs for any parties contemplating co-
operation with others. In certain cases, electoral incentives could indicate a greater potential 
for co-operation between parties. Co-operation might provide an opportunity to win more 
votes or seats and further the prospect of obtaining office and passing legislation. 
Alternatively, electoral obstacles could indicate a smaller potential for co-operation between 
parties. Co-operation might improve or damage a party’s identity to the electorate, and any 
electoral benefits of governing might be ‘stolen’ by another co-operating party. How such 
trade-offs present themselves at any one time will be crucial in influencing the potential for 
co-operation. 
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2.3.3 Organisational 
As well as electoral and policy incentives and obstacles, the potential for parties to co-operate 
is also influenced by their organisational structure(s). Parties are not monolithic entities, but 
multi-faceted organisations, structured around a ruling elite of individuals that is constrained 
by rules, norms and practices, both formal and informal, within their party organisational 
structure (Koole, 1994, Rye, 2015). Two questions are therefore important in this context.  
First, might the opinions of a party’s elite towards party co-operation in government differ 
from the other strata of their party organisation? Assuming that parties are office-seeking and 
vote-maximising, there is a need for parties to present a unified message to the electorate. 
Indeed, one of the key reasons suggested for parties becoming more professionalised is to 
appeal to a wider electorate than individual party activists and members (Kirchheimer, 1966, 
Panebianco, 1988). This might suggest that activists and members have different, i.e. more 
radical, views than the electorate.  
Such an assumption was outlined by May (1973) with the ‘law of curvilinear disparity’, 
which can be summarised thus: voters are moderate actors and tend to endorse the status quo, 
or very minor reforms of it at most. Party leaders, as rational actors, are keen to capture their 
votes in order to achieve political office, and so will cater to the voters’ views. Activists stand 
apart, however, and insist upon far more radical programmes than most voters would support. 
Parties are thus successful when their elites are able to pursue an electoralist strategy that at 
the same time does not dissatisfy their activists. Whilst May’s hypothesis has influenced 
much literature on this topic, it is flawed. Norris (1995) responds to May’s piece in a study of 
the various strata of the British Labour and Conservative parties, finding the curvilinear 
disparity hypothesis wrong on all counts. Kitschelt (1989) is similarly critical, while Van 
Holsteyn et al. (2015) suggest that May’s law should be renamed ‘May’s myth’. Together, 
each criticism suggests that the attitudes and interests of members and activists need not be 
necessarily divergent from party elites, and if they are they might not necessarily be more 
radical. How different party strata differ in terms of policy and strategy has important 
consequences for co-operation. 
The second question concerns influence: to what extent can the grassroots of a party 
organisation influence its elite? Whatever the level of divergence on co-operation by party 
elites and grassroots, grassroots need to be able to act upon their attitudes if it is to present an 
incentive or obstacle to co-operation. Much of the literature suggests a weakened role for 
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members and activists within a party’s organisation. One strand of thought, famously referred 
to as the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ (Michels, (1915) 1959), argues that leadership groups become 
dominant in democratic organisations, and in his study of the British Labour and Conservative 
parties, McKenzie (1955) reached similar conclusions. Some arguments inevitably go on to 
note that such leadership power comes at the expense of grassroots influence. The ‘catch-all’ 
party organisational model suggested that leadership elites seek to develop party policy and 
electoral strategy without the influence of party members (Kirchheimer, 1966). Panebianco 
(1988) developed this further to point out the decline of traditional party organisation in 
favour of professionals and leadership groups, influenced by the ‘opinion electorate’. 
Whiteley (2011) argues that increasing state-backing of political parties makes it easier for 
party members to be ignored. 
However without members and activists, parties would not have candidates for local, sub-
national and national elections. They would lack democratic legitimacy and struggle to win 
elections. Fisher and Denver (2009: 196) summarise it as follows.  
Party members are the mainstay of traditional constituency campaigning. 
They provide voluntary labour for a variety of tasks, such as doorstep 
canvassing, delivering leaflets, taking numbers at polling stations, 
‘knocking-up’ voters on polling day and so on. Without members, it 
would be nearly impossible to run a traditional constituency campaign 
focused on identifying supporters and mobilising them on polling day. 
 
Therefore, how parties are organised and where power is located affects wider party activity, 
and in this context, the potential for parties to co-operate. If the grassroots within a party are 
powerless, May’s Law becomes irrelevant in practice, as the leadership could ignore them 
with reasonable impunity. If the grassroots have enormous influence, May’s Law becomes 
crucial.  
If there are members and activists within a party’s grassroots that have different views to co-
operation in government to the party elite, what options might they have? Hirschman (1970) 
uses the concepts of ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’ to discuss the options to organisations and 
consumers in market-based societies. These concepts are also useful in the context of political 
parties and co-operation between them. In short, should members of either party not get what 
they want, they have three options.  
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Firstly, they can ‘exit’ the party. Prior to recent surges, the Labour, Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat parties have all faced the issue of declining membership in recent years (Johnson, 
2014, Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 2013, Webb and Bale, 2014). This leads to declining 
membership revenue and party activism and campaigning. It is also a demonstration of 
discontent with a party by its (former) members. Those who stay can still exercise their 
second option: show their ‘voice’. That is, they can voice their discontent from within the 
organisation. Hirschman (1970: 30) defines voice as ‘any attempt at all to change, rather than 
to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs’. This can be done both ‘through individual or 
collective petition to (those) directly in charge… or through various types of actions… that 
are meant to mobilise public opinion’ (Hirschman, 1970: 30). Voice then represents a form of 
bargaining; an attempt to convince the leadership that they would be better served agreeing 
with the party membership. The final option is ‘loyalty’. Loyalty, for Hirschman, is used in 
relation to voice. As he puts it, ‘a member who wields (or thinks he wields) considerable 
power in an organization and is therefore convinced that he can get it “back on track” is likely 
to develop a strong affection for the organization in which he is powerful’ (Hirschman, 1970: 
78). However, loyalty is different from blind faith, and it has its limits.  
Another organisational consideration is the extent to which party leaders are restricted by their 
fellow political actors in parliament. Using coalition theory to calculate which parties might 
form governments with each other implicitly assumes that all representatives in each party 
will vote the same way. However, if parliamentarians in any co-operating party disagree with 
co-operation, this becomes a problem. Much in the same way that voters have to rely on what 
their elected representatives choose to do, so do party leaders. Legislators might find that 
supporting co-operation might negatively affect their local support, or their constituency 
party’s support, or they may simply be diametrically opposed to co-operation. The extent to 
which this influences the decisions that party leaders can take is crucial.  
Together, the extent of divergent attitudes between various party strata and the extent to 
which this influences party strategy will determine the organisational incentives and obstacles 
to co-operation. Dunphy and Bale (2011) suggest that attention should be paid to 
organisational unity if success is to be made of co-operation in the arena of government. The 
same applies in other arenas too. If members and activists wish to challenge decisions to co-
operate, and are able to influence party strategy as a consequence, this represents a potential 
obstacle to co-operation between parties. 
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2.4 Specifying the framework 
The previous section sets out the range of considerations that might substantively affect the 
potential for co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The aim in the chapter 
is to present an exploratory framework, to better understand why co-operation may or may not 
take place. Theoretical expectations can be presented and then analysed. So far, the following 
expectations that might be met before parties co-operate with each other can be put forward:  
For co-operation to take place there should be an expectation… 
1. …that it improves the party’s electoral position, either by means of vote-
maximising or improving the chances of winning office. 
2. …that parties have compatible ideologies and policies. 
 
The first expectation covers the electoral objectives of a political party: that they seek votes in 
order to win office. Pre-electorally, parties might co-operate in the hope of improving their 
share of seats, and in post-electoral co-operation parties might look to form coalitions or 
legislative arrangements in order to gain power (Debus, 2008, Golder, 2005). The second 
expectation covers both the ideological and policy objectives of a political party: that a party 
can implement policies compatible both with their instrumental objectives and their 
ideological disposition (Budge and Laver, 1986). This is not just a tick-box exercise of policy 
implementation, but also to what extent parties can preserve their ideological identity without 
being absorbed, either into government business, or another political party (Dunphy and Bale, 
2011). Both expectations should be considered by parties simultaneously. 
Such models of party elite behaviour, and subsequent expectations regarding co-operation, 
fall under rational choice understandings of party interaction. In this sense, arguments made in 
this thesis accept the rational choice argument that it is possible to model a theoretical 
understanding of party co-operation, from which descriptive and causal inferences can be 
made (Dowding, 2006: 28). It assumes a similar spatial theoretical model to that applied to 
party competition by Downs (1957). It also encompasses the rational choice theory applied to 
government formation by Riker (1962), Axelrod (1970), De Swann (1970) and others in 
recognising the primacy of party elites and their individual agency.  
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However, a pure rational choice model would only deliver a model of party behaviour devoid 
of any meaningful structural constraint. It would suggest that co-operation is a one-shot game 
without contributing factors or subsequent consequence, as opposed to rooted in a series of 
path dependencies and institutional factors. As such, on its own a rational choice model is in 
danger of underestimating the extent to which parties are multi-level organisations, influenced 
by their complex institutional history and ethos (Rye, 2015). Understandings of why co-
operation takes place must also go beyond notions of power or spatial alignment that fit under 
the policy, office and votes trade-off (Muller and Strøm, 1999); they should also understand 
how each party’s organisational and institutional context influences their party elites. 
Whose interest is important in a party organisation? The thesis works from the assumption 
that political parties are stratarchical organisations ordinarily dominated by party elites. Those 
elites are dominant within their party, but also accountable to other levels of the party 
organisation to varying degrees (Koole, 1994). As Carty (2004: 21) argues: 
Leadership in these parties is, to borrow Koole’s term, vulnerable. It is at 
once both strong and fragile. Leaders have enormous command over the 
policy and parliamentary life of their parties and are relatively free to 
move in electorally opportunistic ways as they see fit. At the same time, 
they must satisfy the policy and electoral demands of their supporters and 
the career aspirations of their professional colleagues. 
 
The key issue here is the extent to which party leaders can exercise ‘authority’ in their 
organisations. What really counts is not one’s formal position but the informal authority one 
is granted (Bennister et al., 2015: 418). Their authority rests both on their skills and the 
environment in which they can exercise them. Their skills matter, such as their physical, 
emotional and managerial capability to bring about their interests and objectives. However, 
what is also important is being able to rely on the support of those institutions and 
environments that enable them to act.  
Party leaders rely on their organisations to be able to act. Members and activists through their 
local parties provide a direct link between political parties and their voters. Their 
organisations provide the financial stability and security from which parties can contest 
elections, as well as the mobilisation of supporters and the local presence of their political 
parties in various local, regional and sub-national institutions. This importance of 
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organisations has been shown both comparatively, and specifically in the parties explored in 
this thesis (Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005, Russell, 2005b, Samuels and Zucco, 2015). 
Should the two parties decide to co-operate with each other in some form, the organisational 
literature suggests that the extent and direction of each party’s organisational influence will 
affect the potential for co-operation. For example, Michel’s ‘iron law of oligarchy’ would 
suggest that the grassroots might only minimally affect the party elite. However, if they have 
a greater effect, May’s Law would suggest that this might lead a party in a different direction 
to that wished by their party elite. Four more expectations can thus be proposed. 
For co-operation to take place there should be an expectation… 
1. …that a party’s grassroots are likely only to have weak influence within a 
party organisation, or; 
2. …that if a party’s grassroots have influence, they should not be more 
radical than their leaders. 
 
It is also then an expectation that parties with stronger and/or more radical grassroots are less 
likely to engage in co-operation with other parties. In setting out these expectations, the 
framework stresses the importance of institutional and organisational considerations alongside 
more rational, agent-led theories. It maintains that the potential for co-operation relies on 
choices made by elite actors in political parties. This allows existing rational choice 
contributions to the comparative literature on party interaction to be incorporated. Second, it 
recognises that such choices are rooted in institutional contexts not entirely within elite actors’ 
control. This allows for analysis of ideological, electoral and organisational effects on co-
operation. As Strøm (1990: 574-575) argues, ‘party leaders… are constrained by the 
organisational properties of their parties… [and] the institutional environment in which their 
parties operate’. It does not extend as far as solely institutionalist, in that it still recognises the 
primacy of elite party actors (Hindmoor, 2011). A visual aid to this process is illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Party behaviour and continual interaction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the different influences that affect political parties and the choices 
they make, and the effect this has on whether parties co-operate or compete. It is important to 
consider the interactions between these incentives and obstacles. Sometimes, they might not 
be in conflict. A policy that two parties can sincerely and comfortably agree on, that at the 
same time wins votes and satisfies the grassroots, does not require much of a trade-off. 
However, that this happens all of the time is unlikely. In the context of party competition and 
co-operation, this has consequences. Co-operation might have electoral benefits for parties in 
that it improves their office-seeking objectives, but it might mean sacrificing certain policies, 
or aggravating members and activists of their organisation. This is particularly interesting in 
Britain, where governments enjoy a lot more control over the policy process than oppositions. 
Co-operation to win office thus brings with it policy incentives and obstacles: without co-
operation a party might not be in government to implement a policy, but with co-operation 
they will likely need to compromise on certain things to satisfy another party’s objectives. 
Although they are presented with equal weighting in Figure 1, these trade-offs are not fixed, 
and are subject to some degrees of structural and agential effect. The extent to which party 
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elites value some objectives over others will influence the extent to which different incentives 
and obstacles affect party behaviour and the potential for co-operation, but so will the 
institutional and structural constraints upon them.9 The trade-offs between different incentives 
and obstacles to co-operation will also have different effects over time. As Strøm (1990: 573) 
argues in relation to competition, ‘it is a question of how steeply parties discount future 
benefits’. For example, co-operation might help one or more parties win office, but 
government incumbency might bring with it costs at a later stage. In particular, those costs 
might be greater as a specific consequence of co-operation. For example, the Liberal 
Democrats lost heavily, both electorally and organisationally, between 2010 and 2015 due to 
co-operation with the Conservatives (Johnson, 2014, Johnson and Middleton, 2016).  
Similarly, co-operation itself will require different actions and commitments over time. For 
instance, two parties entering into a form of co-operation might require a certain level of 
policy compatibility or compromise. However, to sustain it over time is a different matter. 
Over a period of time, such as a parliamentary session, a coalition or legislative agreement 
will be tested by the policies it agrees during its formation, but also by its response to current 
events. These may be events that political parties have prepared for, or events that are 
unforeseen. For example, a conservative party openly willing to use military force and a 
liberal party more hesitant might respond differently to calls for intervention in a foreign 
country. A social democratic party and a conservative party might respond differently to a 
major banking crisis. These are issues which might not test parties at the start of a period of 
co-operation, but could do so later on.  
It is from this position that this thesis considers the concept of co-operation, and why it might 
or might not happen. As noted above, it is an exploratory and speculative framework. Testable 
hypotheses are not the explicit aim: it is one case study aimed as much at analysing the 
contemporary nature of interaction between Labour and the Liberal Democrats as it is 
building a theory. As Gunther and Diamond (2003) argue, whilst frameworks might speak of 
ideal ‘typologies’, parties do not conform to such specific expectations. This framework will 
                                                   
 
9 The continuing debate between structure and agency is discussed further in the specific chapter on 
leadership. 
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serve to provide a foundation of co-operation and competition between Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats, and hopefully inform analysis of each party.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Co-operation is something often talked about, promoted and referenced both in academic 
literature and in British politics more broadly. However, discussion of it as a concept rarely 
goes beyond individual situations and types. This chapter has provided a more detailed 
conceptual overview of co-operation and its potential in aiding understanding party 
interaction. In doing so, it has recognised the importance but also the limits of focusing only 
on post-electoral coalitions and their potential. There are a variety of types of co-operation 
open to parties in different contexts, and this chapter has presented a diverse framework from 
which to understand them.  
This chapter has also provided an explanatory element from which to understand party co-
operation. It offers three conclusions. First, co-operation relies on there being compatible 
interests to be jointly pursued. Most of the incentives to co-operation in this chapter relate to 
it being a helpful means to other ends of political competition, such as achieving office or 
defeating a greater opponent. Politics remains primarily competitive, and parties will look to 
co-operate if it provides means to other ends. Second, even in those circumstances, co-
operation is dependent upon a range of incentives and obstacles. Electoral, ideological and 
organisational considerations affect the decisions made by leaders in political parties. Finally, 
if co-operation between parties is difficult to achieve because it relies on a balance of various 
incentives and obstacles, it is ultimately difficult because it relies on there being a balance in 
more than one party. As noted above in a tentative and broad definition of co-operation, it 
relies on parties recognising that their interests cannot necessarily be achieved alone. As will 
be discussed throughout this thesis, this recognition can be a difficult task for political parties 
in Britain. 
Alongside the already theoretically dense and empirically tested notions of party competition, 
party co-operation has now received some more attention. This chapter has hopefully shown 
the many different facets and forms of co-operation that are possible between political parties. 
Presented in this way, co-operation can hopefully be better understood alongside the 
incentives and obstacles that promote or inhibit it, and allow a broader discussion of its 
relationship with party competition and interaction. 
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Chapter 3: The party system and Labour-Liberal Democrat interaction 
 
This chapter examines Labour and the Liberal Democrat parties’ previous interaction in more 
detail. This is related to the broader UK party system in which parties compete and co-
operate. How this has developed over time is important for understanding how parties 
interact, and how this might affect the potential for co-operation between Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats. The UK party system has long been classified as two-party (Duverger, 
1954, Mair, 2009, Quinn, 2013, Sartori, 1976). In fact, this classification has largely rested on 
one period of the twentieth century, 1945 to 1970. Cast that period aside, and we arrive at 
very different understandings about what the UK party system actually looks like (Bogdanor, 
2004). This chapter sets out the evolution of the party system, and where this leaves the 
potential for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation.  
Following the 2010 general election, the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties 
discussed policy areas and potential distribution of offices, and how that might be translated 
into an agreement spanning a full parliamentary term. Despite predictions that it would not 
happen, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats formed a coalition government (Bale, 
2011b, Dunleavy, 2010). Ahead of the 2015 general election, a hung parliament and 
subsequent coalition negotiations were widely predicted (Hanretty et al., 2015). The 2017 
general election resulted in a hung parliament, and a formal agreement between the 
Conservatives and the Democratic Unionist Party. The multi-level nature of the UK party 
system has also led to greater co-operation between parties at local and sub-national levels 
(Bennie and Clark, 2003, Lynch, 2007).  
This period of increased attention on co-operation is not the result of a one-off election, but 
instead the culmination of change in the party system (Curtice, 2010). The underlying 
argument in this chapter is that changes in the party system have contributed to more active 
consideration of co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. This is not to say 
that they are either necessary or sufficient, but that changes in the underlying party system 
have affected each party’s coalition potential, the potential for single-party government, and 
the reasons why each party might contemplate competition or co-operation. As such, it is 
necessary to take a longer term approach to the UK party system. First, the chapter introduces 
party system theory and demonstrates that the two-party system that characterises British 
politics from 1945 to 1970 has mistakenly characterised as the norm before and ever since. 
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Second, it looks at the nature of competition and co-operation between parties in Britain, and 
how this has changed over time. Finally, it assesses the party system after 2010, and where 
this leaves the potential for co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 
Throughout, the chapter will apply the framework to other examples of co-operation.10  
 
3.1 Understanding party systems and party interaction 
The very notion of a party system implies the existence of a plurality of parties (Bardi and 
Mair, 2008, Sartori, 1976). There have been two broad approaches to how systems might be 
understood. The first is to look at the number of parties that make up the system. A system in 
this sense is little more than the description of the combination of its combined parts (Bardi 
and Mair, 2008). Therefore, if there are two main parties that exist in a system then we have a 
two party system or three parties in a three party system, and so on. The distinction in this 
case often becomes between two party systems and multi-party systems (i.e., more than two 
parties) (Duverger, 1954). Blondel (1968) later added the distinction of the ‘two-and-a-half 
party system’ to account for smaller parties.  
Blondel’s argument suggests that some parties count more than others in a party system. How 
parties are ‘counted’ within a system depends on what is measured. The most widely 
articulated numerical method of ‘counting’ was provided by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), 
who developed a formula for counting the ‘effective number of parties’ in a system. Parties 
can be measured by their influence in the electoral arena (share of the popular vote) (ENEP) 
or by their influence in the parliamentary arena (share of parliamentary seats won) (ENPP). 
The perfectly equal two-party system, in their measure, will have an effective number of 2.0. 
If a dominant party were to win 60 per cent of the vote in an election, and the other 40 per 
cent, the effective number using share of the popular vote would be 1.6 (Flinders, 2005: 68-
                                                   
 
10 For two reasons, this will be a limited application. First, there is not the time and space to look at each 
case in-depth. Second, to adequately analyse each case requires quantitative data and qualitative data, such 
as that utilised with regard to Labour and the Liberal Democrats in this PhD study, which is otherwise not 
available.  
45 
 
69). Three equal parties would generate an effective number of 3.0, and so on. How this plays 
out in the UK party system will be shown later in this chapter.  
What this approach lacks, however, is any real sense of the interactions between parties 
within a system. The second approach views a party system as precisely that: a system, as 
opposed to a set of parties. Sartori’s framework of party systems dominates this particular 
approach. He argues that: 
The concept of system is meaningless – for purposes of scientific inquiry 
– unless (i) the system displays properties that do not belong to a separate 
consideration of its component elements and (ii) the system results from, 
and consists of, the patterned interactions of its component parts, thereby 
implying that such interactions provide the boundaries, or at least the 
boundedness, of the system. . . . Parties make for a ‘system’, then, only 
when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the 
system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition (Sartori, 
1976: 3-4). 
 
Sartori (1976) proposed a new framework of analysis based more on the nature of interaction 
within a party system, identifying four key types. These are shown in Table 3.1. Sartori 
suggested that parties only have ‘relevance’ in a system if they have ‘coalition potential’ (the 
ability to form part of a feasible coalition that could govern) or ‘blackmail potential’ (the 
ability to affect the behaviour of those parties that have coalition potential).  
Table 3.1: Sartori’s four types of party system  
Type Number of 
‘main’ 
parties 
Nature of interaction Competition or 
cooperation 
Predominant 
party 
1 One party government control for a 
significant period of time (three elections or 
more).  
Competition 
(weak) 
Two-party 2 Small ideological distance between centrist 
parties on a left-right scale. Alternating one 
party government. 
Competition 
Moderate 
pluralism 
3-5 Small ideological distance between centrist 
parties on a left-right scale. At least three 
relevant parties, so coalitions generally 
obligatory. Single-party government still 
possible, but likely to be ‘feeble’. 
Co-operation 
and competition 
Polarised 
pluralism 
5+ Large ideological distance across a wider 
spectrum. Coalition government due to 
fragmentation of party vote.  
Co-operation 
and competition 
Source: Sartori (1976). 
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The end of Sartori’s quote provides his definition of a party system: that it is ‘precisely the 
system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition’. However, a party system is not 
necessarily defined solely by competition. A party system is also defined by the extent to 
which parties co-operate with each other. Any definition of a party system therefore needs to 
also note within it the potential for co-operation as well as competition. Webb (2000: 1) 
addresses this, and argues that a party system is ‘a particular pattern of competitive and 
cooperative interactions displayed by a given set of political parties’. Mair (2009: 287) 
similarly uses Sartori’s understanding of a party system to define it as ‘the system of 
interactions between political parties that results from their mutual competition or 
cooperation’.  
Figure 3.1: Sartori’s classification of party systems  
Source: Sartori (1976: 292) 
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Key to Sartori’s classification of party systems is the explicit focus on the interactions of 
political parties, and the relationship between the party system and the nature of interaction. 
The two key aspects are party fragmentation (i.e. the number of parties) and the ideological 
distance between the parties involved. He argued that systems with few parties tended to have 
small ideological differences, with centripetal competition. On the other hand, in systems with 
lots of parties, the ideological distance between political parties was likely to be or become 
particularly polarised, with centrifugal competition and parties vacating the centre. In 
Sartori’s three types of party system that involve multiple ‘main’ parties11, the two-party 
system is characterised by small ideological distance between parties and centripetal 
competition. Moderately pluralist systems exhibit similar characteristics, but with more 
parties (usually three to five) and slightly greater ideological distance, and polarised pluralist 
systems are characterised by a large number of parties and a large ideological distance across 
the system. Figure 3.1 shows Sartori’s model in simplified form, mapping out the relationship 
between party fragmentation and ideological distance between parties, and the subsequent 
nature of centripetal or centrifugal competition.  
Historically, Britain has been argued to be a ‘two-party’ system (Blondel, 1968, Duverger, 
1954, Quinn, 2013, Sartori, 1976, Webb, 2000). This is based on the notion that only the two 
major parties within it (in the British context, the Labour and Conservative parties) will ever 
win enough votes or seats to govern. This was mostly the case in Britain between 1945 and 
1970. During this period, Britain broadly matched the nature of competition identified by 
Sartori as typical within a two-party system. As well as having two-party competition in the 
electoral and parliamentary arena, in that no other party had coalition or blackmail potential12, 
such competition was largely centripetal. While the Labour and Conservative parties still had 
electoral competition based on ideological differences between 1945 and 1970, at no point 
was this debate heavily polarised. Quinn (2013) argues that between 1945 and 1970, Britain’s 
                                                   
 
11 The predominant party system’s key characteristic is the dominance of one ‘main’ party; it is thus not by 
the nature of competition or co-operation, but the lack of it. 
12 There are minor exceptions to this: Labour might have looked to rely on the Liberals between 1950 and 
1951, and Labour also discussed co-operation with the Liberal Party following the 1964 general election. 
However, both are rare and small examples. 
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party system was a perfect example of the two-party framework, in which both parties sought 
to best match the wishes of the median voter.  
The party system is therefore important for the potential for co-operation between political 
parties, in that it manipulates how parties interact (Sartori, 1986). A two-party system 
suggests intense zero-sum competition, with a winner-takes-all mentality for both parties 
(Mair, 1997). A multi-party system with more than five parties, what Sartori labels polarised 
pluralism, suggests that co-operation is required in order to win office and implement policy. 
Such systems also suggest a greater ideological distance between all of the parties. A more 
moderate form of pluralist party system suggests a mix of competition and co-operation. A 
winner-takes-all style of competition is still possible, but it is unlikely to be guaranteed, and 
smaller parties will threaten the likelihood of single-party government.  
Mair (2009) argues that the UK party system has helped to maintain two-party competition. In 
UK general elections, while voters are theoretically free to choose between a large number of 
candidates from different parties for whichever reasons they might have and whichever 
preferences they wish to express, the democratic purpose is to convert those votes through the 
party system to choose a government. The UK is able to maintain two-party competition 
because the competition for government is so narrowly and restrictively structured. As Bardi 
and Mair (2008: 153) argue, ‘it is the sheer embeddedness of the British ‘two-party system’ 
which facilitates the long-term survival of two particular parties’ and subsequent two-party 
competition. 
However, the period from 1945 to 1970 represents just one phase of the UK party system. It is 
not the case that Britain has always epitomised a competitive party system with no co-
operation. As Clarke (2010) argues, ‘the idea that Britons are constitutionally inured against 
coalitions is manifestly not true’. In one paragraph, Butler (1978b: 112) summarised the 
conventional wisdom of British politics and then the inadequacy of it.  
Single-party government in the British system is the norm. Politicians and 
writers on politics assume that, in all but exceptional circumstances, one 
party will have a Parliamentary majority and will conduct the nation’s 
affairs. In fact clear-cut single-party government has been much less 
prevalent than many would suppose. The years from 1945 to 1974 have 
coloured contemporary thinking but, even with their inclusion, 
governments relying on a majority drawn from a single party have held 
office for less than half the twentieth century.  
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Only by reviewing the evolution of the party system over a longer period time can the 
potential for co-operation for Labour and the Liberal Democrats be reviewed and analysed. 
This also allows for analysis of what Smith (1989) labels the ‘core’ of a party system. If there 
have been underlying changes to the party system, this contributes to the potential for co-
operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Finally, it allows analysis of parties 
themselves, and developments in their history which have incentivised or constrained co-
operation. To be clear, this chapter is focusing on the national party system. It adopts Peter 
Mair’s (2009) argument that local and sub-national politics represent related but different 
party systems from national politics. As such, this chapter uses local and sub-national political 
events where appropriate for context or for understanding Labour-Liberal Democrat 
interaction, but its focus remains the national party system. The next section analyses 
evolution of the party system, focusing on pre-1945, 1945-1970 and 1970 to the present day.13  
 
3.2 Party system evolution 
3.2.1 Pre-1945: multi-party politics 
The early period of the 20th century was characterised by multi-party politics. The Liberal and 
Conservative parties were the largest parties in the system, with the Liberal Unionist, Labour 
and Irish parties also involved. Theoretically, a combination of multi-party politics and a 
single member simple plurality electoral system provides incentives for pre-electoral co-
operation, so that votes are not wasted when translated into seats (Golder, 2005, Strøm et al., 
1994). Indeed, the Conservative and Liberal Unionist parties had been involved in an electoral 
pact from 1886 until their formal merger in 1912. Bogdanor (2004: 718) argues that during 
this period there was a ‘multi-party but two bloc system’.  
This period saw the beginnings of the Labour Party, and subsequently a relationship between 
Labour and the Liberal parties. Between 1874 and 1910 there were ‘Lib-Lab’ MPs: they were 
                                                   
 
13 One can go back in time and point to the Fox and North government in 1782, Grenville’s ‘Ministry of All 
the Talents’ in 1806, the Earl of Aberdeen’s government in 1852, and indeed the Home Rule crisis 
government of 1885 as examples of deviations from two-party politics. However, to maintain a 
contribution to a thesis on contemporary party co-operation, this chapter will focus instead on party system 
evolution from the period surrounding the Labour Party’s inception.  
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some of the first working class representatives in parliament, taking the Liberal whip whilst 
being able to speak freely on issues relating to labour and employment (Hudson, 2003). They 
only began to fade away following the formation of the Labour Representative Committee in 
1900, formally re-named as the Labour Party in 1906. The formation of the Labour 
Representation Committee in 1900 resulted in fifteen candidates and two MPs in the 1900 
election, followed by 29 MPs in 1906, 40 MPs in January 1910 and 42 MPs in December 
1910. By 1910, most of the Lib-Lab MPs had moved to the Labour Party (Liberal History 
Group, 2010). Labour’s success during this period was in part due to the secret electoral pact 
signed by Liberal Chief Whip Herbert Gladstone and Labour Representation Committee 
secretary Ramsay Macdonald. The Liberals agreed not to contest around 50 seats where 
Labour had a better chance of defeating the Conservative candidate. Alongside office-seeking 
motivations for co-operation, the two parties also agreed on areas of ideology and policy. 
During this time, Gladstone argued that he saw ‘no material line of difference’ between the 
two parties on key aspects of policy (Powell, 1986: 383), and Labour was influenced by the 
social liberals of the day as much as it was the socialists (Diamond and Kenny, 2010). 
The pact was an immediate electoral success for the Labour Party, with 24 of their 29 MPs 
winning in the 1906 general election unopposed by the Liberal Party. Whilst the Liberals won 
a comfortable parliamentary majority, this was as much due to divisions within the Unionist 
coalition rather than any huge revival of support for the Liberal Party (Otte, 2011: 82). 
Indeed, the Liberals appeared content to avoid any specific announcements ahead of the 
election, preferring to allow the Unionists to divide themselves over tariff reform, education 
and welfare. Meanwhile, the 1906 general election gave Labour legitimacy in parliament, and 
the 29 MPs went on to form the Labour Party, distinct from the Liberal government.  
The Liberal Party continued to implicitly assist and accommodate the rise of the Labour Party, 
setting up a Royal Commission on Electoral Systems in 1908, and passing the 1913 Trade 
Union Act to allow trade unions to maintain a political fund, from which payments could be 
made to a political party (Bogdanor, 2004). The more that the Liberals adjusted their policies 
and positions to accommodate Labour, the more they succeeded only in emphasising the 
differences between their respective parties’ approaches to politics (Powell, 1986). In 
particular, it emphasised the Liberals’ inability to represent the working class vote, and 
Labour’s increasing ability to do so.  
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Although 1906 saw the election of a Liberal government with a large majority, the 1906-1914 
period ultimately witnessed the start of the long term decline of the Liberal Party and the 
breakdown of the relationship between the Liberal and Labour parties. Hudson (2003) argues 
that the failure of the Liberal Party to boost the number of Lib-Lab MPs was its ultimate 
failure, and the subsequent inability to represent working class interests allowed the Labour 
Party to replace it as the main opposition to the Conservative Party in British politics. 
McKibbin (1974) echoes these sentiments, and also suggests that the Liberal-Labour alliance 
was dependent upon a working arrangement that was slowly disappearing, as the Liberals 
failed to represent the working class.  
The Liberals won the most seats in both general elections in 1910, although only by a handful 
of seats ahead of the Conservatives in each case. They relied on the Labour and Irish 
Parliamentary parties to govern, but there were no coalitions. Both Labour and the Irish 
Parliamentary Party were committed to remaining outside government. Both feared losing 
their identity, and being swallowed up by the larger Liberal Party (Otte, 2011). Not only was 
it not a governing coalition, but nor was it a formal parliamentary co-operative arrangement. 
Boston and Bullock (2012) write of recent New Zealand politics as evidence of coalition 
theory inadequately accounting for the diversity of governing arrangements, but UK party 
politics in the early 20th century would also be an appropriate case study.  
The governments throughout the First World War were a mixture of political truces and 
coalitions, led by Herbert Asquith and David Lloyd George. For the latter period of the war, 
Lloyd George led the country but Asquith still had control of the Liberal Party organisation. 
Following on from the Gladstone-Macdonald pact fifteen years earlier, the Conservatives and 
Coalition Liberals went into the 1918 general election in an electoral pact following the end of 
the war. Asquith’s Liberals were heavily defeated, and the election resulted in a continuation 
of the Conservative-Liberal coalition. Conservative rebellions forced Lloyd George’s 
resignation in 1922, and both the Liberals and Lloyd George’s National Liberals performed 
very badly in the subsequent general election. The period also marked the end of coalition for 
some time. As Otte (2011: 98) argues, ‘in October 1922, the coalition died with a whimper. 
No one mourned its passing; no one missed it afterwards; no one demanded its return. The 
notion of coalition government in peacetime, indeed remained discredited’. The period also 
saw the weakening of the Liberal Party to the extent that they no longer commanded a 
primary position in British party politics after 1922. While they continued to have influence 
for brief periods in hung parliaments in 1924 and 1929-1931, they appeared powerless to 
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influence the agenda to such an extent as to revive their fortunes. However, Marquand (1978: 
72-73) credits the Liberal Party during the period for ensuring their continued existence by 
finding the right balance between staying in government and being in opposition.  
The divide between Labour and the Liberals also increased during the period after World War 
One. Prior to 1914, both parties co-operated in the legislative and electoral arenas, but after 
1918 they were divided by greater ideological differences. In 1918, the Labour Party changed 
its constitution. Whilst there is strong disagreement about whether the 1918 constitution 
committed the party to a programme of socialism (see Bogdanor, 1981, Cole, 1948, 
McKibbin, 1974, McKibbin, 2010), it is widely accepted that the Labour Party was moving 
away from the idea of the ‘progressive alliance’ to a focus on a broader response to 
capitalism, and that their view was becoming increasingly different to the Liberals. The 
difference was somewhat mitigated by the Liberals’ own ideological shift to a more New 
Liberal position (see Green, 1895, Hobhouse, 1911). Nonetheless, the two parties appeared 
further apart than they were previously.  
There was also a greater sense of hostility between party elites. In 1924, MacDonald ‘reverted 
again and again to his dislike of the Liberals’, claiming the ‘feeling against the liberals was 
general in the party’ (Bogdanor, 1981: 137). Similarly, Henderson declared to the Labour 
Party Conference in 1918 that ‘as long as he ever lived he should never be a member of any 
other government, whatever its colour, unless Labour was in control’ (Bogdanor, 1981: 137). 
Electoral strategy coincided with Henderson’s declaration when the National Executive 
Committee decided that the party should contest all seats in the future, ending the electoral 
pact that had previously existed (McKibbin, 1974: 112-113).  
During the period 1918-1931 the Liberals were unable to present themselves as representing 
the newly-franchised working class, and Labour opted to compete with the Liberal Party 
instead of co-operate, and then ultimately to replace them as the anti-Conservative party in 
British politics (McKibbin, 1974: 112-123). The period did, however, see increased co-
operation between Labour and the Co-operative Party. In 1927, an agreement was reached, 
which became known as the Cheltenham Agreement, in which Co-operative Party candidates 
would run under the Labour banner, and work in tandem with them during elections 
(Redvaldsen, 2010). This formed part of a broader agreement between the two parties ahead 
of the 1929 general election, including consultation on each party’s manifesto, and shared 
stages at party events in constituencies across the country. Labour had attempted to forge 
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some form of alliance with the Co-operative Union before the Co-operative Party was formed 
at the end of the First World War, both on tactical and ideological grounds (McKibbin, 1974: 
43). Tactically, any electoral support that the Co-operative Party won would be primarily at 
Labour’s expense. Ideologically, the co-operative movement was argued to stand alongside 
the labour movement in advancing the working-class cause. While Labour hoped that the Co-
operative Party would eventually be assimilated into their organisation (Cole, 1948), the two 
have remained separate entities that nonetheless co-operate strongly with each other, with 25 
Labour and Co-operative Party MPs in parliament at the time of writing. 
Going into the 1930s, British politics was defined by intra-party and inter-party conflict and 
disagreement. Labour Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald’s 1929 government faced economic 
turmoil, and there were significant disagreements in the Cabinet. Macdonald joined the 
Conservatives, Liberals and National Liberals in a National Government, which subsequently 
easily won the 1931 general election. Labour, now split from Ramsay Macdonald, saw their 
vote and seat share collapse, winning just 52 seats. The vast majority of parliamentary support 
for the government came from the Conservatives (470 MPs) rather than the National Liberals 
(35 MPs), Liberals (33 MPs) or Macdonald’s National Labour (13 MPs). Nonetheless, 
Macdonald remained Prime Minister: the government’s majority was arguably as much his as 
it was the Conservatives’ (Marquand, 1978). Those in Labour opposing Macdonald saw co-
operation with the Conservatives as a betrayal. While at the beginning of the government, it 
was a genuine coalition, it increasingly became a Conservative government of which 
Macdonald played a reduced part. Macdonald was eventually replaced by Stanley Baldwin. 
The 1935 general election brought about another majority for the National Government, albeit 
reduced as Labour recovered under Clement Attlee’s leadership. There were bitter disputes 
between the parties over economic affairs, and eventually foreign affairs ahead of World War 
Two. Labour strongly opposed Baldwin’s replacement, Neville Chamberlain. In 1940, 
following the outbreak of war Labour refused to join the government under Chamberlain, and 
eventually agreed to join Churchill’s government in May 1940. Taylor (1978: 74) argues that 
the 1940-1945 government was more than just a successfully united coalition, but a 
government ‘in the unique position of commanding the almost unanimous allegiance of both 
parliament and country’. Unlike many other examples discussed in this chapter, party interest 
was potentially subservient to national interest, given the overwhelming priority of defeating 
Germany. However, party interest was still there. Labour strengthened its position by 
becoming a genuine governing alternative to the Conservatives, and while the Conservatives 
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were briefly weakened in the 1945 general election, they quickly recovered. Nonetheless, it 
was a successful act of co-operation between two distinct political parties.  
The period prior to 1945 shows that the British party system is not necessarily defined solely 
by competition over co-operation. In this period, parties engaged in governing coalitions, 
informal legislative agreements and electoral pacts. It was in various parties’ interests to co-
operate as well as compete. However, by the end of the period the party system was beginning 
to take the shape that it would assume for the next fifty years: a two-party system of Labour 
and Conservative party competition centred around socio-economic issues (Bogdanor, 2004, 
Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). The 1929 general election marked the first election with universal 
suffrage, as women over the age of 21 achieved the vote. Following the universalisation of 
suffrage, Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 50) suggest that ‘the party systems of the 1960s [across 
Europe] reflect with few significant exceptions the cleavage structure of the 1920s’. In 
essence, the party system in Britain had ‘frozen’. The increasing politicisation of the industrial 
working class and the resulting political debate on economic issues, barring times of great 
political turbulence between 1929 and 1945, created the conditions for a two-party system and 
primarily competitive party politics which was to define the following period.  
 
3.2.2 1945-1970: two-party competition 
In Sartori’s classification of party systems (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1), he argues that two-
party politics should be characterised by three conditions. First, competition should be based 
on moderate ideological distance between a centre-left party and a centre-right party. Second, 
it should be a zero-sum game where the winner takes all and governs alone, and the winner 
changes on a somewhat regular basis. This satisfies the office-seeking requirement of political 
parties: that they look to govern with as few partners as possible. Third, the winner should 
change on a regular basis (at least every three elections) so that competition remains and does 
not get reduced to a predominant party system. In practice, no system will perfectly conform 
to every element of a classification, but it provides a useful means of understanding a party 
system.  
From 1945 to 1970, British politics reasonably characterised Sartori’s notion of a two-party 
system, although the same party (the Conservatives) won a majority in three consecutive 
general elections between 1951 and 1964. It was, however, winner-takes-all. The incentive to 
govern alone is clear: the winning party has a majority in the House of Commons, dependent 
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only on its own party’s MPs to support its governmental programme. Ideally, the only 
obstacle will be the opposing dominant party, who will do all it can to gain power back at the 
next general election, and subsequently govern alone. Following World War II, between the 
general elections of 1945 and 1970, Britain only had single party government, with Labour in 
power for 12 years and the Conservatives for 13. Table 3.2 shows general election results 
between 1945 and 2015, along with the share of the vote and seats for the Labour and 
Conservative parties, and the Laakso-Taagepera index for the ‘effective number of parties’ in 
the party system (both electoral and parliamentary). As the Table 3.2 shows, the effective 
number of parliamentary parties remained very stable between 1945 and 1970, and while the 
effective number of electoral parties was larger, it never exceeded 2.5.  
For part of this period, the Liberals have been argued to be marginal in British politics to the 
extent of being irrelevant (Ware, 1996: 148).14 This is not to say that Britain was a two-party 
system during this period in any literal sense of the term, or that it was characterised solely by 
competition. The Liberal Party contested over one hundred parliamentary seats at each 
election, winning a small number of them, and during this time various forms of inter-party 
co-operation were discussed between parties. Winston Churchill continued to seek an anti-
socialist alliance with the Liberals, fostering what became known as the Woolton-Teviot 
agreement in 1947, which merged the National Liberals with the Conservative Party at the 
constituency level (Butler, 1978a: 95).  
Pressure for Conservative-Liberal co-operation continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
with a Cabinet post offered to Clement Davies following the 1951 general election, and some 
Conservative candidates continued to stand with ‘Liberal’ in their title (Butler, 1978a). While 
there was no great enthusiasm in the Labour Party for increased co-operation between Labour 
and the Liberals during this period, following the 1964 general election, there were public 
utterances that co-operation might be necessary to ensure governmental stability. Liberal 
leader Jo Grimond argued that ‘if you are living on a small majority it is common sense… to 
approach the Liberals… with proposals for active co-operation’ (Butler, 1978a: 100). 
                                                   
 
14 Ware particularly refers to the 1950s. Whilst in 1951, it can be argued that the Liberals deprived Labour 
of a majority in the House of Commons, this was precisely because of their irrelevance – the votes that the 
party lost from the 1950 general election largely went to the Conservatives rather than to Labour. 
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However, these were small exceptions in an era largely dominated by the two main parties. 
The lowest combined vote share for Labour and the Conservatives was 87.4 per cent (in 1964) 
and the minimum seat share 94.7 per cent (in 1945). Although the Liberals achieved 11.2 per 
cent of the vote in 1964, this was a high compared with a low of 2.5 per cent in 1951. 
While the two-party system was largely maintained during this period, it is worth noting the 
extent to which intra-party organisation played a part. The two parties that arguably 
dominated the party system, as noted in various points throughout this chapter and thesis, are 
broad churches, to the extent that they themselves encompassed other parties or names under 
their banner. Thus, the Conservatives’ electoral results during this period include those 
standing under the Scottish Unionist banner in Scotland, as well as National Liberal 
associations, and Labour’s electoral results include those with Co-operative Party 
associations. Whilst the period 1945-1970 was broadly defined by two-party politics, it was 
not defined solely by competition. In contrast to Bogdanor’s (2004) argument that prior to 
World War One British politics was multi-party but two bloc, during the period 1945-1970 
British politics had multiple blocs, but under the banner of two parties.  
The incentives for these alliances, as in the previous periods, were multi-faceted. Both Labour 
and the Conservatives saw electoral gain through their associations with these smaller parties, 
shoring up important support in particular areas of the country. There was also an ideological 
connection. Churchill saw co-operation with the various guises of Liberals throughout the 
period both as a means of ensuring an anti-socialist pact, but also to express his distaste for 
certain wings of the Conservative parliamentary party (Charmley, 2011). For Labour, by this 
point their co-operation with the Co-operative Party had become long established, and there 
was no reason to end it. 
 
57 
 
 Table 3.2 – UK general election results since 1945 
 Conservative Labour Lib. Dem. Others Laakso/Taagepera Lab. + Con. 
Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats ENEP ENPP Vote Seats 
% N % N % N % N N N % N 
1945 39.8 213 48.3 393 9.1 12 2.7 22 2.5 2.1 87.6 94.7 
1949 43.5 299 46.1 315 9.1 9 1.3 2 2.4 2.1 89.6 98.1 
1951 48.0 321 48.8 295 2.5 6 0.7 3 2.1 2.1 96.8 98.6 
1955 49.7 345 46.4 277 2.7 6 1.1 2 2.2 2.0 96.1 98.7 
1959 49.4 365 43.8 258 5.9 6 0.9 1 2.3 2.0 93.2 98.9 
1964 43.4 304 44.1 317 11.2 9 1.3 0 2.5 2.1 87.4 98.4 
1966 41.9 253 47.9 363 8.5 12 1.7 2 2.4 2.0 89.7 97.8 
1970 46.4 330 43.0 287 7.5 6 3.1 7 2.5 2.1 89.4 97.9 
1974(F) 37.8 297 37.1 301 19.3 14 5.8 23 3.1 2.3 74.9 94.2 
1974(O) 35.8 277 39.2 319 18.3 13 6.7 26 3.2 2.3 75.0 93.7 
1979 43.9 339 37.0 269 13.8 11 5.3 16 2.9 2.1 80.9 95.6 
1983 42.4 397 27.6 209 25.4 23 4.6 21 3.5 2.1 70.0 93.2 
1987 42.3 376 30.8 229 22.6 22 4.4 23 3.3 2.2 73.1 92.9 
1992 41.9 336 34.4 271 17.8 20 5.8 24 3.0 2.3 76.3 93.3 
1997 30.7 165 43.3 419 16.8 46 9.3 29 3.2 2.1 74.0 88.5 
2001 31.7 166 40.7 412 18.3 52 9.4 29 3.3 2.2 72.4 87.7 
2005 32.4 198 35.2 355 22.1 62 10.4 31 3.6 2.5 67.6 85.6 
2010 36.1 306 29.0 258 23.0 57 11.9 29 3.7 2.6 65.1 86.8 
2015 36.9 331 30.4 232 7.9 8 24.8 79 3.9 2.5 67.3 86.6 
2017 42.4 318 40.0 262 7.4 12 10.2 58 2.8 2.5 82.4 89.2 
 
Notes: ‘Lib. Dem.’ refers to the Liberal Party for the period 1945-1979, the SDP-Liberal alliance in 1983 and 1987, and the Liberal Democrats from 
1992 onwards. ‘Others’ refers to all parties other than the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats. ‘Laakso/Taagepera’ refers to the Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979) index to measure the effective number of (electoral/parliamentary) parties in a party system. 
Sources: Electoral Commission, Webb (2000), and Quinn (2013). 
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The various pacts and agreements between the National Liberals and the Conservatives 
constituted an ‘anti-Labour’ politics that ran through the entire period (Charmley, 2011: 133). 
In the early years of this period it did not amount to a serious challenge to Labour. They were 
able to govern between 1945 and 1950 without the support of Liberal MPs, and no serious 
thought was given to Labour-Liberal co-operation at this time. A stronger case for co-
operation could be made between Labour and the Liberals following the 1964 general 
election, despite similar parliamentary arithmetic to that in 1950 (Butler, 1978a). The country 
was facing greater economic pressure in 1964, and the support of the nine Liberal MPs could 
have been very useful to the Labour whips.  
However, electoral support for Labour never fell to such a point that leader Harold Wilson felt 
it necessary to pursue any co-operation, telling his party conference in 1965: 
I hope that others will feel able to support these measures which we put 
forward… if they can we shall welcome their support. If they cannot, we 
shall have to go on without them (quoted in Butler, 1978a: 101) 
 
Discounting Wilson’s confidence for one moment, Labour’s electoral position was still 
fragile. The Conservatives made gains in local elections in 1965 which placed doubts in the 
Wilson team, and there was also the fear that the Liberals would suffer heavy defeats in any 
early election (Short, 1989). Nonetheless, Labour’s decisive victory in the 1966 general 
election suggests their public confidence was well placed. For a short period of time, British 
politics was largely characterised by two-party adversarial competition.  
 
3.2.3 1974-2010: latent moderate pluralism? 
During this period, the two-party system weakened to the extent that by 2010 it is possible to 
suggest that the ‘core’ of the party system had changed, with subsequent effects for the 
potential for co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The change in the party 
system was particularly evident in the electoral arena, but also the case to a lesser extent in the 
parliamentary arena. First, it is worth noting the events following the February 1974 general 
election up until the 1979 general election, as this provides a sudden end to the notion of two-
party politics in the electoral arena. The Liberals won 12 per cent of the vote, and despite 
winning only 14 seats, had the opportunity to entertain the idea of co-operation (in 
government or in the legislature), as neither Labour (301 seats) or the Conservatives (297 
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seats) had a majority in the House of Commons. Conservative Party leader Edward Heath 
tried to persuade the Liberals to form a coalition, but the prospect of forming a government 
which would still be a minority (311 seats, with 318 required for a majority) was not very 
appealing. Added to this, the Liberals were not as ideologically aligned with the 
Conservatives as they had been in the period before and after 1945.15 Put together, there were 
few incentives to co-operation between the two. Neither however, were there great incentives 
for Labour-Liberal co-operation. They too would not satisfy the office-seeking requirements 
for a coalition.  
In the end, Labour leader Harold Wilson repeated his strategy from 1964, governing as a 
minority for a short space of time, before going to the electorate again, this time in October 
1974. Whilst Labour won a majority, it was wafer thin, and would soon be eroded through by-
elections by the time that Wilson stepped down and James Callaghan became leader. In 
March 1977, his government faced a vote of no-confidence, and he negotiated a deal with the 
Liberal leader David Steel. David Steel spent the days before the negotiations with Callaghan 
consulting party members and activists, getting their thoughts on any arrangement; Callaghan 
did not consult the party organisation at all, only informing the Cabinet on the morning of the 
pact’s announcement (Hazell and Paun, 2009). In the pact itself, Steel gained only limited and 
vague concessions on economic matters, and struggled to gain even those on anything else. 
Labour could rely on the support of the 13 Liberal MPs on any no-confidence motion, and the 
Liberals would be consulted on economic and devolutionary matters (Charmley, 2011). A free 
parliamentary vote would also be given on reform of the voting system, although this was 
almost certain to come to nothing, given that the majority of Labour and Conservative MPs 
opposed electoral reform. For Labour, the incentives for the pact were clear. They remained in 
government, and were able to carry on without fear of a vote of no-confidence and a general 
election that they were not confident of winning. At the same time, they had those 
reassurances without giving any great ground on policy. The Liberals’ incentives were less 
clear, but the ultimate incentives seemed to be to experience government.  Ultimately, the pact 
began to splinter when the Liberals struggled in by-elections, and found that they were 
                                                   
 
15 Although not necessarily closer to an increasingly left-wing Labour Party, either.  
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burdened by the unpopularity of government without enjoying any of the spoils. Steel (1980: 
153) himself noted that this was the pact’s ‘most obvious defect… that the failure and 
unpopularity of the Labour government rubbed off on us’. The pact ended in July 1978. 
Despite the Liberals’ difficulties, it did show that pacts and parliamentary co-operation can 
last if the conditions are right and the key actors are willing (Kirkup, 2016).  
The 1979 general election brought about what would become eighteen years of majority 
Conservative government. Former Labour cabinet members Roy Jenkins, David Owen, 
Shirley Williams and Bill Rodgers left Labour to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 
1981, citing disagreements on European policy and defence, as well as the splits emerging in 
the party over internal party democracy as reasons for their departure. It is notable that what 
became known as the ‘Gang of Four’ formed their own new party as opposed to joining up 
with the Liberals. Crewe and King (1995) highlight the immediate problem that most Labour 
Party members would have simply stayed put if their only option was to join the Liberals. The 
party would eventually merge with the Liberal Party to form the Social and Liberal 
Democrats, and later the Liberal Democrats. 
Following a difficult start to the merger, the Liberal Democrats began to build pockets of 
support in certain areas of the country, winning council seats, councils and eventually going 
on to win 46 seats at the 1997 general election. During the 1990s, Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats worked together across a range of issues. A Scottish Parliament, Welsh and 
London assemblies were created as a result, alongside electoral reform for European 
Parliament elections, and the hereditary peers in the House of Lords were all but abolished. 
This was not just a product of co-operation during Labour’s time in government after 1997, 
when the Joint Consultative Committee was established, but of years of debate in opposition 
under the leadership of Robin Cook and Robert Maclennan (Sherlock and Lawson, 2007). 
Similar co-operation was to be found in Scotland with a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition in 
the Scottish Parliament, and to some extent in Wales, where Labour governed with the Liberal 
Democrats in the Welsh Assembly between 1999 and 2003. The coalition in Scotland lasted 
two terms (1999-2003 and 2003-2007), and changed the electoral system in Scottish local 
government, as well as making significant changes in health and education policy.  
This period of increased co-operation between the two parties had office-seeking and policy-
seeking incentives. First, Tony Blair, Paddy Ashdown and others in both parties saw the 
electoral opportunities that co-operation could bring. Both parties heavily benefitted from 
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tactical voting in the 1997 general election (Evans, 1999, Herrmann et al., 2015), although 
evidence that either party explicitly encouraged it is lacking. It is clear though that the party 
leaders were relaxed about it: Tony Blair told backbench Labour MP Chris Mullin that putting 
Liberal Democrat MPs onto Cabinet committees was an effort to stop them forming an anti-
Labour bloc with the Conservatives. In particular, Blair noted that ‘it makes it easier for 
Liberal voters to switch to us in the West Country, and if we lose a few votes to the Liberals 
in places like Richmond, so what’ (Mullin, 2010: 257).  
Second, both parties were also ideologically aligned to the extent that there was very little on 
which they disagreed with regard to policy (Sassoon, 1997). As will be shown in Chapter 
Four, there were strong ideological overlaps between Labour’s ‘Third Way’ and social 
liberalism. However, the electoral benefits for Labour were strongly overridden by their large 
majority: they simply did not need the Liberal Democrats. Both party leaders also faced 
strong organisational obstacles. Labour’s support was heavily dependent upon Tony Blair and 
Robin Cook to confront scepticism and outright opposition in its ranks, whilst Paddy 
Ashdown could only drag the Liberal Democrats so far from equidistance before MPs and 
party activists gave up their support (Brack, 2007). Following the replacement of Paddy 
Ashdown as leader by Charles Kennedy in 1999, the Liberal Democrats more explicitly 
opposed the Labour government.  
Co-operation at the party level never went further than encouraging tactical voting, and joint 
committees that influenced the Labour government’s policy. The Liberal Democrats assumed 
a role of ‘constructive opposition’. Leader Paddy Ashdown (1997) told his annual party 
conference that the Liberal Democrats’ relationship with Labour would comprise of a mix of 
co-operation and opposition, saying that they would provide: 
‘constructive criticism, cajoling and, if necessary, vigorously opposing where the 
government is wrong, but working with them where we agree and where it’s in the 
national interest… where we shall co-operate we will do so wholeheartedly. Where 
we must oppose, we will do so unflinchingly’.  
 
At the same annual conference, two Labour Ministers addressed Liberal Democrat fringe 
meetings (Joyce, 1999). However, the Liberal Democrats were always on the outside of 
government, and nor did co-operation ever reach any more substantial legislative 
understanding. Co-operation between the two parties was that of ‘competitive allies in a spirit 
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of vive la difference’ (Pimlott, 1996). While the two parties had many policy objectives in 
common, co-operation did not aid Labour’s office-seeking objectives, and the Liberal 
Democrats appeared to reap electoral benefit from being in opposition to Labour 
(Meadowcroft, 2000). Organisational obstacles also played a key part in Liberal Democrat 
opposition to greater co-operation with Labour (Brack, 2007). 
The various events of the period also had an effect on the party system. Table 3.2 shows a 
clear and steady increase in the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) in this period, 
averaging 2.4 in the period 1945-1970 and 3.3 in the period 1974-2010. The increase in the 
effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) is less pronounced, increasing from 2.1 in 
the period 1945-1970 to 2.3 in the period 1974-2010. The primary reason for such a 
difference between ENEP and ENPP is the distorting effect of the first-past-the-post electoral 
system (Webb, 2000), which continually rewards parties with concentrated areas of support, 
at the expense of those with more widely geographically spread support. This is highlighted 
further by the distortion between vote share and seat share enjoyed by Labour and the 
Conservatives. Between 1945 and 1970, the average distortion between the combined Labour 
and Conservative vote share and seat share was 6.7 per cent. Between 1974 and 2010, this 
rose to 18.3 per cent. 
The period 1974-2010 thus shows a changing pattern of electoral competition in Britain. In 
the February 1974 general election, the Liberal Party’s share of the vote rose to 19.3 per cent, 
culminating in a hung parliament. Although it fell back in 1979 (to 13.8 per cent), it rose 
above 20 per cent in 1983 and 1987 with the Liberal/SDP alliance, never going lower than the 
16.8 per cent the Liberal Democrats achieved in 1997. In 2010, the Liberal Democrats 
achieved 23.0 per cent of the vote. Such a rise for the Liberals, SDP and now the Liberal 
Democrats inevitably damaged the Conservatives’ and Labour’s combined vote share 
between 1974 and 2010, only once going above 80 per cent (in 1979), reaching a post-war 
low of 65.1 per cent in 2010. The changing pattern of national elections in Britain also 
affected constituency contests. Ninety three per cent of constituency contests were primarily 
fought between Labour and the Conservatives in 1964; this was just 67 per cent in 1992 
(Webb, 2000: 9). Such a shift in the pattern of competition dates very clearly back from 
February 1974. This period did not only see the advance of the Liberal (Democrats), but also 
the Scottish and Welsh Nationalists, and other small national parties such as the Green Party, 
UK Independence Party and the British National Party gained support in a small number of 
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constituencies. Between 1945 and 1970, the ‘other’ parties averaged 1.6 per cent of the vote. 
Between 1974 and 2010, this rose to 7.4 per cent.  
The period 1945-1970 was dominated by class structure and social cleavage. Since that 
period, various commentators have noted the weakening of such cleavages, alongside the 
emergence of new issues that generate new political alignments (Heath et al., 1991, Heath et 
al., 1985). Whilst class remains a key indicator of voting and political activity (Evans, 1999), 
there has been a clear decline in class voting since the first key studies into class and voting in 
the British context in 1964 (Alford, 1964). As well as a clear downward trend in class 
alignment, similar arguments can be made about partisan alignment. Whilst in 1964, 81 per 
cent of respondents in the British Election Study said they identified with either the 
Conservative or Labour parties, this was down to 62 per cent in 2010 (Denver et al., 2012: 
71). Again, while partisan alignment remains important, and more people still identify with a 
political party than do not, fewer people do and do so less strongly than before (Crewe and 
Thomson, 1999). 
Inglehart (1990) in particular has argued that attitudes towards social morality and class have 
changed to the extent that the ‘post-materialist’ cleavage is now important in determining 
political attitudes. Instead of such strong focus on class and social structures, the post-material 
cleavage focuses more on ‘quality of life’ issues, such as the environment, racial and gender 
equality, and identity politics. Together, they amount to issues not so strictly confined to two-
party competitive politics (King, 1993, Webb, 2000).  
The extent to which the post-materialist cleavage has heavily influenced voting attitudes in 
Britain is questionable. Much more attention has been paid to the notions of ‘valence issues’ 
and ‘performance politics’. Valence theory asserts that there are issues where there is little 
public disagreement, and people will support the party best able to deliver on such issues 
(Clarke et al., 2009).16 For instance, most voters want to see a prosperous economy and a 
functioning health care system. What is most important in these issues is not the particular 
ideological stances of a political party, but the competence with which they are perceived to 
                                                   
 
16 The extent to which this stands up in light of the EU-referendum or US presidential election remains to 
be seen.  
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manage the issue (Butler and Stokes, 1974). More recently, this argument has been developed 
into the notion of ‘performance politics’. This has been most strongly developed by Clarke et 
al. (2004, 2009), who suggest that voters are primarily concerned with parties’ competence 
and ability to govern, rather than ideological attitudes to particular issues.  
However prior to 2010, despite the various indicators that two-partism was declining in 
Britain, the first-past-the-post electoral system continued to manufacture legislative 
majorities. Since 1974, although the combined Labour and Conservative vote share has never 
gone higher than the 80.7 per cent won by both in 1979, the combined seat share has never 
gone lower than the 85.6 per cent won in 2005. Webb (2000: 5) argued after the 1997 general 
election that ‘there is now a two-party system in the national legislative arena, but a multi-
party system in the national electoral arena’. This point is crucial. To characterise Britain’s 
party system as ‘two-party’ during the period 1974-2010 is inaccurate. Even during this 
period, Labour had to rely on the Liberal Party support to maintain its period in office (1977-
1978), and the Conservatives relied on the support of the Ulster Unionist Party during the 
latter years of John Major’s government between 1992 and 1997.  
Were it not for the single member simple plurality electoral system, a more appropriate label 
might be Sartori’s category of ‘moderate pluralism’ (Webb, 2000: 13-15). It accounts for the 
increased number of effective electoral parties, whilst still retaining the small ideological 
distance between them based on centripetal competition (Sartori, 1976: 178-179). However, 
given that Britain still has the first-past-the-post electoral system17, Webb notes that the 
British party system instead should be labelled ‘latent moderate pluralism’, to account for the 
retention of largely two-party politics in the legislative arena. This echoes the argument that 
Britain’s party system reflects ‘suppressed multi-partism’, with suppression ensured by the 
electoral system (Smith, 1989: 162-163). Even alone in the parliamentary arena, the label of 
two-partism is inappropriate, as during this period the governing party did not change on a 
regular basis. The Conservatives won four consecutive general elections between 1979 and 
1997, and Labour won three consecutive general elections between 1997 and 2010. This low 
                                                   
 
17 The probability of electoral reform in the national parliament is small following the rejection of the 
Alternative Vote (AV) system in a referendum in 2011, but the continuing disproportionate nature of 
electoral results might bring about a debate again in the future. 
65 
 
level of competition makes two-partism an inaccurate description. The term ‘alternating 
predominance’ has been helpfully used to characterised the parliamentary arena between 1974 
and 2010 (Mair, 2009, Quinn, 2013). However in 2010, even the first-past-the-post electoral 
system could not maintain single-party majority government in Westminster – a key tenet of 
two-party electoral competition. The next section discusses the party system during this 
period, and the effect on Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. 
 
3.2.4 Post-2010 
The 2010 general election brought about the first hung parliament since February 1974, and 
the first coalition government at Westminster since 1945. The Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats formed a coalition government, dividing cabinet positions roughly reflecting the 
percentage of seats each party won in the election. This was done in spite of the electoral 
system, which still manufactured a much greater share of seats for the Conservatives and 
Labour than their share of the vote indicated. Applying coalition theory to the 2010 general 
election, the only possible coalition government that could satisfy office and policy-seeking 
priorities was the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition that eventually followed. 
However, despite such evidence to the contrary, most academic and media commentary did 
not predict a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. Polling continued to suggest that the 
Conservatives would be the largest party, but the potential for them to work together with the 
Liberal Democrats and form a coalition was deemed unlikely (see Dunleavy, 2010).  
What this period means for Labour and the Liberal Democrats, and the specific potential for 
them to co-operate in the future, is covered in depth throughout the rest of this thesis. 
However, this period also had significant consequences for the British party system. 
Considered in isolation, the 2010 general election suggests that the word ‘latent’ can be 
removed from Webb’s characterisation of the British party system in 2000 as ‘latent moderate 
pluralism’. The two-party system which has long been undermined in the electoral arena has 
now been undermined in the parliamentary arena as well. However, this is just one general 
election and parliament, and whether or not it changes the ‘core’ of the party system is yet to 
be determined.  
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The core refers to those features that have been essential for the way in 
which the system has functioned and, as a corollary, which appear most 
resistant to change. Three features belong to the idea of the core, although 
clearly there is an extent of overlap involved: 1. the party or parties that 
over a substantial period have been in leading positions; 2. those parties 
that have been especially influential for the functioning of the system; 3. 
the particular pattern of party alignments, especially the coalitional line-
up, that has evolved (Smith, 1989: 161). 
 
Looking exclusively at Smith’s (1989) definition of the core, between 1974 and 2010, the 
British party system remained largely unchanged. The Labour and Conservative parties were 
in the leading positions for the entirety of the period. While there was a change pattern of 
party alignments, such as the Lib-Lab pact in 1977-1978, and the threat to the Labour Party 
posed by the Liberal-SDP Alliance, the coalitional line-up remained unchanged. Prior to 
2010, a combination of latent moderate pluralism and alternating predominance made up the 
‘core’ of the UK party system.  
However, this is not sufficient to explain the extent to which party competition and co-
operation has altered during the period. Whilst until 2010, the Liberal Democrats did not have 
sufficient coalition potential to actually enter government, their coalition potential still gained, 
to the extent that the Labour Party actively considered coalition before the 1997 general 
election and, as noted earlier, maintained an unusually co-operative relationship with them 
afterwards with the establishment of a joint cabinet committee (Webb, 2000: 11). Alongside 
this, UKIP came second in the national elections to the European Parliament in 2009, and 
won them in 2014. The introduction of devolution to the individual nations of the UK has also 
led to smaller parties gaining legitimacy in sub-national government. The Scottish National 
Party, Plaid Cymru, Liberal Democrats, Greens and the Northern Irish parties have all now 
governed at least at a sub-national level in Britain, and gained greater control over the 
governmental process. In local government, between 1979 and 2010 the percentage of hung 
local authorities doubled (Wilson and Game, 2011).18 While this evolution might not have 
                                                   
 
18 However, this has not led to a big increase in coalitions and greater co-operation at the local level 
(Kassim et al., 2012). 
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changed the ‘core’ of the party system on its own, it has hastened the potential for its change 
in the future. 
 
To analyse the long-term nature of any party system change, Smith (see Table 3.3) suggests a 
period of three general elections to identify any trends; anything less than that, according to 
Smith, is a ‘temporary fluctuation’. Nonetheless, the 2010 general election does not represent 
a one-off election where the Labour and Conservative parties won a reduced share of the vote, 
and one or more minor parties won an increased share. Instead, the 2010 general election 
represents the culmination of declining two-party competition and increased multi-party 
competition in the electoral arena (Mair, 2009), and now realised in the parliamentary arena. 
The period 1970-2010 represents a restricted change, from the two-partism to latent moderate 
pluralism. The period 2010-2017 represents a temporary fluctuation towards a manifest 
moderate pluralism. It might not represent more than a temporary fluctuation. As Sartori 
(1976: 178-179) argues, ‘the major distinguishing trait of moderate pluralism is coalition 
government… [and] that no party generally attains the absolute majority’. Following the 2010 
parliament, the Conservatives won a majority in the 2015 general election, but it was very 
small. The 2017 general election resulted in a hung parliament.  
Irrespective of whether or not the change represents a different name on Sartori’s schema, it 
still has implications for how parties interact, and whether they look to compete or co-operate. 
Albeit sometimes with different electoral systems, the decline in two-partism has led to the 
emergence of smaller parties and, in places, coalition politics throughout sub-national and 
Table 3.3: Classification of degrees of structural change  
Degree of structural change 
 
Nature of change 
Temporary fluctuations Short-term variations in support for individual parties 
which have no long-lasting effects on the core structure 
Restricted change Little change to the leading parties and their roles in 
government and coalition formation 
General change Changing lead parties and relationship between them, 
without representing a complete change in electoral 
support and party competition. 
Transformation Replacement of most or all of the distinguishable 
features of the core structure. Change in the leading 
parties and their roles in government and coalition 
formation, e.g. a leading party going into a steep and 
seemingly irreversible decline. 
Source: Smith (1989: 166-167). 
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local government, involving a wide range of political parties across the various governing 
institutions in Britain. In part due to constitutional reforms, and in part due to changing voting 
behaviour, party interaction is different within different systems within Britain (Dunleavy, 
2005, Flinders, 2005). Scotland now has a powerful government and parliament, which has 
experienced both single-party and coalition government. Both Wales and Northern Ireland 
have devolved administrations with different patterns of party interaction to Westminster, and 
proportional representation in the European Parliament has awarded greater representation to 
smaller parties. While this is not uncommon in parliamentary democracies, it has possibly 
served to undermine the two-party structures of the Westminster system (Mair, 2009). 
Irrespective of the causal element, the 2010 general election and parliament showed that 
multi-party politics and more pluralistic interaction is possible at the national level too.  
The 2015 general election might suggest that coalition politics in Westminster was a one-off. 
The Liberal Democrats were heavily punished for their participation in coalition, and the 
Conservatives won an outright majority. However, while the Liberal Democrats were heavily 
punished, this was not a return to two-party politics. Together, the two main parties’ 
combined vote share increased by just 2.2 per cent between 2010 and 2015. Even accounting 
for the Liberal Democrat collapse, smaller parties still performed well in the 2015 general 
election. UKIP and the Greens together won over 15 per cent of the vote, and the Scottish 
National Party won 56 out of 59 seats in Scotland. As Table 3.2 shows, the effective number 
of electoral parties was at its highest point in the post-war period, and the effective number of 
parliamentary parties as broadly at the same level as it was in 2005 and 2010. As Curtice 
(2015: 40) argues, ‘the UK may have narrowly avoided having another hung Parliament this 
time around, but it could still well find itself at continued risk of one occurring in future, even 
if single-member plurality remains in place’.  
This was the case in 2017. However, it is a complicated picture. Two-party politics returned 
in some form, with the Conservative and Labour parties getting their highest collective vote 
share since the 1970 general election. Nonetheless, the Scottish National Party still 
comfortably won the most seats in Scotland, and the Liberal Democrats maintained its small 
but important presence, leaving the Conservatives reliant on the DUP to pass key legislation.  
The changing nature of the party system during this period has potentially important 
implications for how political parties interact. The long-term trend away from two-partism to 
moderate pluralism suggests that parties should contemplate co-operation more than they have 
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previously. For Labour, if governing alone is no longer possible, governing with another party 
should be preferable to not governing at all (at least in theory). As will be discussed in 
Chapter Five, Labour’s currently perilous electoral position makes this argument even 
stronger. For the Liberal Democrats, it provides an opportunity to have greater coalition 
potential than previously. However, this long-term trend is mitigated by the Liberal 
Democrats’ woeful electoral experience after the 2010 general election. Their electoral results 
throughout the 2010 parliament and eventually in the 2015 general election represent a 
warning to any smaller party about entering into co-operation with a larger party. On the other 
hand, it suggests for Labour that attacking the smaller party that you might need on side one 
day is potentially poorly considered. At the very least, this period suggests that the nature of 
competition and co-operation between political parties remains a key consideration for 
political parties and researchers alike.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the nature of competition and co-operation between political parties, 
within the context of the broader party system. While the framework set out in Chapter Two 
cannot be applied in great detail, there is some scope for comment here. 
The beginning of the 20th century brought with it a significant electoral pact between the 
Labour and Liberal parties. Both parties saw the electoral benefit of defeating the 
Conservatives, and both parties were reasonably ideologically aligned, to the extent that there 
had been ‘Lib-Lab’ MPs prior to the Labour Party’s formation. However, Labour and the 
Liberals did not enter into coalition, which demonstrates that merely using coalition theory as 
a proxy for understanding the nature of party interaction is insufficient. This period also 
shows the importance of ideology and identity, as both parties adopted different approaches to 
capitalism and the role of the state. Labour also became less reliant on the Liberals, and co-
operation became less appealing. The two parties no longer had as convergent interests. 
British politics post-1945 was largely dominated by two-party competition. This was further 
enshrined by the electoral system. Throughout the 20th century, but especially since 1974, the 
electoral system has inhibited co-operation between political parties. While voting behaviour 
would not be the same under a more proportional system, the first past the post system 
exaggerated the Labour and Conservative parties’ support to freeze out the more thinly and 
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broadly supported Liberal Party. Even if the support for minor parties continues, the electoral 
system is still a significant inhibitor on the potential for co-operation between political parties.  
Nonetheless, at various points during this period there were fragile majorities, and following 
1974 a hung parliament too. Again, despite the lack of coalitions, party co-operation was still 
a consideration. In particular, the role of parties in parliament was important. The Lib-Lab 
pact kept the Labour Party in power until 1979 and gave the Liberals access to government. 
This co-operation also showed the importance of individual agency of party elites. Callaghan 
and Steel were crucial in maintaining an otherwise difficult parliamentary agreement (Kirkup, 
2016). 
This chapter has shown that the notion of Britain as the embodiment of a two-party system is 
inaccurate. While the two-party system persisted for a period of the 20th century, away from 
then it has not existed or it has only existed in the national parliamentary arena. The hung 
parliament following the 2010 general election and the small majority for the Conservatives 
following the 2015 general election suggests that multi-party interaction is not going away 
from British politics anytime soon. The 2017 general election might present a reversal of this 
trend. However, there has been somewhat of an English-dominance to this discussion. The 
Scottish National Party continue to dominate in Scotland, albeit to a lesser extent, and the 
Conservatives are now reliant on the Democratic Unionist Party, as well as their own divided 
parliamentary party. Following the quite dramatic changes in party support during the 2017 
general election campaign, it is too early to reach authoritative conclusions about the long-
term impact on the party system. 
More broadly, this chapter has sought to show the necessity of a broader understanding of 
party co-operation. As Quinn (2013: 398) argues:  
Classifications of party systems are more useful when they focus on the 
structure, direction and intensity of competition rather than numbers of 
parties. Overemphasis on the number of parties in Britain has distracted 
attention from the more important story of weaker major-party 
competition in recent decades. 
 
The nature of a party system is important to understand the broader interaction between 
political parties. In a perfect two-party system, there is every incentive to compete and little 
incentive to co-operate. The changing of the UK party system towards latent moderate 
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pluralism, and decreasingly latent at that, suggests that there are more reasons for parties to 
consider co-operation alongside competition. Parties are not necessarily closed off to this 
idea: the dominance of the Conservatives after 1979 led Labour to question many of the 
centralised, winner-takes-all elements of the British political system (Webb, 2000). While 
single majority governments have been the norm since 1945, the main reason for this has been 
the first past the post electoral system, which has ensured continued single party governance 
in Westminster. As Bardi and Mair (2008: 153) argue, ‘it is the sheer embeddedness of the 
British ‘two-party system’ which facilitates the long-term survival of two particular parties’. 
However, even the electoral system is now struggling to maintain single-party government in 
British politics. 
This chapter has shown that the broader nature of party interaction is different now to the 
classic period of two-partism, 1945 to 1970. This does not mean that the ground is 
immediately fertile for greater co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The 
substantive chapters in the rest of this thesis demonstrate the many different incentives and 
obstacles that both parties must consider.   
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Chapter 4: Ideology, policy and its effect on Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
operation 
 
At various points in their histories, the Labour and Liberal (Democrat) parties have been 
described as having broadly compatible ideological goals and commitments (Clarke, 1978, 
Leaman, 1998, Marquand, 1991), often under the label of ‘progressivism’ (Joyce, 1999). Such 
assertions continue to be made, with recent analyses of both parties reflecting that Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats have more ideological and policy incentives to co-operate than 
compete (Diamond and Kenny, 2012, Sloman, 2014). However, aspects of both parties’ 
ideologies remain further apart than certain accounts suggest, and the idea that both parties 
share ideology and policy programmes that will necessarily facilitate co-operation is too 
simplistic. This chapter assesses the nature of ideology and policy in each party, and to what 
extent they provide incentives and obstacles to co-operation between Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats. 
How ideological and policy considerations affect the potential for co-operation between 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats reflects the trade-offs between ‘policy, office and votes’ 
highlighted by Muller and Strøm (1999). Axelrod (1970) and De Swaan’s (1970) stress the 
importance of policy proximity between political parties for co-operation to take place. 
Similarly, theories of party competition stress the incentives for political parties to accurately 
and competently represent their voters’ policy preferences (Butler and Stokes, 1974, Clarke et 
al., 2009, Whiteley et al., 2013). However, this does not necessarily indicate that ideology and 
policy matter as much as other incentives and obstacles to co-operation. Lees et al. (2010) 
argue that ideological convergence might be a necessary but not sufficient incentive for co-
operation, as other more pressing problems need to be overcome. Dunphy and Bale (2011) 
highlight the difficulties for smaller parties in delivering policies when co-operating with 
others. However, it often remains the only credible option open to smaller parties to achieve 
ideology or policy influence in the first place.  
This chapter explores these issues in the context of Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The 
first section focuses on the ideological compatibility between each party through a historical 
analysis of each party’s ideology. The second section analyses the policy compatibility of 
each party, examined within the spatial and valence structures of party competition. This is 
done through qualitative analysis of manifestos, policy documents and speeches for the 2015 
73 
 
general election campaign, and quantitative analysis of manifesto data coded by the Manifesto 
Project on Political Representation (MARPOR) to provide a longer term perspective. The 
third section updates this to provide a contemporary analysis of each party’s policy platform 
following the 2015 general election. The chapter argues that the two parties share many 
common ideological principles and objectives, and when this is translated into policy, there 
are few obstacles to co-operation. However, the sheer lack of co-operation between the two 
parties over time and the continued hostility to each other suggests that ideological and policy 
factors ultimately need to be considered alongside other more important incentives and 
obstacles to co-operation. 
 
4.1 Ideology, social democracy and liberalism 
Political parties are not solely electoral competitors: however loosely held, parties are bound 
together by common ideas and principles (Shaw, 2007). A commonly used19 definition of 
ideology is as follows:  
An ideology is a set of ideas by which… [people] posit, explain and 
justify the ends and means of organized social action, irrespective of 
whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given 
social order (Seliger, 1976: 14). 
 
This forms a useful starting point, and permits study of the broader ideologies of liberalism, 
socialism and conservatism. Alexander (2015: 982) similarly argues that an ideology is ‘a 
view about what ought to be thought, said and done about politics’. Freeden (1996: 140) 
defines ideologies as ‘combinations of political concepts’. Griffiths (2014: 24-29) adds that 
ideologies are a series of ‘concepts, values, aspirations and even aversions’. Ideologies can 
thus encompass a party’s ideas, policies and attitudes (Webb, 2000). Together, they 
demonstrate the way ideology helps us understand political parties’ approaches to the 
individual, society and the state. This chapter analyses Labour and the Liberal Democrats’ 
ideologies in this context. How do they prioritise the individual and the collective? How are 
                                                   
 
19 See Alexander (2015) and Freeden (1996).  
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liberty, fraternity and equality understood in both parties? How do they conceive of the state 
and market? How do they understand Britain in relation to other recent phenomenon, such as 
the environment and the European Union? 
As it is central to this chapter’s arguments, it is important to set out a definition of the 
ideologies primarily associated with each party. Debates surrounding the ideological 
trajectory of the Labour Party are largely intertwined with social democracy, despite an often 
complicated relationship between the two (Diamond and Kenny, 2012). While all ideologies 
are fluid (Griffiths, 2014), this is especially true of social democracy, which stands as one of 
the most reappraised ideologies in British politics (Randall and Sloam, 2009).20 Social 
democracy combines elements of socialism and liberalism, and looks to ‘reconcile socialism 
with liberal politics and capitalist society’ (Padgett and Paterson, 1991: 1-2). Randall and 
Sloam (2009: 94) similarly argue that social democracy is a ‘hybrid ideological tradition 
which draws upon both socialism and liberalism. It is pragmatic… views human nature in 
positive terms, with individuals ultimately being virtuous, moral, fraternal and co-operative’.  
From the very outset the Labour Party was committed to social change implemented through 
reform initiated within parliament (Joyce, 1999, Wickham-Jones, 1996).  
In particular, unlike other socialist counterparts in western democracies the British labour 
movement in the early 20th century was not dominated by class struggle (Shaw, 1994). For 
many in the Labour Party, democracy had changed the rules of class struggle identified by 
Marxist thought (Bernstein, 1961, Sassoon, 1999). Crosland (1956) argued that economic 
prosperity, state power and trade union had challenged and ameliorated the abuses that 
capitalism generated, and socialism should recognise this. Social democracy in Britain thus 
lies firmly rooted in the reformist tradition of socialism, with an aim to offer universal health 
and education coverage, access to housing, and welfare to care for those deemed in need. All 
should be funded through general taxation to promote a more equal society.  
                                                   
 
20 Stedman-Jones (1983: 243) similarly points out that Labour’s ideological history is best understood in 
terms of a ‘number of discontinuous conjunctures which enabled it to achieve particular and specific forms 
of success at rather widely separated points of time, rather than as a continuous evolutionary movement’.  
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British social democracy has long been influenced by the ‘Fabian’ tradition, geared heavily 
towards government planning, public ownership, ethical socialism and organised labour with 
its roots in the trade union movement (Foote, 1997, Jones, 1996). While Labour has never 
sought the radical overhaul of capitalism in the same way that other socialist traditions might, 
they have still been willing to promote equality at the expense of certain individual economic 
freedoms. Indeed, the social democratic argument is that it is only in a more equal society that 
individual freedom is worth having, in order to maximise the life chances and individual 
autonomy of as many people as possible (Crosland, 1956).   
As such, social democracy promotes a positive and collective form of freedom and an 
evolutionary form of social change and equality. In particular, equality has formed the core of 
social democracy. Crick (1984: 158) argues that ‘equality is the value basic to any imaginable 
or feasible kind of socialism’, and the same has generally applied to British social democracy 
(Shaw, 2007). The broader concept of equality is supported universally across Labour’s social 
democratic tradition: ‘this belief in social equality, which has been the strongest ethical 
inspiration of virtually every socialist doctrine, still remains the most characteristic feature of 
socialist thought today’ (Crosland, 1956: 87). More recently, Tony Blair (2000) told Labour 
Party conference that ‘we know the danger that in a changing world new forms of inequality 
and social exclusion are created… our central belief [is] that every single child deserves an 
equal chance’. Prior to the 2015 general election, in a speech referencing ‘equal’, ‘equality’ or 
‘inequality’ 31 times, Ed Miliband (2014) said, ‘The principle of equality: an ethical view 
about the equal worth of every citizen. This is the foundation of my commitment to equality 
too. Whoever you are, wherever you come from, you are of equal worth’. 
The Liberal Democrats are often understood as split between two faces of liberalism: social 
liberalism and economic liberalism (Hickson, 2009). In this argument, classical liberals 
articulated ideas of negative freedom: liberalism is not about what the state can do for people, 
but how the state should be deliberately limited in its activity and reach. This debate was 
particularly pressing at the turn of the twentieth century, when liberals promoted free trade 
and property rights at the expense of greater state spending, particularly state spending on the 
military. Individual liberty was paramount. Social liberals, or ‘New Liberals’ (Green, 1881, 
Hobhouse, 1911), supported more positive interpretations of freedom: people are only free if 
they are in a position to prosper. Indeed, Hobhouse (1911: 71) defended the state as not only 
not in conflict ‘with the true principle of personal liberty, but [as] necessary to its effective 
realisation’. The social liberals were responding to the inequality that was resulting from the 
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transformation of the economy following the industrial revolution. They argued that 
liberalism could still provide the economic benefits of individual freedom and rights while 
also addressing the inequality that it generated.  
So while liberals do not neglect equality, they place a different emphasis on equality from 
social democracy. British liberalism opposes vast inequality in that it undermines liberty if 
society promotes extreme wealth and poverty. However, freedom for the liberal must also 
include the freedom to fail, and egalitarian principles contradict this fundamental liberal 
principle (Rasmussen, 1965). A good example is of the Liberal William Beveridge’s 
distinction between a welfare state and a welfare society. Indeed, he was unhappy that some 
of his welfare proposals were implemented primarily by the state and not by voluntary 
agencies. Beveridge would go on to strongly criticise the 1945 Labour government for their 
state-driven agenda for welfare (Harrop, 2012).  
The two ideological strands of liberalism that developed at the turn of the twentieth century 
continue to sit alongside each other in the Liberal Democrats today. In 2004, some on the 
supposed economically liberal wing of the Liberal Democrats published The Orange Book: 
reclaiming liberalism (Laws and Marshall, 2004). In 2007, the social liberals responded with 
Reinventing the State (Brack et al., 2007). The debate is an important one and is addressed 
throughout this chapter, but the distinctions between economic and social liberalism within 
the party today can often be overstated. Indeed, not many members of the Liberal Democrats 
would eschew the ‘social liberal’ tag. This point was addressed particularly by former Liberal 
Democrat MP David Howarth (2007), in a chapter published in Reinventing the State. In it, he 
argues that those who might be defined as classically or economically liberal do not disagree 
about the ends of liberalism. Social liberalism remains the end goal of those involved with 
The Orange Book.21 As an example, take David Laws, joint editor of The Orange Book, and 
former Liberal Democrat MP and Chief Secretary to the Treasury. Laws is often regarded as 
the ultimate economic liberal in the Liberal Democrats, to the extent that in 2012 he felt the 
need to echo Hayek’s (1960) The Constitution of Liberty postscript: ‘why I am not a 
                                                   
 
21 Indeed, some of the writers in The Orange Book also wrote chapters for Reinventing the State, including 
former Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg. 
77 
 
conservative’, and stress that he was a not a Tory, but a Liberal (Chorley, 2012). Yet Laws 
was and remains one of the strongest supporters of state intervention in early years education, 
calling for money to be spent particularly in disadvantaged areas, and in government led the 
introduction of free school meals for all children. 
The lack of division between social and economic liberals in the party today is further 
highlighted by the number of issues that do not fit into the debate. Social and economic 
liberals largely agreed on individual freedoms such as civil liberties and sexual minority 
rights, or broader issues such as the environment, the European Union or constitutional 
reform. The ends of liberals are not so much the issue. As Howarth argues, ‘the political goals 
of liberalism are always more important than any particular method of achieving them’ 
(Howarth, 2007). Where means matter is the extent to which the state plays a role in 
achieving the liberal’s objectives. In this, social liberals take a more positive view of the state 
than economic liberals, but both are still more suspicious of the state than social democrats.   
There are areas of compatibility between each party’s ideologies. Social democracy embodies 
elements both of socialism and liberalism, and social liberalism incorporates aspects of social 
democracy through its defence of the state and equality. Nonetheless, there remain 
differences: while liberalism has generally had some sense of common good, its primary 
focus has been on individual liberty, freedom, human rationality and on limiting collectivism 
(Freeden, 1999). Social democracy, on the other hand, has largely focused on more collective 
prescriptions for individuals and societies. Where it has focused on individuals, it has done so 
in the context of their social environment. At the very least, there is a tension between the two 
ideologies. 
 
4.1.1 Ideological traditions 
It is clear so far that both parties’ ideologies are part of ideological traditions. The idea of 
tradition denotes the ‘background against which individuals come to adopt an initial web of 
beliefs’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010: 78). In other words, traditions are important to consider 
when analysing a party’s ideology. As Cronin (2004: 7) argues, parties have ‘encompassing 
beliefs and cultures within which specific politics and strategic emphases took shape and 
which provided the overall framework for policy and strategy’. Shaw’s (2007) detailed 
analysis of Labour’s social democracy focuses on the social democratic ‘tradition’. Randall 
(2003: 20) argues that ‘it is among the institutions, mechanisms, processes and actors of the 
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party that ideological changes are initiated, alternatives considered, policy statements drafted, 
amended and voted upon’.  
Much of both party’s history and traditions are rooted in competitive and adversarial politics. 
For example, former Liberal leader Jo Grimond’s ultimate objective was not co-operation but 
competition. As he stated in 1958: 
The long-term objective is clear: to replace the Labour Party as the 
progressive wing of politics in this country: to sweep in not only Liberals, 
but Liberal-Socialists and Liberal-Tories. It is certain that in the sixties a 
fresh tide will flow with new ideas… I say to you that has got to be a 
Liberal tide (quote cited from Jones, 2011: 20).  
 
The same commitment to tribal unity appeared in Wilson too. For all his attributes as a 
modernising reformer when Prime Minister, he would not have threatened party unity to co-
operate with the Liberal Party (Dutton, 2006). Indeed, at many points throughout the 20th 
century, Labour and the various iterations of the Liberal Democrats have had sufficiently 
similar ideological positions to incentivise co-operation, yet it has not happened. It has yet to 
be seen with Labour and the Liberal Democrats that a shared ideological or policy platform 
can overcome the majoritarian, competitive and adversarial system within which they or their 
predecessors have operated for over one hundred years. 
This suggests other incentives and obstacles to co-operation, which will be considered later in 
this thesis, but also highlights the importance of context and tradition when considering 
ideology. Indeed, former Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown thought that tribalism was 
the first obstacle to co-operation. Highlighting three phases of Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
operation, he argued that phase one would see ‘the climate of hostility and tribalism’ between 
the two parties replaced by ‘goodwill and the presumption of co-operation’ (Ashdown, 2001: 
297). Phases two and three would see co-operation in government and some form of 
institutional realignment. They never really got past phase one.  
Marquand (1991) argues that this dimension of Labour’s tradition - its tribalism - has 
prevented it from engaging with other parties and progressive co-operation. In particular, he 
argues that Labour, unlike other social democratic parties in Europe, has been dominated by 
trade unionism in a manner that prevents anything other than tribal competitiveness. 
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Above all, its [Labour’s] ethos – the symbols, rituals, shared memories 
and unwritten understandings, which have shaped the life of the party and 
given it its unmistakable identity – had been saturated with the ethos of 
trade unionism… it has helped to shape the structure of British politics 
and the assumptions of British politicians... (Marquand, 1991: 17) 
 
He makes this point in The Progressive Dilemma, as part of a broader argument that Labour 
and Britain’s 20th century would have been better served by adopting a blended ideology of 
social democracy and New Liberalism. This point is heavily criticised by Fielding and 
McHugh (2003: 146), who argue that even Marquand’s ‘social democratic perspective is just 
like any other: self-interested, partial and subject to variation over time’. For them, to present 
a case for Labour as a progressive party unfettered by tribalism is to argue for a history as 
hoped rather than a history as seen.  
To what extent has Labour embodied this non-liberal social democratic history more recently? 
Shaw (2007) analyses whether or not New Labour embodied the ‘soul’ of the Labour 
tradition. In doing so, he identified two dimensions of Labourite ideology: redistributive 
social democracy and ethical socialism. The first is characterised by equality and collectivism, 
and the second by fellowship and the public service ethos. The second dimension in particular 
is a separate tradition from the Liberal Democrats. Shaw concludes that Labour, to some 
extent, disowned the second characterisation, and tentatively argues that New Labour 
comprise both social democracy and social liberalism. Hennessey (2004, quoted in Shaw, 
2007) argues that ‘when it comes to fraternity, New Labour is pretty well tone deaf’.  
As Kitschelt (1994: 299) argues, in times of electoral decline social democratic parties ‘need 
to identify a new balance between liberty, equality and community’. The early period of the 
New Labour government did this; it is less clear that Labour, New or otherwise, has since. 
Beech and Hickson (2014) rightly define New Labour as the ‘politics of paradox’. Between 
1997 and 2010, New Labour preserved and promoted individual rights in a manner 
compatible with liberalism, yet also often prioritised security over liberty. Both the Blair and 
Brown governments increased the surveillance powers of the state. New Labour was also 
actively communitarian, working with different faith communities, highlighting patriotic 
values and promoting responsibilities alongside rights in relation to welfare, law and order 
and the state. ‘New Labour contained elements that were simultaneously metropolitan liberal 
and communitarian; patriotic and internationalist; Fabian and devolutionist; followers of 
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economic liberalism in the financial sector and tax-and-spend social democrats’ (Beech and 
Hickson, 2014: 84). 
Of course, the Liberal Democrats are part of an ideological tradition too. Despite being 
officially constituted in 1988, the party is rooted in the foundations of the British political 
system. Steed (1996: 79) argues that the Liberal Democrats’ principles are rooted in the 
‘intertwined traditions of social liberalism and social democracy’, with a commitment to 
decentralisation of power and individual rights and liberties. However, it is doubtful that the 
Liberal Democrats are as wedded to tribal loyalties as Labour. Dutton (2006) argues that 
Grimond and Ashdown as Liberal leaders have underestimated the tribalism that continues to 
distance Britain’s political parties. For every senior figure in the Labour Party that was open 
to co-operation there were others much more hostile.  
Former Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg (2015a) considers this a pressing question for 
Britain’s party system.  
Is it possible to have the kind of politics that I believe in of reason, of 
pluralism, of give and take in a system which discriminates very, very 
heavily against those kinds of compromises, where every compromise is 
shouted down as a betrayal?  
 
The evidence for smaller parties, comparatively or in Britain, suggests that it is not (Duch et 
al., 2015, Dunphy and Bale, 2011, Johnson and Middleton, 2016). Ideologically, it highlights 
what many Labour supporters and former Liberal Democrat supporters see as a ‘betrayal’ by 
the Liberal Democrats when they joined the Conservatives in coalition between 2010 and 
2015 (Cutts and Russell, 2015).  
Marquand (1991: 235) argued that the Liberal Democrats ‘are more open to new currents of 
thought and feelings’ and that is applicable today. For instance, Labour are extremely unlikely 
to co-operate in any sustained fashion with the Conservatives.22 As will be shown later in this 
chapter, the two parties do not have such huge differences to policy, but instead their 
                                                   
 
22 Save for referendum campaigns when they are on the same side, such as in the Scottish independence 
referendum or, to some extent, the campaign to remain in the European Union. 
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ideologies and histories are rooted in different ideas and approaches to politics to the extent 
that co-operation between the two would be almost unthinkable for any Labour politician. As 
one Labour MP tweeted last year, ‘you Tories never understand how much we hate you. 
Many Labour MPs motivated to get into politics to stop you’ (Perkins, 2015). The two 
parties’ different approaches to party interaction reflect different ideologies, and present an 
obstacle to co-operation between the two. The electoral consequences of this ‘temporary 
progressivism’ are discussed elsewhere in this thesis, but it has consequences for ideological 
and policy agreement too. It suggests that while ideological and policy convergence is 
important, and necessary for co-operation to take place, it is context dependent.  
Diamond and Kenny (2012: 11) argue that ‘progressive politics has advanced most 
powerfully when liberalism and labourism have been in fruitful dialogue’, and they may be 
right, but this is because it was appropriate for fruitful dialogue at that moment in time. In 
short, the argument that progressivism is temporary and tribalism is eternal has yet to be 
defeated in the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. Robinson (2012: 28-29) rightly argues 
that Labour-Liberal co-operation in the 1970s was based on attempts to moderate the 
ideological divide in British politics rather than unite shared histories in both parties. It may 
be the case that co-operation based on practical responses to problems, such as ideological 
divide or perceived electoral necessity, might be manageable but that more entrenched co-
operation based on shared principles and ideologies is harder to achieve and sustain.  
 
4.2 Ideological dimensions since 1945 
Having established broad definitions and characteristics of the main ideologies associated 
with Labour and the Liberal Democrats, we can try and map out where each party has located 
themselves on ideological dimensions over time. This is done using data from the Manifesto 
Project on Political Representation (MARPOR) (formerly known as the Comparative 
Manifestos Project). The MARPOR dataset consists of political documents, usually 
manifestos, coded by placing ‘quasi-sentences’ into 56 attitude categories. The number of 
sentences in each category is then reported in percentage form. As such, the MARPOR 
dataset uses measures of salience to generate a spatial measure, based on the idea that the 
more a party emphasises a particular position in its manifesto, the more we can place that 
party at a particular place on a scale (Lowe et al., 2011). The MARPOR dataset thus allows us 
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to analyse where parties place themselves on policy issues or ideological dimensions over 
time.  
The MARPOR group develop their own ‘RILE’ (left/right) scale based on the percentages of 
quasi-sentences in each category, but criticism has been made of their scaling methods. In 
particular, seemingly irrelevant sentences in a manifesto can heavily change the value 
assigned to a party’s position (Lowe et al., 2011, Prosser, 2014). This chapter uses a two-
dimensional scale developed by Prosser (2014), which maps policy positions on a comparable 
economic left-right scale and a social liberal-conservative scale using a uniform methodology. 
This is argued to be preferable to self-selecting policy scales, to allow comparison with 
different contexts and times as appropriate. The categories included in each dimension are 
shown in the Appendix. This builds on methodological work by Lowe et al. (2011), and is 
different from the MARPOR scales in two ways. First, the scales are constructed based on the 
number of sentences, not the percentages. This reduces measurement problems when 
comparing manifestos of radically varying lengths. Second, the scales are initially constructed 
using a logit-scaling method. This still uses the salience method to position parties on a scale, 
but argues that repeated emphasis of a position reduces its impact. For example, if a party had 
zero sentences in favour of nationalisation and then had one sentence in favour, this is argued 
to be a bigger change than if a party had ninety nine sentences in favour of nationalisation and 
then had one hundred in favour. The increase is one sentence in both cases, but the logit-
scaling method credits less emphasis to the latter increase. In short, the marginal effect of one 
more sentence decreases depending on the amount that has already been said on the issue 
(Lowe et al., 2011: 130). In practice, this means that the logit-scaling method often leads to 
more centrally distributed policy scales, rather than more polarised scales often generated by 
the additive scales used by Kim and Fording (1998), and others. 
From this point, the same additive scale is used as the MARPOR RILE scale: the total number 
of right quasi-sentences minus the total number of left quasi-sentences; or the total number of 
conservative quasi-sentences minus the total number of liberal quasi-sentences.23 The scales 
                                                   
 
23 Finally, 0.5 is also added to each scale. This is because the log of 0 is undefined, and so any scale with 0 
quasi-sentences would be incalculable. It is a small number, and only makes minimal changes to any scale. 
83 
 
cannot eliminate coding error, and this should be taken into account when interpreting results. 
The ‘score’ that is produced for each manifesto is meaningful only when compared to others 
‘scores’ – zero should not be taken as any measure of centrist position. Instead, the scale 
provides a means of comparison between cases and time: for the left/right scale, the higher the 
score, the more right-wing a manifesto scores; for the liberal/conservative scale, the higher the 
score, the more conservative a manifesto scores.  
Figure 4.1 presents the ideological changes in the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat 
parties’ economic position since 1945.24 The more that economically right-wing themes 
outnumber left-wing themes, the more positive the manifesto score, and the further 
economically right wing the party is deemed to be. Between 1945 and 1966, Labour are to the 
left of the Conservatives, although they are further part in elections such as 1950 and 1964 
and closer in elections such as 1955 and 1966. In 1970, the two parties adopt very similar 
overall positions, before Labour veered left in the February 1974 general election, when Tony 
Benn played a key role in putting together Labour’s manifesto. Following that period, a larger 
gulf appears between the two parties, with Labour staying left in the 1980s and early 1990s 
and the Conservatives staying right, before the two parties converged in 1997, and stayed 
reasonably similar distances from each other between then and 2015. This is a pattern largely 
in agreement with non-manifesto analysis of each party’s ideological change during these 
periods: Labour and Conservatives were two parties on either sides of the a mixed economy 
‘consensus’ until 1979, followed by Thatcherite and Labour disagreements in the 1980s, and 
then Labour’s move back to the centre in the 1990s (Webb, 2000).  
  
                                                   
 
24 Until 2015. Data from the 2017 manifestos is not yet available.  
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Figure 4.1: Economic left-right position of Labour, Liberal Democrats and 
the Conservatives, 1945-2015 
 
Note: ‘Lib. Dem.’ refers to the Liberal Party from 1945-1987 and the Liberal Democrats 
from 1992-2015. The SDP are not included in analysis here.  
 
The long-term Liberal Democrat (and Liberal Party before it) trend is gradually leftwards 
between 1945 and 2015. During the 1950s, the Liberals occupied a position economically to 
the right of the Conservatives. Since then however, they have generally occupied a space 
between Labour and the Conservatives, and since 1992 they have been much closer to Labour 
than the Conservatives. There is one exception: in 2010, the Liberal Democrats were closer 
towards the Conservatives, and this supports arguments that the Liberal Democrats shifted 
rightward between 1997 and 2010 (Bale, 2011b, Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011).  
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Figure 4.2: Social liberal/conservative position of Labour, Liberal Democrats 
and the Conservatives, 1945-2015 
 
Note: ‘Lib. Dem.’ refers to the Liberal Party from 1945-1987 and the Liberal Democrats 
from 1992-2015. The SDP are not included in analysis here.  
 
Figure 4.2 presents the ideological changes in the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat 
parties’ social position since 1945. Here, there are a lot more stark changes between election 
years. In part, this may be due to greater changing contexts relating to home affairs and 
human rights, and subsequent effects on party policy positions. For the most part, Labour 
adopts a more socially liberal approach than the Conservatives, but for significant periods the 
two parties are much closer together. Particularly, the years in which Labour adopts more 
socially conservative positions coincides with periods when they are in government (see 
1964-1966 and 1997-2010, although see October 1974 as an exception to this argument). The 
Liberal and Liberal Democrats’ position also changes starkly over time, but between 1987 and 
2010 the two parties adopt reasonably similar overall positions. However, in 2015 the Liberal 
Democrats adopt comfortably the most liberal position.  
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On both scales, throughout the last seventy years, Labour and the Liberal Democrats have 
been closer to each other, and this is particularly the case since the 1970s. Again, this accords 
with analysis of the Labour and Liberal/Liberal Democrat parties during this period. During 
the late 1970s, the Lib-Lab pact brought together the two parties. During the 1980s the two 
parties (with the Liberals joining with the SDP) competed to be the main challenger to the 
Conservatives, and in the 1990s Paddy Ashdown publicly aligned the Liberal Democrats 
closer to Labour than the Conservatives.  
However, the Liberal Democrats are not so distant from the Conservatives at various points in 
this period too. Prior to 1970, the Liberals were economically closer to the Conservatives than 
to Labour, supporting efforts by Churchill and others to secure an anti-socialist alliance. Even 
after then, it is only between 1997 and 2005 that the Liberal Democrats are economically both 
close to Labour and distant from the Conservatives. Socially, the Liberal Democrats are quite 
often apart from both parties, not just the Conservatives. While there is a large gulf between 
the social positions of the Conservatives and Liberals/Liberal Democrats in the late 1980s and 
1990s, the current trend in Conservative positioning seems to be increasingly liberal. Indeed, 
the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats had very few disagreements on social issues during 
their period in coalition between 2010 and 2015, save for disagreements on the Draft 
Communications Data bill (aka the Snooper’s Charter). The trends in ideological positions 
since 1945 provide few obstacles to Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation, but they do not 
appear to continually obstruct Conservative-Liberal Democrat co-operation, either.  
 
4.3 Policy outcomes and debates 
The previous section shows that there are considerable overlaps between Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats’ ideology and policy platforms. However, while manifesto scales provide a 
very useful means of historical and contemporary comparison, they cannot give a detailed 
insight into party’s policy positions. They provide a snapshot of the official ideas presented 
by a party to the public. However, such a snapshot does not adequately cover the debates and 
potential disagreements within and across parties over a period of time. This section analyses 
these in more detail. Labour’s last period in government between 1997 and 2010 dictates 
much of its current ideological debate. Prior to it, Labour’s modernisation under Neil Kinnock 
and John Smith in the 1980s and 1990s and continued further by Tony Blair took Labour 
away from the left towards a more New Liberal outlook. In a speech to the Fabian Society in 
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1995, he argued that ‘the ethical basis of socialism… based on a moral assertion that 
individuals are interdependent… is the only one that has stood the test of time’ (Blair, 1995: 
12). The Liberal Democrats were now a single entity following the merger of the SDP and 
Liberal Party in 1988. Accordingly, understanding both parties ideological character, and 
subsequently any incentives or obstacles to co-operation, requires consideration of each 
party’s policy positions within different contexts. This section looks at the period 1997-2010, 
and subsequent sections will consider 2010-2015, and the current situation following the 2015 
general election.  
 
4.3.1 1997-2010 
While ‘New’ Labour maintained an active and social democratic welfare state (Giddens, 
1998), they were operating in a stronger market-driven policy environment than any other 
Labour government (Gamble, 2009). Heffernan (2001) argues that the 1997 Labour 
government predominantly stayed in this Thatcherite paradigm. However, Randall and Sloam 
(2009) defend New Labour as continuing the British social democratic tradition, Bevir (2005: 
63) argues that New Labour was social democratic in its ‘ideals of social justice, citizenship 
and community’, and Freeden (1999) labels New Labour’s ideology as something between 
liberalism, socialism and conservatism. While the New Labour governments promoted the 
market as the primary means of economic growth, this was done partially to establish a 
reputation for economic prudence, and once this was established record amounts were spent 
on education and health.   
Blair’s reification of socialism (Bevir, 2000) evoked the Hobhouse and Green brand of New 
Liberalism, seeking to distribute resources fairly within capitalism (Holmes, 2007, Marquand, 
1997). Indeed, his speech on the 50th anniversary of the 1945 Labour government is notable 
for its praise of Liberals and liberalism alike (Blair, 1995). As he told the Labour Party 
Conference following the 1997 general election, ‘my heroes aren’t just Ernie Bevin, Nye 
Bevan and Attlee. They are also Keynes, Beveridge, Lloyd George’ (Blair, 1997). The 
following year, he argued that there was ‘no necessary conflict’ between a market economy 
and social justice, and that Labour and the Liberal Democrats should work together to unite 
‘the great streams of left-of-centre thought – democratic socialism and liberalism – whose 
divorce this century did so much to weaken progressive politics across the West’ (Blair, 1998: 
1). Liberal Democrat opposition to the original ideas of the third way espoused by Blair was 
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minimal (Jones, 2011). Particularly during the early years of the New Labour era, the two 
parties shared much in common. Marr (1998: 21) proclaimed that New Labour’s Third Way 
was the ‘revival of liberalism inside a Labour body’. Beer (2001) argues that New Labour (in 
its first term, at least) brought together the Labour Party and liberalism. Certainly during the 
New Labour period, much of the party’s thought was congruent with the Liberal Democrats. 
As Webb (2000: 103) argues, at the beginning of New Labour’s period in office there was 
little doubt ‘that New Labour and the Liberal Democrats share virtually identical positions on 
things like the appropriate roles of state and market, the need for state action… and so on’.  
However, this was only the case during the early years of New Labour. For many within the 
Liberal Democrats, the alignment with Labour became too strong and the party was in danger 
of losing its identity as a consequence (Meadowcroft, 2000). This was put into sharper focus 
following the release of The Orange Book, which promoted a more continental liberal 
individualist approach (Laws and Marshall, 2004). As shown above, while the book is not as 
controversial a challenge to Liberal Democrat thought as has been claimed, the key point here 
is that it makes a much more sustained attack on social democracy and social liberalism than 
it does conservatism and economic liberalism (Sanderson-Nash, 2012). Laws later suggested 
the book was an attempt to ‘make clear the distinction between a Labour philosophy and set 
of aspirations and a Labour one’ (Jones, 2011: 195). The publication coincided with a distinct 
hardening of attitudes towards the Labour government (Russell et al., 2007), and further 
publications followed which suggested that the contemporary liberalism that the Liberal 
Democrats should defend had much more in common with conservatism than had previously 
been argued by the party (see Margo, 2007, Astle and Bell, 2008).  
This is not to suggest that the publication of The Orange Book now makes the Liberal 
Democrats a classically liberal party. Indeed, some of the chief writers in The Orange Book 
have argued that ‘freedom is curbed by poverty and inherited disadvantage, which is why 
liberals have been concerned about these issues for more than a century’ (Astle et al., 2006: 
144). Nonetheless, the publication of The Orange Book and the change in ideological 
direction of the Liberal Democrats has had important negative implications for co-operation 
with Labour (Beech and Hickson, 2014). The greater space for economically liberal ideas in 
the Liberal Democrats, alongside the professionalisation of the policy-making process, helped 
to facilitate positive coalition talks with the Conservatives following the 2010 general election 
(Bale, 2011b, Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011). Many of the writers in The Orange Book 
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served as ministers in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, and some of the broader 
ideas noted in the book were realised in policy terms by that government.  
As New Labour went on, the two parties increasingly disagreed on areas of policy (Cowley 
and Stuart, 2009), in a fashion that arguably exposed differing ideological viewpoints. In 
particular, the two parties appeared to have different views of the individual, the state and 
society. One example that sets out the difference is in Berlin’s conception of liberty and 
freedom. As Berlin (1969: 31) notes: 
Freedom… entails not simply the absence of frustration… but the absence 
of obstacles to possible choices and activities… such freedom ultimately 
depends not on whether I wish to walk at all, or how far, but how many 
doors are open, how open they are [and] upon their relative importance in 
my life. 
 
The approach to the state marks a key area where Labour and the Liberal Democrats’ 
ideologies have different roots. No serious member of either party has ever endorsed a 
completely owned economy, nor on the other hand an entirely minimal state. Instead, it is a 
matter of degree, and the degrees matter. Grayson (2007: 37) argues of the state that ‘Liberals 
are suspicious of it, while there is little evidence of social democrats fearing it at all’. Where 
the Liberal Democrats supported state intervention, it was in a decentralising fashion. 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the Liberal Democrats continued to advance the idea of 
‘community politics’, not just for electoral gain, but as a genuine attempt to decentralise the 
power of the state. This was in contrast to a greater willingness by the 1997-2010 Labour 
governments to use the central power of the state. In government, Labour introduced tax 
credits in attempt to make work more financially rewarding, as well as setting targets to 
reduce and eliminate child poverty. While not matching the nationalisation records of 
previous Labour governments, New Labour was still willing to nationalise or part-nationalise 
failing private organisations (for example, Halifax Bank of Scotland, Railtrack, Lloyds and 
Northern Rock).  
However, Grayson’s (2007) argument by extension that Liberal Democrats doubt and distrust 
the state more than Labour has contradicting evidence, too. In recent years Labour have 
happily adopted a more economically liberal approach to the state, while the Liberal 
Democrats have freely supported state expansion. In office, New Labour sought to broadly 
maintain the capitalist economy while in office. They restricted borrowing only to fund 
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investment, made the Bank of England independent, sought to part-privatise Royal Mail, 
funded health and education investment through private finance while bringing greater 
competition into the public services sector. Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats in opposition 
supported higher general taxation to fund investment in education, supported higher taxation 
for high earners, opposed university tuition fees, and they called for Northern Rock to be 
nationalised before Labour actually did it. Both parties were happy to change their policies to 
match the economic context; it is not necessarily the case that either party eschewed their 
ideologies in doing so.  
Differing approaches to home affairs and international policy suggested that Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats still had different approaches to not just the individual and the state, but 
also contemporary phenomenon, such as terrorism, the environment and the European Union. 
While at the end of New Labour’s period in office, David Miliband (2008) urged a fusion 
between the ‘social democratic commitment to social justice through collective action and 
radical liberal commitment to individual freedom in a market economy’, other social liberal 
figures felt that Labour was continuing to draw ‘from the deep, poisoned well of its Fabian 
tradition’ (Collins and Reeves, 2008). In particular, they argued that Labour had ‘tested, often 
to destruction, the idea that a bigger, higher-spending state can deliver a better society’. Their 
argument was stark: ‘liberalise or die’. 
Throughout Labour’s period in government between 1997 and 2010, more marked 
disagreement was often found on non-economic issues. Following the attack on the World 
Trade Center in September 2001, the Liberal Democrats supported the Labour government in 
deploying troops in Afghanistan, but were much more critical than the Conservatives in 
opposition. Most notably, they opposed invading Iraq in 2003. While their opposition was 
rooted more in internationalism and support for United Nations resolutions than an ethical 
opposition to war, it remains the most highlighted disagreement between the two parties’ 
leaderships to date (Philip, 2009, Russell, 2009). The events of September 2001 also began a 
long process of disagreement between Labour and the Liberal Democrats on issues 
surrounding civil liberties and state intervention in personal freedoms. This was quickly 
apparent, with Charles Kennedy telling Liberal Democrat conference in 2001: 
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We do nothing to protect [democracy]… if we abandon, in the name of 
security, the very principles which the terrorists seek to destroy – liberty, 
democracy, diversity… cracking down on civil liberties carries a price… 
wherever civil liberties are lost, tread with care. Tread with care 
(Kennedy, 2001).    
 
For New Labour the focus was often more on security, communitarianism and solidarity. In 
2001, Labour introduced DNA retention of anybody charged with an offence. This was 
extended in 2003 to anybody arrested for most offences. Anti-terror legislation was 
introduced that (potentially unintentionally) occasionally prohibited journalists from 
photographing police in public places. A database of children’s identity information was 
accessible to a wide range of public bodies. A National Identity Register was introduced, with 
a plan to then introduce identity cards eventually shelved. Anti-social behaviour orders were 
introduced for children and young adults who disrupted communities. Detention of people 
suspected of terrorist offences was introduced, and extensions to this were proposed but voted 
down in parliament. People suspected of terrorist offences could also be put under house 
arrest through ‘control orders’.  Finally, demonstrations close to Parliament were outlawed.25  
In all cases, Labour deemed either security or community solidarity to be more important than 
individual liberty and freedoms.  
The Liberal Democrats opposed Labour on most of these issues, and their opposition was 
such that when they launched their 2010 general election manifesto, Nick Clegg claimed that 
‘the division between the Lib Dems and Labour on civil liberties is as wide today as it was at 
the height of Blair’s authoritarian populism’ (Stratton and Wintour, 2010). Liberal Democrat 
negotiators during the coalition talks following the 2010 general election also identified the 
Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives as in agreement against Labour’s policies on civil 
liberties and freedoms (Laws, 2010). Indeed, the eventual Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition agreement agreed to ‘implement a full programme of measures to reverse the 
substantial erosion of civil liberties under the Labour Government and roll back state 
intrusion’ (Cameron and Clegg, 2010).  
                                                   
 
25 For a comprehensive summary of Labour’s policies in these areas, see Klug (2010). 
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As with economic matters, there are counters to the arguments above. While Labour did 
extend the powers of the state to interfere with personal freedoms, it also granted rights and 
freedoms to many different sections of society. Minority groups gained much stronger rights 
and representation in Britain between 1997 and 2010. Labour abolished Section 28 of the 
1988 Local Government Act, which banned councils from ‘intentionally promoting’ 
homosexuality. During their third term they introduced civil partnerships, which allowed 
same-sex relationships to be recognised in law. They also introduced more liberal 
immigration rules, and made a concerted effort to decouple race from the debate on 
immigration (Ford, 2008). The Labour governments also protected groups, such as the 
disabled, from discrimination in the workplace, and the Equality Act sought to ensure fair 
rights for everybody in and out of the workplace. They devolved power to Scotland, Wales, 
Northern Ireland and regions within England. They developed strong and ambitious targets 
and policies on climate change, and introduced human rights and freedom of information 
legislation, often strongly opposed by the Conservative Party.  
Alongside this, many within Labour ranks opposed the policies implemented by the Blair and 
Brown governments. This was most notably the case with the Iraq invasion, where 139 
Labour MPs rebelled against the government, but there were also significant Labour 
rebellions on identity cards and detention of terror suspects. Ed Miliband later argued that 
Labour in government had been ‘too draconian on aspects of our civil liberties’ (Hundal, 
2010). The distinctions between the two parties are not as clear as ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’: 
elements of Labour’s policies prioritised the communitarian stand of New Labour thinking, 
but others adopted a more sincerely liberal approach.  
 
4.3.2 2010-2015 
This period provided a very different set of circumstances for both parties. Labour was out of 
national office for the first time in thirteen years, and the Liberal Democrats in it for the first 
time in their current form. Labour elected Ed Miliband as its leader, who distanced himself 
from the New Labour governments; though by nowhere near to the same extent as Jeremy 
Corbyn. The Liberal Democrats joined the Conservatives in coalition government, and 
supported policies that reduced the size of state, as well as cutting direct taxation (while still 
raising indirect taxation). This section examines each party’s policy programme at the 2015 
general election, focusing particularly on issues salient to the public and issues commonly 
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associated with both parties. This is done for three (related) reasons. First, an election marks a 
set period in time where each party has to present an articulated and organised platform to the 
electorate. As noted earlier in this chapter, the ideological debates within a party are 
important, but the practical outcome is a party’s policy. Second, a general election provides a 
series of policy documents, manifestos and speeches that can be utilised for analysis. Third, 
policy programmes are not just an insulated product of a particular period, but a transient 
product of a party’s longer term ideological and political commitments (Harrop and Lee, 
2015, Randall and Sloam, 2009). Together, they suggest that analysing policies is both useful 
and practical in helping to understanding the broader potential for party co-operation.  
Table 4.1: Most salient issues for voters at the 2015 general election 
Issue (%) 
Economy 52 
Immigration 51 
Health 45 
Housing 27 
Welfare 26 
Education 16 
Europe 16 
Tax 10 
Pensions 9 
Environment 8 
Crime 7 
Family life 7 
Transport 3 
Note: Respondents were asked to list up to three issues most important to them.  
Source: YouGov polling (2015), 27-28 April 2015. 
 
The economy, immigration and health were comfortably the most important issues to the 
electorate at the 2015 general election, with all other issues comfortably behind them in terms 
of voter salience (see Table 4.1). The economy and the National Health Service are both 
valence issues, as the public broadly knows what it wants, and is more likely to support 
parties it thinks competent on them. The extent to which immigration is a valence issue is 
debatable. For most voters, immigration is something they want reduced. However, evidence 
suggests more mixed views amongst Labour supporters, and Liberal Democrats supporters are 
less likely to be hostile to immigration (Johnson and Rodger, 2015). Table 4.2 sets out areas 
of policy agreement and disagreement between Labour and the Liberal Democrats on the most 
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salient issues with the electorate at the 2015 general election, based on analysis of manifestos, 
speeches and policy documents. On the economy, regularly one of the most salient issues in 
British politics, the two parties agreed much more than they disagreed. Both parties adopted a 
similar approach to fiscal policy: they were committed to reducing the deficit and eventually 
the public debt, but not in as extensive a fashion as the Conservatives. Indeed, much of the 
party’s agreement on policy was in opposition to the Conservatives. Both parties supported 
scrapping the spare room subsidy, and neither supported the welfare cuts proposed and now 
being enacted by the Conservatives in government. Instead both parties wanted to raise taxes 
on the wealthy, including a ‘mansion tax’ on properties worth over two million pounds. There 
were differences: the parties disagreed on certain elements of taxation, such as the general 
threshold for paying income tax, and the threshold for the earners to pay the highest rate of 
income tax. However, as shown in Table 4.2, at the 2015 general election the two parties 
shared much ground on economic policy. Certainly, they shared a similar enough platform to 
facilitate a governmental programme. 
The same can be said for immigration policy. Both parties were operating in an environment 
that saw increasing support for anti-immigration policies and parties (Ford and Goodwin, 
2014, Johnson and Rodger, 2015). Both parties adopted broadly similar policies in this regard: 
they supported the restriction of benefits for EU immigrants. However, both parties adopted 
policies more liberal on immigration than the Conservatives or UKIP. For example, both 
parties supported removing international students from immigration figures. Again, they were 
differences: Labour wanted more action on foreign labour and language skills, but these were 
small issues that would have been unlikely to be a significant obstacle to co-operation.  
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Table 4.2: Salient issues at the 2015 general election, and Labour/Liberal Democrat agreement 
 Policy agreement Policy disagreement 
 
Economy 
 
 
Both parties adopted a broadly similar fiscal policy. Both 
committed themselves to reducing the deficit and eventually debt, 
but in a manner that maintained investment in public services. 
Neither party supported the £12bn cuts in the welfare budget 
promised by the Conservatives.  
Both parties supported a ‘mansion tax’ on properties valued at 
more than £2mn pounds.  
Both parties supported scrapping the spare room subsidy (the 
‘bedroom tax’).  
Both parties supported a long term investment plan in 
infrastructure. 
Both parties supported extension of the European Union single 
market, and European Union trade agreements with international 
partners. 
Both parties supported increases to the National Minimum Wage, 
based on advice from the Low Pay Commission,  
Both parties supported the reduction and regulation of zero hours 
contracts.  
Both parties supported increases in the state pension, alongside 
means-testing benefits for wealthy pensioners. 
Both parties supported higher taxation for wealthy earners or land 
 
Labour would abolish the married couples’ tax allowance. The 
Liberal Democrats were unclear on this. 
Labour would retain the automatic deduction of political 
subscriptions from trade union members’ pay. The Liberal 
Democrats were unclear on this. 
Labour supported the restoration of the 50p top rate of tax for those 
earning over £150,000. The Liberal Democrats opposed this. 
The Liberal Democrats supported raising the personal tax allowance 
to £12,500. Labour did not support this.  
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owners. 
Both parties supported competitive business taxes, with particular 
priority for small and medium sized companies.  
Immigration Both parties broadly supported immigration that benefitted the 
economy, tourism and society.  
Both parties supported restrictions on benefits for immigrants. 
Both parties looked to address voters’ economic concerns over 
immigration by focusing on the exploitation of foreign labour. 
Both parties supported removing foreign students from migration 
figures. 
Labour supported language tests for immigrants working in the 
public sector. The Liberal Democrats did not have a policy on this. 
Labour focused much more on the economic exploitation of 
immigrant labour than the Liberal Democrats’.  
Health Both parties wanted spending on the NHS to rise in in real terms. 
Both parties wanted much more integration of health and social 
care policy. 
Both parties supported increased investment in research. 
Both parties supported increased investment and attention on 
mental healthcare.  
Labour supported the repeal of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 
(England) delivered by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government. The Liberal Democrats strongly rejected this.  
The Liberal Democrats supported devolving more budgets to local 
communities. Labour did not support this.  
Labour wanted to guarantee the right to a GP appointment within 48 
hours. The Liberal Democrats did not support this. 
 
Sources: Policy documents, speeches 2015 general election manifestos, Harrop and Lee (2015). 
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More disagreement was to be found at the 2015 general election on health and social care 
policy. As at most general elections, Labour messaging was that the Conservatives were 
destroying the National Health Service, ably supported by the Liberal Democrats (Cowley and 
Kavanagh, 2015). The debates were particularly divisive, with Labour promising to repeal the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition’s Health and Social Care Act (England), the main 
health policy enacted in the 2010 parliament. One Labour MP and former Shadow Health 
Minister told me about the divisions between the two parties on this during the 2010-2015 
parliament: 
I remember speaking to one Lib Dem MP, and I said… that they had an 
opportunity to build bridges with Labour if they used their position in the 
coalition to stop Andrew Lansley’s NHS legislation… If they’re serious 
about realigning the centre left in British politics… this would be critical to 
the prospects of that happening… a shared agenda on certain issues, and it 
was dismissed out of hand, and I think that was a big mistake (Reed, 2016). 
 
However, this was tempered by agreement on funding for mental health and the integration of 
health and social care policy, although even this was still a potentially divisive issue. This has 
continued since the 2015 general election. The Labour Shadow Minister for Mental Health 
attacked the Liberal Democrat MP responsible for Mental Health during the 2010-2015 
parliament, tweeting ‘until 8 months ago u were the Minister for #mentalhealth. What did you 
do about this during ur 2.5yrs’ (Berger, 2016). Harrop and Lee (2015) conclude that while the 
rhetoric was damaging, a shared health care policy programme was achievable by the two 
parties.  
The data in Table 4.2 suggests that at the 2015 general election, the two parties agreed on 
enough areas of policy salient to the public that a governing programme could have been 
reached reasonably comfortably. However, analysis of each party’s policy programme also 
needs to take into account policy issues and areas salient within each party. As a means of 
achieving equality through the state Labour have long prioritised health (already shown in 
Table 4.2) and education policy, while the Liberal Democrats have been associated with 
education, the environment, Europe and constitutional reform (Brack, 1996, Grayson, 2007). 
While these are not quantitative measures of salience, they are supported by data shown in 
Chapter Six: each party’s grassroots highlighted each of these issues as salient within their 
party (see Appendix 2). The nature of policy agreement and disagreement on these salient 
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issues will also be important for understanding the policy incentives and obstacles to co-
operation. 
Table 4.3 sets out areas of policy agreement and disagreement between Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats at the 2015 general election on the most salient issues within each party, 
based on manifestos, speeches and policy documents. Again, there is a great deal of 
agreement between the two parties. On education, both supported the extension of free 
childcare and that teachers should hold a professional qualification. Disagreements on 
education were a matter of budgetary concerns rather than actual policy disagreement. On the 
environment and climate change, both parties agreed on most issues, and disagreements 
reflected differences in nuance and emphasis. However one significant difference was the 
Liberal Democrats’ opposition to Labour’s plan to freeze energy prices between 2015 and 
2017. They saw this as a damaging intervention in the market, and both parties campaigned 
heavily on this during the 2010 parliament. On the European Union, both parties strongly 
supported Britain’s continued membership, and both opposed the Conservatives’ plan to hold 
a referendum on European Union membership unless there was significant treaty change.26 
Finally on constitutional affairs, both parties continued a long-held mix of agreement and 
disagreement. Both supported an elected House of Lords, extended devolution, votes for 16 
and 17 year olds and party funding reform. However on these issues, there is often agreement 
on the need for reform, but disagreement on practical implementation. On the voting system, 
the parties disagree on the voting system for Westminster and English local elections, and on 
party funding reform any agreement on regulation is weakened by disagreement over issues 
such as trade union donations to the Labour Party.  
Of course, some issues are more salient to one party than another. Both parties prioritise 
education, and there is nothing to suggest there would have been significant disagreement 
there. Indeed, former Shadow Education Secretary Stephen Twigg (2016) told me of his 
support for the Liberal Democrats’ pupil premium policy. The environment is arguably an 
issue of more pressing importance to the Liberal Democrats. They made it an issue of  
                                                   
 
26 However, as discussed in the leadership chapter, the Liberal Democrats would likely have accepted a 
referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union had another Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition followed the 2015 general election.  
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Table 4.3: The extent of Labour/Liberal Democrat agreement on issues important to each party  
 Policy agreement Policy disagreement 
 
Education 
 
Both parties supported Ofsted inspecting academies. 
Both parties wanted it to be mandatory for teachers to be 
qualified. 
Both parties supported extending free childcare. 
Both parties supported extending pastoral care and 
lessons in schools, including extended sex and 
relationship education. 
 
The Liberal Democrat supported protecting the education budget 
in real terms. Labour would not guarantee this. 
The Liberal Democrats supported free meals for all primary 
school children. Labour did not support this. 
Labour did not guarantee to continue the Liberal Democrat 
supported Pupil Premium for children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. 
Environment/climate 
change 
Both parties supported long-term decarbonisation 
targets, including a commitment to renewable energy 
investment. 
Both parties supported nuclear power as an energy 
source. 
Both parties supported European Union targets on 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Both parties wanted to extend the Green Investment 
Bank’s funding. 
Both parties supported greater investment in flood 
defences. 
Both parties supported comprehensive, long-term 
Labour wanted to freeze energy prices from 2015 to 2017. The 
Liberal Democrats strongly opposed this. 
The Liberal Democrats wanted to push the European Union 
targets on reducing greenhouse gas emissions further than Labour. 
Both parties offered different targets in relation to renewable 
energy use and energy saving. 
Labour wanted to permit the Green Investment Bank to borrow to 
invest. The Liberal Democrats did not advocate this.  
100 
 
reviews into climate change and planning for its impact. 
Both parties supported greater regulation of the energy 
market. 
European Union Both parties strongly supported Britain’s continued 
membership of the European Union. 
Both parties supported a referendum should more power 
be transferred to the European Union. 
Neither party supported the Conservatives’ plan to hold 
a referendum on European Union membership after the 
2015 general election. 
 
Constitutional affairs Both parties supported greater devolution to Scotland, 
Wales and English cities and regions. 
Both parties supported an elected House of Lords. 
Both parties supported lowering the voting age to 16.  
Both parties supported political party funding reform. 
The Liberal Democrats supported the Single Transferable Vote to 
be used in Westminster elections. Labour did not mention 
electoral reform in its manifesto.  
The Liberal Democrats also supported the Single Transferable 
Vote to be used in local elections in England. Labour did not 
mention electoral reform in its manifesto. 
 
Sources: Policy documents, speeches 2015 general election manifestos, Harrop and Lee (2015). 
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distinction between themselves and the two major parties, and would likely have pushed for 
control of the Department of Energy and Climate Change in a Labour-Liberal Democrat 
coalition. However, Labour leader Ed Miliband was a respected Energy and Climate Change 
Secretary between 2008 and 2010, and any disagreements would likely be budgetary rather 
than principled.  
The European Union was a key issue for both parties in that they would be united against the 
Conservatives. Constitutional affairs have always been much more important to the Liberal 
Democrats than Labour, but while this might have been an issue that damaged the potential 
for co-operation between the two in 2010, it was unlikely to do so in 2015. Electoral reform 
was still a salient issue for the Liberal Democrats, but the decisive rejection of the Alternative 
Vote in a referendum in 2011 made this an unrealistic proposition for the Liberal Democrats 
to pursue after the 2015 general election.   
As with issues salient to the electorate, the data in Table 4.3 suggests that at the 2015 general 
election the two parties agreed on enough areas of policy salient to them both to suggest that a 
governing agreement could easily have been reached. As Harrop and Lee (2015: 2) 
summarise in their analysis of Labour and Liberal Democrat policy overlap, ‘there is 
significant common ground between Labour and the Liberal Democrats which offers scope 
for negotiation and potential agreement… that could form a realistic and comprehensive 
agenda for government’.  This echoes Sassoon’s (1997: 12) comments prior to the 1997 
general election, where he argued that the ‘differences between the two parties are… minimal. 
In fact there is less disparity between them than… is normally the case between any two 
different parties’. In summary, for issues salient to the electorate and salient to each party, 
there is little to suggest that there would have been significant policy to obstacles to co-
operation following the 2015 general election.  
 
4.3.3 Post-2015 
The previous section has shown that had electoral circumstances allowed, co-operation in 
government between Labour and the Liberal Democrats after the 2015 general election would 
not have been greatly hindered by policy matters. However, both parties suffered heavy 
electoral defeats at the 2015 general election, now have new leaderships and arguably new 
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policy and ideological directions. This section outlines the ideological and policy incentives 
and obstacles to co-operation between the two parties after the 2015 general election.  
Successive Labour leaders have sought to appeal to a broad base of voters that includes 
former Conservative supporters, albeit with varying degrees of success. Jeremy Corbyn won 
the Labour leadership election in September 2015, and his re-election as leader in 2016, on a 
platform of opposition to ‘austerity-lite and Conservative-lite’. In particular, he has focused 
more on non-voters rather than Conservatives. He has said little that directly responds to the 
reasons outlined by academics for Labour’s defeat in the 2015 general election, that they were 
seen as incompetent on the salient issues of the economy, immigration and leadership 
(Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015, Denver, 2015), and he purposefully rejects many of the 
ideological platforms argued not just by more economically liberal voices in Labour (see 
Diamond and Kenny, 2010, Diamond and Kenny, 2012, Philpott, 2011), but also the more 
communitarian based politics of New Labour (Geary and Pabst, 2015). 
How much Corbyn’s leadership will challenge Labour’s ideological and policy platform is 
still open to debate. The party’s formal policy positions are not a huge change from Ed 
Miliband’s. However, Corbyn’s ideological positions are certainly a challenge to much of 
Labour’s dominant thinking in recent years (Russell, 2016). Even if his thinking resembles 
the Tribune Group thinking from the 1970s, Corbyn joined the Campaign Group faction 
following his election in 1983, supporting the Bennite wing of the Labour Parliamentary 
Party. In parts, it is a rejection of revisionist thinking more in line with Ralph Miliband 
Parliamentary Socialism (1972). So far, Jeremy Corbyn has repeated Ed Miliband’s pledge to 
re-nationalise the railways as private contracts come up for renewal, opposed welfare cuts 
imposed by the Conservative government, and opposed military action in Syria. He has 
continued his criticism of western democracies’ foreign policy, justified Russian intervention 
in Syria, and also maintained his long-standing opposition to the independent nuclear 
deterrent (albeit with caveats relating to state investment in the communities that build the 
deterrent, and during the 2017 general election campaign he publicly defended party policy to 
maintain the deterrnet). Together, along with Jeremy Corbyn’s history on the fringes of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party, they imply a very different approach to the Labour leadership 
compared with Ed Miliband and those before him.  
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Following the Liberal Democrat defeat in the 2015 general election, Nick Clegg stepped 
down as leader and was replaced by Tim Farron. He named a largely new team to shadow 
government ministers and departments, but this was due more to their heavily depleted 
number in the House of Commons. He made opposing Britain’s exit from the European 
Union, the environment, support for refugees, civil liberties and LGBT-rights the party’s 
priorities, but largely struggled to get recognition for these. While he is generally regarded to 
be on the ‘yellow’ wing of the party, he did not move the party far from its previous positions. 
Indeed, Nick Clegg was their spokesperson for Europe and issues surrounding Britain’s 
membership of the European Union. He also insisted that he would only enter into a future 
Westminster coalition (with any party) if there was a guarantee of electoral reform (Eaton, 
2015b).  
Tim Farron resigned after the 2017 general election, having struggled to reconcile his 
personal evangelical Christian faith and his public liberalism. Vince Cable became Liberal 
Democrat leader, with no other candidate standing. Like Farron, Cable is often grouped in the 
left wing of the party. Yet he wrote a chapter in The Orange Book (Laws and Marshall, 2004), 
and he was a willing (if critical) participant in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government of 2010-2015.  
The vote to leave the European Union in June 2016 also changes matters. Theresa May’s 
Conservative Party is more socially conservative than David Cameron’s on issues of 
immigration, and the current manner of implementing Britain’s exit from the European Union 
is in direct contrast to the Liberal Democrats fervent support for EU membership. While 
Labour also support leaving the European Union and have largely backed the government, 
Labour’s Shadow Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union Keir Starmer has offered 
different rhetoric with regard to single market membership and the rights of European 
citizens. Depending on circumstances, predominantly public opinion, there is potential for 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats’ respective policies on exiting the European Union to 
converge.  
Analysing each party’s contemporary policy platform is no easy task, primarily because many 
of Corbyn’s ideological positions are not just different from the Liberal Democrats, but also 
the vast majority of Labour’s parliamentary party. There are some areas of greater agreement 
with Corbyn as Labour leader: the two parties are closer on abolishing the independent 
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nuclear deterrent. Both parties broadly opposed leaving the European Union, but Jeremy 
Corbyn has appeared much more accepting of the result than Tim Farron or Vince Cable. 
Corbyn is also much more supportive of state intervention in the economy than the Liberal 
Democrats, and much less supportive of intervention in foreign affairs. For example, Tim 
Farron and the majority of his parliamentary party supported intervention in Syria in 2015, 
while Jeremy Corbyn opposed. Corbyn has argued that Labour must have a ‘serious debate 
about the powers of NATO’ and argued for NATO to ‘restrict its role’ in Eastern Europe 
(Hughes, 2015). On these and many other issues, Corbyn’s ideological positions are currently 
closer to the Green Party than they are to the Liberal Democrats or the majority of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party. 
Together, the current debates within the Labour Party pose a greater obstacle to co-operation 
with the Liberal Democrats than previously. Following the ideological debates and changes in 
the Labour Party in the 1980s and 1990s, Joyce (1999: 267-268) concluded that there ‘were a 
number of ideas… common to both parties [that] all progressives could accept’. The changes 
since the 2010, 2015 and 2017 general elections signal a Labour Party policy platform that is 
less convinced than the 1997-2010 Labour governments by the ‘economic liberal assumption 
that markets are a better mechanism for the allocation of goods and services’ (Beech and 
Hickson, 2014). If this view persists in the Labour Party, it presents an ideological and policy 
obstacle to co-operation with the Liberal Democrats. Much will depend on how long Corbyn 
or those with his positions occupy the Labour Party leadership. As of yet, Corbyn has 
presented a very different ideological position, but has offered little substantial policy change. 
A good example of this is in Labour’s response to the referendum on European Union 
membership: Corbyn has promised to support leaving the European Union, but much stronger 
opposition to the government has come from Keir Starmer, Labour’s Shadow Secretary of 
State for Britain Exiting the European Union. Should the two parties be in a position to co-
operate then it is not yet certain that Corbyn’s positions will be dominant in Labour. 
Aside from the two parties’ leaderships, others within Labour and the Liberal Democrats have 
called for more ideological and policy co-operation in light of the 2015 general election. An 
edited book published in 2016 argues for co-operation across centre-left parties (particular 
focus is on Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens) to generate ideas and policies that 
will help ‘build a progressive alliance within parliament’ (Nandy et al., 2016a). The book 
does not endorse mergers, and validates differences in each party. It features contributions 
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from prominent figures in the Labour, Liberal Democrat, and Green parties, including Tim 
Farron MP, Steve Reed MP, Norman Lamb MP, Lisa Nandy MP, Caroline Lucas MP and 
others. In doing so it has contributions from people both in the Progress tendency (Steve 
Reed MP) and the soft left (Lisa Nandy MP) of Labour, and in the Liberal Democrats 
contributions from both the ‘yellow’ (Tim Farron MP) and ‘orange’ (Norman Lamb MP) 
factions. The book complements calls already made by other Labour and Liberal Democrat 
figures for greater anti-Conservative co-operation ahead of the next general election (Cooper, 
2016, Reed, 2015).  
This project, particularly the breadth of contributors across both parties, confirms that there is 
still an ideological appetite for co-operation between the two parties. Alongside this, where 
figures in Labour and the Liberal Democrats have called for co-operation between the two 
parties, this has mostly been done in the name of ‘anti-Conservative’ co-operation. Vince 
Cable has voiced fears of a Conservative ‘one-party state’ (Cooper, 2016). Former Labour MP 
Jamie Reed (2015) has argued that ‘England is home to a strong progressive tradition that its 
two major progressive parties [Labour and the Liberal Democrats] should work to unite, not 
divide’. However, there remains opposition, even amongst those previously in favour of co-
operation between the two parties. Lord Adonis, former SDP member and now Labour peer, 
and former strong proponent of Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation, told me: 
I don’t see much in the way of co-operation in the future – the Lib Dems 
are simply too weak. They are weak, not just electorally but also weak in 
terms of ideas. The Liberals’ ideological position in the 1970s and 1980s 
was coherently between Labour and the Tories. They don’t have that 
now. In part, that’s a consequence of Labour’s moderates or right or 
whatever you want to call them. Blair outflanked the Lib Dems, and 
Labour’s moderates are to the right of the Lib Dems’ soft left. The task 
for Labour moderates, like Chuka Umunna, is to regain ideological 
ground in their own party, not to look at co-operation with the Liberal 
Democrats. It would be like seating yourself next to a corpse. They are 
not even the principal protest party now – UKIP and the Greens have that 
now (Adonis, 2016). 
 
Broadly, the significant changes to both parties in light of the 2015 and 2017 general elections 
provide incentives to co-operation in that they have encouraged key figures in both parties to 
discuss co-operation more openly and more broadly than they did previously. However, there 
is little evidence yet that this will develop into something more substantial. Adonis’s 
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argument about the Liberal Democrats’ electoral and ideological weakness could also be 
applied to the Labour Party, albeit to a lesser extent. Should the two parties somehow manage 
to achieve a parliamentary majority between them at the next general election, again there 
appears enough policy compatibility to facilitate co-operation, but whether such co-operation 
could endure is much more doubtful. 
 
4.4 Conclusion  
In response to the notion that Labour might need the Liberal Democrats’ support in the future, 
Diamond and Kenny (2012: 8) argue that ‘Labour can either pretend that such a scenario is 
simply unimaginable, or it can begin to assess what… centre-left [co-operation] might entail’. 
This chapter has outlined that if Labour wants to assess such an idea, they will find plenty of 
common ground between the two parties that provides no opposition to co-operation. This is 
the case firstly in ideological terms. Labour’s acquiescence with social liberalism has been 
evident throughout the 20th century, and its socialism has always been in an evolutionary, 
reformist form. Even the Liberal Democrats’ ‘orange book’ liberals have social liberalism as 
their primary objective (Howarth, 2007). 
It is also the case in policy terms. While the Liberal Democrats joined the Conservatives in 
coalition between 2010 and 2015, they have long remained closer to Labour, and this is still 
the case today. The breadth and depth of calls by Liberal Democrat figures since the 2015 
general election for increased ‘anti-Conservative’ co-operation with Labour is testament to 
that. Using both quantitative analysis of manifesto data since 1945 and qualitative analysis of 
each party’s recent policy programmes, this chapter has shown that Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats are closer together on policy matters than either party is with the Conservatives. 
On the manifesto data, the Conservatives are also close to both parties, reflecting the 
convergence between the three parties in recent years (Green, 2015). However, based on the 
data there is little obstacle to Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation.   
However, there are still ideological and policy differences between the two parties that 
represent an obstacle to co-operation. The two parties have different approaches to the 
individual, society and state, based on different interpretations of liberty, freedom and 
equality. In policy terms, this had led to different approaches to home affairs, security and 
foreign affairs, as well as different emphasis on public services, social security and the 
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environment. Both their ideological and policy differences are reflected in their histories. As 
shown in Chapter Three, both parties’ previous interaction represents a mixture of 
competition and co-operation, but also a mixture of adversarial and tribal politics. Often, 
tribalism is a successful electoral and organisational strategy (Fielding and McHugh, 2003), 
and to co-operate with other parties is to risk fracture, dissent and loss of identity (Dunphy 
and Bale, 2011, Whiteley et al., 2006). It is something which has been more powerful than co-
operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats so far in their history.   
Each party’s ideologies and policy programmes represent an incentive to co-operation in that 
there would have been little foreseen difficulty in forming a coalition or parliamentary 
agreement in recent years. This would have been the case in 2010 and 2015; however it would 
have been much more difficult following the 2017 general election. However, sustaining co-
operation over a longer period of time, or advancing co-operation to the extent that the two 
parties represent a co-operative force against conservatism or the Conservative Party, would 
likely be much more difficult. As Robinson (2012: 28-29) argues, co-operation between 
Labour and the Liberals in the 1970s was based on pragmatic responses to specific electoral 
and ideological contexts, as opposed to a recognition of shared history and ideology. If co-
operation is to take place between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, it is likely to take place 
on this basis again. Ideology and policy represent an incentive to co-operation, but only to a 
point. If the two parties have shared ideological and policy positions over a long period of 
time, it takes only a cursory glance at the lack of co-operation between the two parties to 
suggest that ideology and policy are not the most important considerations in determining co-
operation. For example, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats were able to agree a policy 
programme to facilitate a coalition after the 2010 general election, but it was mainly the 
parliamentary arithmetic that provided the incentives to co-operate there (Bale, 2011b). The 
next chapter explores these electoral, office-seeking considerations.   
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Chapter 5: The electoral incentives and obstacles to Labour-Liberal 
Democrat co-operation  
 
This chapter addresses the electoral incentives and obstacles to co-operation between Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats, as well as analysing public opinion towards co-operation between 
the two. As shown earlier in the thesis, the hung parliament at the 2010 general election was a 
result of a long term process of party system change, and the relationship between political 
parties and their potential to co-operate with each other is therefore a more pressing issue. 
While the 2015 general election delivered a Conservative majority, it far from heralds a return 
to majoritarian politics solely contested by the Labour and Conservative parties. The recent 
2017 general election provides further evidence of this. The range of results in a future 
general election that could generate a hung parliament is vast (Curtice, 2015), and the issue of 
the electoral incentives and obstacles to party co-operation remains an important question to 
be addressed. 
This change has particular consequences for both Labour and the Liberal Democrats. For 
Labour, the long-term trend away from a two-party system in the electoral arena (Webb, 
2000), and more recently in the parliamentary arena (Curtice, 2010, 2015), makes a majority 
Labour government a more questionable prospect. However, co-operation with other parties is 
not necessarily an easy option to overcome the problem. When Labour is defeated in a general 
election, the view that Labour should join with other centre-left parties in a broad ‘progressive 
alliance’ often gets more prominence. Indeed, the argument that Labour should consider co-
operating with other parties received more attention now following Labour’s poor polling 
numbers in light of the 2015 general election (see Harrop, 2017). 
However, the argument often neglects the complex reasons behind vote choice, focusing 
instead solely on negative attitudes towards the Conservative Party. From Labour’s 
perspective, Fielding and McHugh (2003) argue that any notion of a ‘progressive alliance’ is 
unlikely to provide a basis for electoral success, as it alienates other sections of Labour’s 
electorate. For the Liberal Democrats, a more pluralist party system should be to their 
electoral benefit. However, co-operation with Labour is in danger of defining the Liberal 
Democrats as predominantly anti-Conservative, which could lose them support in their 
(former) south west and south east heartlands. The prospect of coalition with an Ed Miliband 
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and Labour-led government has also been argued to have damaged the Liberal Democrats’ 
electoral performance at the 2015 general election (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). On the 
other side of the political spectrum, co-operation with the Conservatives between 2010 and 
2015 also severely damaged the party at the 2015 general election (Johnson and Middleton, 
2016). If Labour are a rock and the Conservatives are a hard place, then the Liberal 
Democrats were certainly in the centre ground of British politics at the 2015 general election. 
As shown in the theoretical framework, co-operation can take different forms. Most 
understandings of co-operation are post-electoral, through government or legislative co-
operation (Boston and Bullock, 2012, Martin and Stevenson, 2001). However co-operation 
can also be pre-electoral, through electoral pacts and agreements, or the promotion of tactical 
voting (Fisher, 2004, Golder, 2005). In both forms, Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation 
will affect future voting behaviour. Votes are usually valued not intrinsically, but for their 
contribution to winning office (Strøm, 1990). On the one hand, co-operation between the two 
parties might increase the flow of votes to each party where they need them most: in 
constituencies where they have a realistic prospect of winning. On the other hand, co-
operation might increase the flow of votes to other parties if it changes voters’ perceptions of 
each party for the worse. The trade-off between winning some votes and losing others provide 
both electoral incentives and obstacles to co-operation, and how they balance out is important 
for both parties. 
This chapter thus applies the electoral element of the thesis’s theoretical framework: to what 
extent does co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrat improve each party’s 
electoral prospects? Does co-operation increase the chances for both parties winning office? 
How might co-operation affect how each party competes elsewhere? First, the chapter 
outlines each party’s current electoral position, as it is from this point that both parties will 
need to consider the potential for co-operation. Had the 2015 or 2017 general elections 
delivered a hung parliament and a majority in the House of Commons for a Labour and 
Liberal Democrat coalition, any analysis of co-operation would be very different. As it is, the 
two parties’ electoral situations present a different context to work from. Second, the chapter 
analyses the incentives and obstacles to pre-electoral Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. 
Third, it analyses the incentives and obstacles to post-electoral Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
operation. Throughout the chapter makes use of constituency election data, interviews with 
key Labour and Liberal Democrat figures, and secondary survey data from the British 
110 
 
 
Election Study, Hansard Society Audit of Political Engagement and a survey by YouGov 
ahead of the 2015 general election.27 
One of the central arguments presented in the theoretical framework is that co-operation and 
competition are complex concepts, not sufficiently reflected through individual forms of party 
interaction such as coalitions or electoral pacts. However, this means that it is difficult to 
measure through one dependent variable or a series of dependent variables. This is also 
further complicated by a lack of data on party co-operation in the UK, as long-running 
surveys within political science, such as the British Election Study, have understandably paid 
it little attention. Where they take an interest, it is usually solely on coalition, rather than the 
different forms of co-operation presented in Chapter Two. The approach here is thus to try 
and make the most of the data in a way that still satisfies the theoretical concepts discussed in 
Chapter Two. Where multivariate analysis is possible (see Table 5.6), the dependent variable 
is a binary variable indicating support (or not) for a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition after 
the 2015 general election. Qualitative data largely treats co-operation has a more open 
concept, acknowledging that it can incorporate other forms such as electoral pacts, and 
confidence and supply agreements.  
The conclusions of this chapter show that the electoral incentives and obstacles differ 
depending on the nature of co-operation that might take place. With regard to pre-electoral co-
operation, while there are some incentives it is a very risky strategy. A strong Liberal 
Democrat party weakens the chances of a Conservative majority, strengthening Labour’s 
electoral prospects. Losing Labour-leaning supporters also cost the Liberal Democrats badly 
at the 2015 general election, and appears to have also hurt the Liberal Democrats in the 2017 
general election (Fieldhouse and Prosser, 2017). However, for Labour, co-operation with a 
social and economic liberal party is likely to further alienate Labour’s more socially 
conservative vote. For the Liberal Democrats, co-operation with a social democratic party that 
has recently failed to convince the electorate that it can be credible and competent in 
                                                   
 
27 YouGov kindly provided the researcher with the dataset to allow more thorough analysis of public 
opinion to Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. The original YouGov report can be found at 
https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/04/24/ranking-coalitions/.   
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government risks losing Conservative-leaning voters. For co-operation to be electorally 
beneficial to both parties requires strategic thinking and radical changes in their approaches to 
party competition, and there is little evidence of this taking place in either party. 
The chapter also argues that should the parties be in a position to co-operate post-electorally, 
their own voters do not provide much of an incentive to co-operation. The best data relating to 
Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation stems from 2015. Very few Labour voters were 
enthusiastic about a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition at the 2015 general election, and one 
third even disapproved. While Liberal Democrat voters had broadly similar views to forming 
a Labour-Liberal Democrat or Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, they strongly 
favoured David Cameron as Prime Minister over Ed Miliband. However, if both parties need 
each other to govern in the future then coalition remains a likely prospect. Brought together, 
these conclusions show that there is potential for co-operation between Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats based on electoral concerns, but there are big risks too. Without a big change in 
each party’s thinking, as well as addressing their own fundamental electoral issues, there are 
more reasons to be pessimistic at present. 
 
5.1 Labour and the Liberal Democrats’ electoral position 
First, it is important to examine the precariousness of both parties’ electoral position in light 
of the 2015 and 2017 general elections. Labour won 232 seats at the 2015 general election, 94 
short of a majority. While the constituency boundaries and the electoral system particularly 
favoured Labour between 1997 and 2010, the balance shifted heavily in the Conservatives’ 
favour between 2010 and 2015. For example, the Conservatives previously ‘wasted’ a lot of 
their votes on coming second to the Liberal Democrats in seats in the south west of England. 
Now, those votes have elected Conservative MPs. Meanwhile, Labour is ‘wasting’ votes 
coming in second place to the Scottish National Party in many seats in Scotland. The 
intricacies of the 2015 general election left fewer marginal seats than ever before (Curtice, 
2015). For Labour to achieve a majority, they will need a swing of over 9 percentage points 
from the Conservatives, a fate not achieved by Labour since the 1997 general election. This is 
assuming that the electoral boundaries remain the same. While not certain, there is the 
potential for changes to voter registration and boundaries that will likely damage Labour’s 
electoral prospects even further (Baston, 2014). However, Curtice’s (2015: 39) analysis of the 
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current boundaries shows that any result between a Conservative lead in vote share of 5.8 
percentage points over Labour and a Labour lead in vote share of 12.5 percentage points over 
the Conservatives will result in a hung parliament. While a Labour majority government looks 
difficult to achieve, a hung parliament might not be an unreasonable expectation.  
Indeed, at the 2017 general election the Conservatives won 2.4 percentage points more votes 
than Labour, and there was a hung parliament. Labour won 262 seats. While this has been 
celebrated by many Labour commentators, and indeed is a far better result than many 
academics and analysts predicted (Fisher et al., 2017), Labour still comfortably lost the 
election. They have just four more seats than when Labour contested the 2010 general 
election with Gordon Brown as its leader.  
This leaves Labour with a number of questions about its electoral prospects. Labour did not 
just lose the 2015 general election due to some intricate changes in constituency competition. 
Labour lost because voters did not trust them on the economy, which continued from the 
financial crisis in 2007. Indeed, Labour’s more radical position on the economy under 
Miliband was a risky strategy. As one adviser to the Labour Shadow Cabinet and consultant 
to the manifesto team told me: 
We were always going to lose a chunk of our 2010 vote to the Tories. If 
you remember our 2010 campaign, it was ‘better the devil you know’, 
‘let’s not change course in the middle of a crisis’, ‘the Tories are a risk’. 
Now if you’re a risk-averse… type of voter, what are you gonna do in 
2015? You’re not gonna vote Labour again, you’re gonna vote Tory this 
time (private interview).  
 
Alongside issues relating voters’ perception of the economy, voters did not trust Labour’s 
leadership, and they appeared out of touch on key issues such as immigration and welfare. 
Any efforts to widen Labour’s electoral base between 2010 and 2015 failed. Labour won just 
three seats south of London at the 2015 general election. Bar one (Brighton Pavilion for the 
Greens), every other seat was won by the Conservative Party. Following the 2015 general 
election, Diamond and Radice (2015: xi) argued that the ‘risk for the Labour Party, like social 
democratic parties across Europe, is further electoral defeat and, then inevitably, permanent 
irrelevance’.  
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Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party originally showed little cause for optimism in this regard. 
Noting that Labour lost due to incompetence and distrust on the key issues of the economy, 
welfare, immigration and leadership, Bale (2016: 1) argues: 
It will not win an election five years later by being even less determined 
to balance the books, by being led by someone who looks and sounds 
even less prime ministerial, and by being seen as an even softer touch on 
welfare and immigration. Throw in being regarded as a danger to the 
defence of the realm and the security of its people, too, and you have a 
recipe for total and utter disaster. 
 
Labour continue to trail the Conservatives on the economy, and Jeremy Corbyn continues to 
trail Theresa May on who would make the best prime minister (YouGov, 2017c, YouGov, 
2017a). However, Labour and Corbyn closed the gap on both issues during the 2017 general 
election campaign. As in the Labour leadership elections of 2015 and 2016, Jeremy Corbyn 
showed his abilities as a campaigner. Using data from the British Election Study, Fieldhouse 
and Prosser (Fieldhouse and Prosser, 2017) find that Labour won most of the ‘undecided’ 
voters during the general election campaign. They also find that Labour performed best 
among ‘Remain’ voters, and did well with those that did not want a strong break with the 
European Union. Labour also benefitted from a stunted Conservative campaign, that spent 
time focusing on unpopular issues like specific health care taxes and fox hunting. Labour won 
40 per cent of the vote at the 2017 general election, their best performance since 2001, and yet 
remain quite some way from winning a majority.  
If Labour’s electoral position provides reasons both for optimism and caution, the Liberal 
Democrats’ electoral position provides reasons predominantly for despair. At the 2015 
general election, they received just 7.9 per cent of the vote and won just 8 MPs, a drop from 
23 per cent of the vote and 57 MPs at the 2010 general election.  
In urban areas of northern England where they had built up support as the 
opposition to Labour in both local and Westminster elections, they were 
heavily beaten. Standing against the Conservatives in the south west of 
England, long-standing Liberal Democrat MPs were wiped out. In 
Scotland, along with Labour and the Conservatives, they lost heavily to 
the Scottish National Party (Johnson and Middleton, 2016: 63). 
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The Liberal Democrats, and their Liberal and SDP counterparts before them, have long 
struggled for electoral relevance. Between 1992 and 2010, the Liberal Democrats ruthlessly 
targeted constituencies, winning council seats, a majority on the council and subsequently the 
parliamentary seat (Cutts, 2014). It has been labelled the ‘snowball effect’ (Harrison, 2007), 
or ‘creeping Liberalism’ (Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005). Following the 2010 general election, 
the Liberal Democrats won enough seats to have coalition potential, and following five days 
of negotiations with Labour and the Conservatives they joined the Conservatives in coalition. 
It was electorally disastrous for them. With their previous voters, the Liberal Democrats were 
not perceived as competent in government, lost trust and failed to hold on to seats they had 
built support in over a long period of time (Cutts and Russell, 2015, Johnson and Middleton, 
2016). The 2015 general election showed the weakness of the Liberal Democrat vote.  
Since the referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union, the Liberal Democrats 
have positioned themselves as the ‘voice of the 48 per cent’ that voted to remain. They 
performed reasonably impressively in council by-elections throughout 2016, gaining 29 seats 
(Labour lost 7 and the Conservatives lost 33 in the same period). They also gained the 
Richmond Park constituency from former Conservative MP Zac Goldsmith, the first time they 
have held the seat since 2010. However, their national poll ratings remained stubbornly low, 
and in the 2017 general election, they won just 12 seats (losing Richmond Park), and just 7.4 
per cent of the vote. They lost 375 deposits, even more than they lost in the 2015 general 
election, compared with losing none in the 2010 general election.28 Fieldhouse and Prosser 
(2017) show that the Liberal Democrats lost a share of their 2015 ‘Remain’ vote to Labour. 
Nonetheless, they survived and increased their share of seats, which was by no means 
guaranteed.  
 
                                                   
 
28 A candidate loses their deposits if they poll fewer than five per cent in a constituency.  
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5.2 Theorising electoral incentives and obstacles to pre-electoral co-operation 
Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats are therefore in a very difficult position. Prior to the 
2015 general election, based on opinion polling and election forecasting, both held realistic 
hopes of entering government (Monk and Lambert, 2015). As it happened, they were both 
heavily beaten. Neither party was argued to have a chance of entering government in 2017, 
although Labour were not far away from having a chance at forming a government in a hung 
parliament. Both parties’ electoral position has led some in Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
to suggest that co-operation might electorally benefit each other in the future (Cable, 2016, 
Reed, 2015). Strøm et al. (1994: 316) argue that the more disproportional the electoral system, 
the greater the incentive for pre-electoral pacts or alliances. On this basis, the UK would have 
many cases of pre-electoral co-operation to analyse. As it is, there have only been a small 
number in the last century (Wager, 2015). As shown in Chapter Three, this is partly due to the 
electoral system and party system. For periods of the twentieth century the UK political 
system embodied two-partism. With only two parties competing for office in a winner-takes-
all system, even with a disproportionate electoral system there is little electoral incentive to 
co-operate (Golder, 2005). However, this has been gradually changing to the extent that there 
are more parties and different interactions throughout the UK.  
The argument then is that disproportional electoral systems and multi-party competition 
provides electoral incentives for parties to co-operate (Golder, 2005). In the UK, as of 2015, 
there are 650 single-member districts brought together to form the legislative chamber.29 If 
one section of the electorate, such as the right on a spatial dimension, is represented by one 
political party, and another, the left, is represented by two (or more) parties, the one party on 
the right will win more districts than the left parties as their votes will be split across them. 
The rational act would be for the left parties to form a pre-electoral pact, recognising that in 
some districts it would be much easier for one of them to win without the competition of the 
other. Short of that, each party could encourage tactical voting. As Fisher (2004: 157) defines 
it, a tactical voter is ‘someone who votes for a party they believe is more likely to win than 
                                                   
 
29 Only 632 (631, if the Speaker’s current constituency is included) are relevant to the argument. Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats do not stand candidates in Northern Ireland.  
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their preferred party, to best influence who wins in the constituency’. Evidence from elections 
in Britain suggests that tactical voting is commonplace in general elections, and at the 2010 
general election one in six voters voted tactically (Johnston and Pattie, 2011a). In certain 
constituencies, Labour or the Liberal Democrats could field a ‘paper’ candidate and put little 
or no resources into a seat in the hope of encouraging support for another party.  
Applied in practice to British politics, the left/right spatial dimension example throws up a too 
simplistic problem. Although Labour and the Liberal Democrats have more in common than 
either party does with the Conservatives, they remain different entities with different priorities 
and platforms. However, there are also arguments that both parties have electoral incentives to 
consider co-operation. Both parties, though particularly the Liberal Democrats, benefitted 
from tactical voting by each party’s supporters to defeat Conservative candidates in seats in 
the 1997 and 2001 general elections (Evans et al., 1998). Curtice and Steed (1997) estimate 
that tactical voting won the Liberal Democrats 14 seats in the 1997 general election, while 
more focused analysis of constituency results by Herrmann et al. (2015) estimates that 21 of 
the Liberal Democrats’ victories in the 1997 general election were as a result of tactical 
voting, compared with 9 for Labour. 
There are clear theoretical electoral incentives for co-operation between Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats. However, it necessarily follows that co-operation is not an act without 
electoral consequence (Strøm, 1990): parties will look to co-operate in order to reap electoral 
benefit, but just as it is possible for there to be electoral benefits it is possible for there to be 
electoral costs too. It is a fanciful argument that you can get a plurality of soft left voters 
together to outvote the Conservatives in a majority of seats through some clever process of 
electoral strategy. Labour co-operating with the Liberal Democrats has the potential to win 
both parties votes that might help win seats from the Conservatives. It also has the potential to 
cause some of both parties’ current or previous support to go elsewhere in opposition to the 
idea. In short, if Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation is to have electoral incentive it brings 
with it two key assumptions: 
1. If there are sufficient Labour supporters in seats where the Liberal Democrats might 
defeat the Conservatives, and vice versa, this is an incentive to Labour-Liberal 
Democrat co-operation. 
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2. If this outweighs the number of Labour and Liberal Democrats who, in opposition to 
co-operation, will desert the relevant party, this is an incentive to Labour-Liberal 
Democrat co-operation.  
 
Using a mixture of constituency election data over time, public opinion data and qualitative 
data from interviews from key party figures, we can develop a good understanding of the flow 
of vote in important constituencies, and how this might present incentives and obstacles to 
pre-electoral co-operation. To this end, Table 5.1 shows the number and makeup of seats 
where the Liberal Democrats are in competition with the Conservatives following the 2015 
and 2017 general elections, as well as those where Labour and the Conservatives are in 
competition. This will highlight the potential areas where Labour or the Liberal Democrats 
might withdraw a candidate to further the electoral prospects of the other (and free up 
resources to spend in other constituencies).  
 
Following the 2017 general election, there are 37 seats where the Liberal Democrats and 
Conservatives are the primary competitors, down from 50 in 2015. Of those, 29 are 
Conservative-held and 8 Liberal Democrat-held. Meanwhile, there are 519 seats where the 
Conservatives and Labour are the primary competitors, up from 380 in 2015. Of those, 273 
are Conservative-held and 246 Labour-held. The dominance of Labour-Conservative 
Table 5.1: Seats showing the Conservative’s primary competitors, 2015 and 
2017 general election 
 2015 2017 
N of seats where Conservatives and Liberal Democrats are primary 
competitors 
50 37 
(Conservative-Liberal Democrat) 46 29 
(Liberal Democrat-Conservative) 4 8 
N of seats where Labour vote exceeds either majority 18 15 
N of seats where Conservatives and Labour are primary competitors 380 519 
(Conservative-Labour) 207 273 
(Labour-Conservative) 173 246 
N of seats where Liberal Democrat vote exceeds either majority 31 54 
Note: ‘Primary competitors’ is defined as those that finished in first or second 
place in the constituency. 
Source: 2015 and 2017 British Election Study constituency dataset. 
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competition in 2017 demonstrates not only the collapse of two now former third-parties: the 
Liberal Democrats in 2015, and UKIP in 2017.  
As a starting point, this chapter focuses only on seats where the weaker (potential) co-
operating party’s constituency vote is higher than the winning party’s majority. This is on the 
basis that it is only worth discussing those seats where the entire Labour or Liberal Democrat 
vote going to the other party would have enabled victory for the other party, or substantially 
strengthened its majority if the seat was already held by a Labour or Liberal Democrat 
candidate. This in itself is very unlikely, but highlights that any seat where the weaker party’s 
vote would not generate a different result is not worth including in a discussion of seats for a 
potential pact. It also focuses on constituency results from the 2017 general election as a 
starting point. While focusing on the most recent election leaves this analysis vulnerable to 
shifts in public opinion and changes in constituency boundaries, it is where parties currently 
are and the basis from which they will operate. Focusing on 2017 provides a useful starting 
point from which to understand where Labour and the Liberal Democrats may co-operate in 
the future.  
There are 53 seats where the Liberal Democrat vote is higher than the Conservative or Labour 
majority and 15 where the Labour vote is higher than the Conservative or Liberal Democrat 
majority. In total, it leaves 68 seats where an electoral pact might affect the result in the 
constituency. They do not represent a definite list of constituencies where Labour or the 
Liberal Democrat might withdraw a candidate, but instead that if either party is to consider 
co-operation with each other, there are a group of potential seats that might serve as a starting 
point.  There remain incentives and obstacles beyond that, which are asymmetric in each 
party. The following section thus outlines the specific incentives and obstacles for each party 
in different anti-Conservative contexts. 
 
5.3 Co-operation in Liberal Democrat-Conservative seats 
This section sets out the incentives and obstacles to co-operation in Liberal Democrat-
Conservative seats. Previous research has suggested that in the 1997 general election, the 
Liberal Democrats benefitted heavily from Labour-minded supporters switching their vote to 
the Liberal Democrats in seats where only they could realistically defeat the Conservatives 
(Evans et al., 1998, Herrmann et al., 2015, Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005: 157-160). However, 
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this was at a point where the two parties collectively opposed the Conservatives, to the extent 
that Russell and Fieldhouse (2005: 160) labelled it an ‘anti-Conservative’ alliance in key 
marginal seats. Since then, the two parties have diverged on a series of policy areas, and the 
Liberal Democrats have co-operated in government with the Conservatives. Indeed, data from 
the British Election Study shows that while in 1997, 60 per cent of voters thought the Liberal 
Democrats were closer to Labour than the Conservatives; just 34 per cent of voters thought 
the same in 2010.  
However, it remains the case that there are a small number of constituencies where the Liberal 
Democrats are far better placed to defeat the Conservatives than Labour. Since the Liberal 
Democrats’ inception, their primary electoral competitors have been the Conservatives 
(Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005). There are 15 seats where Labour withdrawing their candidate 
might significantly help this end. Table 5.2 shows these in more detail, outlining whether or 
not the Conservatives or Liberal Democrats are the incumbent party and Labour’s share of the 
vote in the constituency between 1997 and 2017. This is important, as it highlights the 
damaging effects of Labour’s increasing support between 2010 and 2017 on the Liberal 
Democrat vote share.  
Following the 2010 general election, Labour targeted the Liberal Democrats as much as, if not 
more than, the Conservatives. As one of Ed Miliband’s former advisers outlined to me: 
We knew of the 1.5 million Lib Dems who left Labour after Blair and 
Iraq, and they were there for the re-seizing after Blair left. Gordon 
[Brown] never really won them back… but Ed [Miliband] definitely tried 
to win them back, and we thought there were lots of Lib Dems in key 
seats… it was definitely a strategy of ours to pin it on the Lib Dems in the 
first couple of years to get the low-hanging Lib Dem fruit back to Labour 
(private interview). 
 
Labour particularly focused on the Liberal Democrats’ ‘broken promises’ over tuition fees, 
spending cuts and the top rate of income tax (Eaton, 2014, Hurst, 2010a). In terms of winning 
votes, it was successful. Labour won many more votes in the 2015 general election from 
former Liberal Democrat voters than the Conservatives, and won as many votes from former 
Liberal Democrat voters as they did from former Conservative, Green and UKIP voters put 
together (Green and Prosser, 2015). It goes some way to explaining why Labour’s vote share 
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in England30 increased by 3.6 percentage points at the 2015 general election, compared with 
an increase of just 1.4 percentage points in the Conservative vote share in England.  
 
However, it also explains why the Conservatives gained more seats from the Liberal 
Democrats than Labour at the 2015 general election. Labour gained plenty of votes from the 
Liberal Democrats, and it helped win 12 seats from them in the 2015 general election. 
However, many of the votes that Labour gained from the Liberal Democrats were also in 
Liberal Democrat-Conservative marginals. Indeed, in those seats where the Liberal 
                                                   
 
30 The focus here is only on England, as this is where the Liberal Democrat-Conservative seats are. There 
are no other seats where the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives are the primary competitors. 
Table 5.2: Seats where Labour’s vote share exceeds the majority in a 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat constituency, 1997-2017 
Constituency Incumbent Lab 
97 
(%) 
Lab 
01 
(%) 
Lab 
05 
(%) 
Lab 
10 
(%) 
Lab 
15 
(%) 
Lab 
17 
(%) 
Majority  
(%) 
Cheadle Cons 15.7 14.0 8.8 9.4 16.3 19.1 8.3 
Cheltenham Cons 10.1 12.0 11.4 5.1 7.3 9.5 4.5 
Devon North Cons 9.8 10.1 9.0 5.2 7.1 12.7 7.8 
Hazel Grove Cons 11.9 16.2 17.5 12.5 17.5 20.5 12.5 
Lewes Cons 10.6 7.3 9.0 5.0 9.9 11.2 10.2 
Richmond Park Cons 12.6 11.3 9.3 5.0 12.3 9.1 0.1 
St Albans Cons 42.0 45.4 34.3 17.6 23.3 23.0 10.7 
St Ives Cons 15.2 13.3 13.1 8.2 9.3 14.3 0.6 
Bath Lib Dem 16.4 15.7 14.8 6.9 13.2 14.7 11.5 
Carshalton and 
Wallington 
Lib Dem 23.9 18.4 17.2 8.7 15.0 18.4 2.7 
Eastbourne Lib Dem 12.5 13.3 10.9 5.8 7.8 8.1 2.8 
Kingston and 
Surbiton 
Lib Dem 23.0 8.8 13.2 9.3 14.5 14.8 6.6 
Norfolk North Lib Dem 25.1 13.3 9.2 5.8 10.2 9.9 6.7 
Oxford West and 
Abingdon 
Lib Dem 20.2 17.7 16.6 10.6 12.7 12.6 1.4 
Westmorland and 
Lonsdale 
Lib Dem 20.6 10.9 7.6 2.2 5.4 9.3 1.5 
Average Labour 
vote share 
 18.0 15.2 13.5 7.8 12.1 13.8  
Source: Election results, British Election Study constituency dataset. 
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Democrats were fending off a Conservative challenge, more votes went from the Liberal 
Democrats to Labour than from the Liberal Democrats to the Conservatives (Green and 
Prosser, 2015). This is highlighted further in the constituencies listed in Table 5.2, where 
Labour’s vote increased on average by 4.3 percentage points. This contrasts with an increase 
of 1.4 percentage points across Britain. Paradoxically, Labour’s gain in Liberal Democrat 
votes was the Conservatives’ gain in Liberal Democrat seats (Johnson and Middleton, 2016). 
This played a part in helping the Conservatives win a majority in the House of Commons at 
the 2015 general election. Green and Prosser (2015) estimate that 2010 Liberal Democrat 
voters switching to Labour in 2015 cost the Liberal Democrats seven seats to the 
Conservatives’ benefit. Labour putting forward a broader electoral appeal will help them 
tackle the Conservatives in constituencies where they have a local presence and strong 
organisation. However in other seats, Labour needs either to begin to win in seats it has never 
looked in contention, or recognise that another party is better placed to win (Green and 
Prosser, 2015). Electorally speaking, the latter is a much easier option, and presents a strong 
incentive to co-operation with the Liberal Democrats. If Labour supporters in Liberal 
Democrat-Conservative seats can be persuaded that the Liberal Democrats are a substantively 
better option than the Conservatives to the point that they will vote Liberal Democrat, then 
Labour’s electoral prospects are improved. In short, a strong Liberal Democrat party 
electorally damages the Conservatives more than Labour. Labour’s vote share in 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat seats increased further in the 2017 general election, with large 
Labour vote shares and wafer-thin Conservative majorities in seats like Richmond Park and St 
Ives.  
A key issue that arises from this is the extent to which Labour can actually help rectify the 
Liberal Democrats’ current weak position. That a strong Liberal Democrat party damages the 
Conservatives is one thing, but it only acts as an incentive to Labour-Liberal Democrat pre-
electoral co-operation if Labour wants to do something about it, and is actually able to do 
something to make it happen. While the Liberal Democrats lost some seats to the 
Conservatives at the 2015 general election due to lost votes to Labour (Green and Prosser, 
2015), this is not the only reason the Liberal Democrats lost. They lost mainly due to the 
electorate perceiving them as incompetent and untrustworthy (Johnson and Middleton, 2016).  
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How important are potentially switching Labour supporters to the Liberal Democrats 
defeating the Conservatives? Table 5.2 shows the average Labour vote share in key Liberal 
Democrat-Conservative seats. The increase between 2010 and 2017 supports Green and 
Prosser’s (2015) argument regarding the extent to which voters went from the Liberal 
Democrats to Labour following 2010. However, whatever the presence of tactical voting by 
Labour supporters, the success or failure of the Liberal Democrats in the seats it has contested 
against the Conservatives has been primarily dependent on the Liberal Democrats’ popularity 
on certain policy issues (Green and Hobolt, 2008), and local factors and contexts (Cutts, 2006, 
Cutts et al., 2010, Russell et al., 2001). While Labour supporters may have assisted the 
Liberal Democrats, they still remain small in number in these constituencies. The Liberal 
Democrats have previously proved at least equally adept at winning and holding on to votes 
from former Conservative supporters as they have Labour ones. There have been two key 
strands to this. 
First, the Liberal Democrats have sought to develop a programme of policies distinctive from 
the left/right context. In short, the Liberal Democrats have claimed themselves to be ‘not left 
nor right, but radical’ (Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005). As the electorate have become more 
instrumentally focused on competence on valence issues rather than left/right ideological 
differences (Clarke et al., 2009, Crewe and Denver, 1985), the Liberal Democrats have been 
able to gain support by being distinctive on key policy issues such as the Iraq invasion, 
education, Europe and the environment (Green and Hobolt, 2008).  
Second, key to the Liberal Democrats’ success against the Conservatives has been their 
personal incumbency and popularity. As Smith (2013) argues, prior to the 2015 general 
election one of the most difficult tasks in politics was to remove a sitting Liberal Democrat 
MP. Iain Dale (2014), Conservative candidate in the Liberal Democrat-Conservative marginal 
seat Norfolk North in 2005, remarked: ‘every single house we went to… [delivered] the same 
message: “Well, we’re really Conservatives but we’re going to vote for that nice Mr Lamb 
[the Liberal Democrat MP].”… That’s it, I know now I can’t win’. The importance of local 
contexts and incumbency to the Liberal Democrats has now been well noted (Cutts, 2006, 
Cutts, 2014, Johnson, 2014, Smith, 2013). Building arguments from a series of interviews 
with Liberal Democrat MPs and party strategists, Russell and Fieldhouse (2005: 192-198) 
stress the importance of tailoring messages to individual constituencies. Tailoring the message 
in such a manner not only helps to stop the ‘third-party squeeze’ associated with first-past-
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the-post elections in a two-party parliamentary system, but also allows the Liberal Democrats 
to challenge the Conservatives in some areas and Labour in others.  
One Liberal Democrat MP told Russell and Fieldhouse (2005: 195) that ‘we would like to try 
to minimise the perception that we are closer to Labour than we are to the Tories’. This is 
because in a lot of seats where the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives are primary 
competitors, how Labour supporters vote matters a little, but it is not the main factor in 
influencing who wins the seat. As the new Liberal Democrat leader told me in 2016: 
My constituency in particular, has been for a long time, pretty much since 
I stood in 1992, has been Lib Dem vs Conservative. [There were] a few 
Labour councillors, but they finally disappeared in the late 1990s, and 
they’ve never reappeared. Every [council] ward is Lib Dem vs 
Conservative… At general elections, there has always been a heavy 
degree of tactical voting, certainly when I first got elected in 1997 and the 
immediate following election, Labour was virtually reduced to deposit-
losing levels, and that has remained a significant factor. At the last 
general election, we lost some of that tactical support. The Labour vote 
went up considerably, but it was still way way behind the Liberal 
Democrats and the Conservatives (Cable, 2016). 
 
Another former Liberal Democrat MP agrees, highlighting that while former Labour voters 
have been important for Liberal Democrat support, they left Labour not out of tactical 
considerations but a changing view of the Labour Party. 
Our vote in 2010 had consisted of people who were Lib Dems, and 
enthusiastic about us for various reasons, both local and national… Quite 
a large number of working class voters who would have been Labour in 
the 60s and 70s and came over to us in the 80s and 90s and so forth, they 
didn’t greatly like the austerity, they didn’t like immigration. There was a 
new party that stands up for people who are not in the mainstream which 
was UKIP… people initially thought UKIP’s rise would damage the 
Tories but I was always nervous about the impact on us… so there was 
definitely a Labour vote, but that didn’t go up much in 2015, partly lack 
of enthusiasm across the country but they’d also been killed in our area 
(Laws, 2016b).  
 
While those voters who moved back to Labour between 2010 and 2017 might have partially 
cost the Liberal Democrats at the 2017 general election, it was far from the only factor, and 
other considerations must be taken into account. 
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There are probably a few seats, including mine actually, which had we 
not seen some drift in the tactical vote would have been held, just about. 
But it wasn’t the key factor. We basically lost the Conservatives, and they 
panicked a lot of voters. That was more important than the tactical vote 
(Cable, 2016). 
I think what killed us was a lot of soft Lib Dem-Conservative-type voters, 
non-council house, working… aspirational voters who just did not like 
the idea of Ed Miliband, the SNP, and bought into the idea that their seat 
might decide the government. A bit of left splintering off, but not huge… 
the Labour vote didn’t really go up… a large transfer of working class to 
UKIP and then this… late in the day switch [of people] who sort of voted 
Lib Dem without being very political… this time round bought the idea 
that they wanted the status to quo to continue, and the best way for that 
was to vote Conservative. They definitely didn’t want Ed Miliband and 
they certainly didn’t want the SNP (Laws, 2016b). 
 
This presents an obstacle to Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. Would co-operation with 
Labour turn away more Conservative-minded supporters than attract Labour-minded ones? 
For instance, prior to the 2005 general election, this fear was raised by many Liberal 
Democrat MPs, to the extent that then leader Charles Kennedy was forced to signal his 
opposition to governmental co-operation with Labour (Russell, 2005a).  
Much of this will depend on the positions of Labour and the Liberal Democrats ahead of 
future general elections. For the Liberal Democrats, co-operation with a Labour Party winning 
over previous Conservative supporters, such as at the 1997 general election, presents less of 
an obstacle than co-operation with a Labour Party vacating centrist, valence politics. In 1997 
and 2001, and to a lesser extent in 2005, Labour was able to win elections because it was 
more popular and perceived as more competent than the Conservatives (Johnston and Pattie, 
2011b). However, the present position of the Labour Party is unlikely to be one amenable to 
many Conservative supporters (Diamond and Radice, 2015, O'Hara, 2015).   
This is the key challenge for the Liberal Democrats, balancing a multitude of types of soft 
support. Labour and Liberal Democrat co-operation in Liberal Democrat-Conservative seats 
might well bring some Labour supporters back to the Liberal Democrats. Holding all other 
things constant, this is a clear incentive to co-operation. However, the flow of the vote 
outwards could be even greater. Why should a Conservative-leaning voter support the Liberal 
Democrats, if it makes a Labour-led government more likely? If a likely Labour-led 
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government is one that appears competent, trustworthy and aiming to govern in the hallowed 
centre ground, then to vote Liberal Democrat is perhaps less of a risk. However, when the 
potential outcome is a Labour government radically different to the Conservatives then the 
risks are much great.  As Vince Cable told me: 
The same kind of voters who were scared by the prospect of a Miliband-
led government will be even more scared by Corbyn, and they may well 
continue to vote Conservative for reasons of fear (Cable, 2016). 
 
Consideration should be given to how the Conservatives might react to such Labour-Liberal 
Democrat co-operation. During the 2015 general election campaign, the Conservatives 
strongly highlighted the prospect of an Ed Miliband-led government supported by the Scottish 
National Party. Various Conservative Party press releases highlighted ‘Nicola Sturgeon 
walking all over Ed Miliband’, ‘Ed Miliband is in the pocket of Alex Salmond and Nicola 
Sturgeon has him on a leash’ (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015: 172). Leading current and former 
Liberal Democrat MPs have spoken of how this ‘fear’ peddled by the Conservatives was very 
successful in former safe Liberal Democrat seats (Cable, 2015, Clegg, 2015b). Given the 
perceived success of such a campaign (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015, Fielding, 2015), the 
Conservatives would likely campaign in the same fashion again. As one former Liberal 
Democrat MP told me:  
What they [the Conservatives] don’t want to face are Lib Dem candidates 
who look moderate and sensible. What they [the Conservatives] would 
love to do is put us all in a box marked ‘Jeremy Corbyn’ and galvanise as 
large a number of voters against that proposition, which they would have 
no difficulty doing (Laws, 2016b).  
 
The Conservatives tried this again during the 2017 general election campaign, 
warning of a ‘coalition of chaos’, but it appeared more difficult to convince voters 
that a Labour-led rainbow coalition was a likely outcome, given the opinion polls 
and expected comfortable victory. Nonetheless, it remains a problem for co-
operation between the two parties. In short, there are potential electoral incentives 
for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation in Liberal Democrat-Conservatives 
seats. However, there are potentially more risks and challenges at the present time.  
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5.4 Co-operation in Labour-Conservative seats 
An electoral pact would also suggest a Liberal Democrat withdrawal in certain Labour-
Conservative seats. If a pact is initiated alongside a clear and public statement of support for 
co-operation between the two, then Liberal Democrat supporters might be persuaded to move 
to Labour. Even without a pact, evidence continues to suggest that supporters of a party with 
no chance of winning in a constituency will tactically vote for a competitor they can still 
support (Johnston and Pattie, 2011a). All other things staying the same, a full transfer of 
support would lead to 31 gains for Labour over the Conservatives, and 23 Labour-held seats 
strengthened even further. At the 2017 general election, this would have prevented a 
Conservative majority, and would have made a Labour-led government a likely outcome.  
Of course, this would not have happened. The average 2015 Liberal Democrat vote in the 
seats shown in Table 5.3 was 7.0 percentage points, and just 6.0 percentage points in those 
seats at the 2017 general election. This is down by 22.4 percentage points in the same seats at 
the 2010 general election. The collapse of the party’s vote suggests that those people who still 
voted Liberal Democrat in the 2015 general election in those constituencies had a strong 
commitment to the party. Labour may have already won all of the Liberal Democrat 
supporters they could in the 2015 and 2017 general elections. This is supported by broader 
evidence of voting behaviour, which suggests that those with strong identification to a party 
are less likely to vote strategically in an election (Carvalho and Winters, 2014, Johnston and 
Pattie, 2011a). The question arises: why would those people vote Labour if the Liberal 
Democrat candidate stood down?  
One response is: where else would they go? If the Liberal Democrats publicly declare that 
they are co-operating with Labour, then those supporters would arguably be more inclined to 
support Labour than another party. Even if only some of them change their vote to Labour, 
then Labour’s electoral prospects might be improved. However, it is a very questionable 
strategy for so few votes. It is incredibly difficult to accurately anticipate shifts in support 
depending upon a withdrawing party’s instruction (Gschwend and Hooghe, 2008).  
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Table 5.3: Seats where the Liberal Democrats’ vote share exceeds the 
majority in a Conservative-Labour constituency, 2017 general election (%)  
Constituency Incumbent Majority 
(%) 
Lib Dem 
2015 
Lib Dem 
2017  
10-17 
(+/-) 
Aberconwy Cons 2.0 4.6 2.9 -16.4 
Bolton West Cons 1.8 4.0 2.9 -14.3 
Broxtowe Cons 1.5 4.0 4.0 -12.9 
Calder Valley Cons 1.0 5.0 3.4 -21.8 
Camborne and Redruth Cons 3.3 12.4 6.1 -31.3 
Chipping Barnet Cons 0.6 4.5 5.4 -14.8 
Cities of London and 
Westminster 
Cons 8.1 7.0 11.1 -9.4 
Colchester Cons 10.6 27.5 17.0 -31.0 
Finchley and Golders Green Cons 3.2 3.3 6.6 -10.4 
Hastings and Rye Cons 0.7 3.2 3.4 -12.3 
Hendon Cons 2.0 2.2 3.8 -8.6 
Middlesbrough South and 
Cleveland East 
Cons 2.1 3.4 2.8 -13.1 
Milton Keynes North Cons 3.0 6.2 3.9 -18.2 
Milton Keynes South Cons 2.6 3.9 2.9 -14.8 
Morecambe and Lunesdale Cons 3.1 3.7 3.7 -9.6 
Northampton North Cons 2.0 3.6 2.5 -25.4 
Northampton South Cons 2.9 4.3 3.4 -16.0 
Norwich North Cons 1.1 4.3 3.2 -15.1 
Preseli Pembrokeshire Cons 0.8 1.9 2.6 -11.9 
Pudsey Cons 0.7 3.8 3.3 -17.5 
Putney Cons 3.3 6.3 11.6 -5.3 
Reading West Cons 5.6 4.9 5.9 -14.2 
Southampton Itchen Cons 0.1 3.6 3.0 -17.8 
Southport Cons 6.1 31.0 26.4 -23.2 
St Austell and Newquay Cons 20.6 24.0 21.5 -21.2 
Telford Cons 1.6 2.3 2.1 -13.4 
Thurrock Cons 0.7 1.3 1.6 -9.1 
Truro and Falmouth Cons 6.7 16.8 14.9 -25.9 
Watford Cons 3.6 18.1 9.1 -23.3 
Wimbledon Cons 10.9 12.7 14.5 -10.5 
Source: 2015 and 2017 British Election Study constituency dataset. 
 
  
128 
 
 
Table 5.3 (continued): Seats where the Liberal Democrats’ vote share exceeds the 
majority in a Labour-Conservative constituency, 2017 general election (%) 
Constituency Incumbent Majority 
(%) 
Lib Dem 
2015 
Lib Dem 
2017  
10-17 
(+/-) 
Ashfield Lab 0.9 14.8 1.9 -31.4 
Barrow and Furness Lab 0.5 2.7 2.7 -7.3 
Battersea Lab 4.4 4.4 8.0 -6.7 
Bedford Lab 1.6 4.2 5.9 -14 
Bishop Auckland Lab 1.2 4.4 2.7 -19.6 
Canterbury Lab 0.3 11.6 8.0 -24.5 
Colne Valley Lab 1.5 6.0 4.1 -24.1 
Crewe and Nantwich Lab 0.1 2.8 2.4 -12.6 
Derby North Lab 4.1 8.6 4.6 -23.4 
Dudley North Lab 0.1 1.3 0.9 -9.6 
High Peak Lab 4.3 4.7 5.0 -16.8 
Ipswich Lab 1.6 2.9 2.3 -15.9 
Keighley Lab 0.5 2.7 2.4 -12.4 
Kensington Lab 0.1 5.6 12.2 -7.4 
Newcastle-Under-Lyme Lab 0.1 4.2 3.8 -15.8 
Penistone and Stocksbridge Lab 2.6 6.3 4.1 -17.0 
Peterborough Lab 1.3 3.8 3.3 -16.3 
Portsmouth South Lab 3.5 22.3 17.3 -28.6 
Stockton South Lab 1.6 2.6 1.8 -13.3 
Stroud Lab 1.1 3.4 3.2 -12.2 
Warrington South Lab 4.1 5.6 5.4 -22.1 
Warwick and Leamington Lab 2.2 5.0 5.2 -13.1 
Average vote share   7.0 6.0 -22.4 
Note: ‘Average vote share’ is across both sets of results in Table 5.3. 
Source: 2015 and 2017 British Election Study constituency dataset. 
 
Another obstacle to such co-operation for Labour is that by aligning themselves so strongly 
with the Liberal Democrats, they alienate other elements of their support. The electoral 
environment is rather different today than in other periods that Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
operation has been discussed. In the 1990s, Labour and the Liberal Democrats were often the 
only party available to any voters that did not want to support the Conservatives. Now, there 
are many other viable options: UKIP, the Green Party, the Scottish National Party and Plaid 
Cymru have all improved their vote and seat share at local, sub-national or national levels in 
recent years. Co-operation with the Liberal Democrats might win over some new voters, but it 
is a risky strategy that would likely alienate other Labour supporters too. Labour has recently 
failed to broaden its electoral appeal sufficiently while previously losing some of its support 
to UKIP (Ford and Goodwin, 2014, Roberts et al., 2014). This is not just a problem for 
Labour, but also social democratic parties across Europe. As Bale et al. (2009: 423) argue, 
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most parties end up ‘mixing and matching, boxing and coxing, in the hope that they can stay 
competitive without surrendering too many of their values and too much of their credibility’.  
For the most part, the Liberal Democrats are not particularly competitive in the potential pact 
seats, although local parties might still have issues with withdrawing their candidate. There is 
very little chance of them winning most of these seats at the next general election. However, 
as is the case with Labour in Liberal Democrat-Conservative seats, it would be an admission 
of defeat in a manner rarely seen in British politics. For a party that claims to represent all 
corners of Britain, they would be withdrawing from seats across England (and one in Wales, 
in this table).  
More specifically for the Liberal Democrats, it would potentially limit the Liberal Democrats’ 
scope as a political party. While co-operation with the Conservatives might be off the table in 
the short term due to the nature of electoral competition between the two, the Liberal 
Democrats have co-operated with the Conservatives in government. They defended their 
actions to the country, and while Tim Farron sought to slightly distance his party from the 
2010 coalition government, and Vince Cable will likely attempt the same, both maintain that 
it was the right decision to join the Conservatives in coalition. It would be a decisive shift in 
rhetoric, strategy and identity to break with that past and align the Liberal Democrats with 
Labour against the Conservatives. This would not just be being anti-Conservative, which is a 
perfectly reasonable course of action for an independent political party, but would be a clear 
signal of support for Labour over the Conservatives. As one former Liberal Democrat MP 
told me: 
I think that there are reasons why people go out and support the Lib Dems 
rather than voting Conservative or Labour. There have to be good reasons 
to join a small party rather than a large party. I never like the idea that we 
are pro- or anti- one of the big parties. We’re an independent party, we 
think that the differences between us are significant enough that we want 
to actually join a small party and fight our way through that much more 
difficult path (Laws, 2016b). 
 
5.5 Pre-electoral considerations for both parties 
This chapter has so far shown the different incentives and obstacles to pre-electoral co-
operation for both parties in different electoral contexts. This section brings these arguments 
together. As outlined in the theoretical framework, co-operation has the potential to improve a 
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party’s electoral position and subsequently the prospects of achieving office. However, it is 
very difficult to predict with confidence the benefits and costs of co-operation. In a party 
system with different electoral competition in different constituencies, trying to predict the 
flow of vote shares from one party to another becomes more complex. However, if parties can 
be confident that co-operation will lead to more votes being accurately converted into seats, 
they are more likely to pursue that electoral objective (Strøm, 1990: 588). 
For Labour, co-operation with the Liberal Democrats might help prevent a Conservative 
majority, and potentially make a Labour-led coalition more likely. If the Liberal Democrats 
strengthen their position, this will be primarily at the expense of the Conservative seats, and at 
the same time Liberal Democrat-leaning supporters voting Labour in key Labour-
Conservative seats could help Labour. Viewed in this context, co-operation is an appealing 
prospect. However the Liberal Democrats’ electoral position is fundamentally weak following 
the 2015 and 2017 general elections, and they face a monumental battle to rebuild credibility 
both in their strongest areas and across the country (Cutts and Russell, 2015, Johnson and 
Middleton, 2016). One of Ed Miliband’s former advisers thinks that co-operation is an 
unlikely strategy for Labour, but it might be short sighted for Labour not to think about it in 
the long term: 
The game has changed… it’s a historic dilemma. That [19]97 dilemma is 
one for the history books, not for the future. Which I do think could be 
short sighted. The Tories will have a rough two or three years… but I 
think the Lib Dems will be the beneficiaries of that… most places south 
of Birmingham and west of London wouldn’t contemplate voting Labour. 
So the Lib Dems will pick up… [but] the prospects of understanding that 
logic are low… probably in the long term that’s not right (private 
interview). 
 
The Liberal Democrats’ membership boost after the general election and local by-election 
victories in the south west of England and elsewhere suggests that there is room for them to 
begin to recover in their former heartlands (Cutts and Russell, 2015). In a small but important 
number of seats there are enough Labour voters to suggest that co-operation would yield 
electoral benefits. However, it is very much dependent upon context and there is a very fine 
balance between attracting Labour-leaning supporters and losing Conservative-leaning ones. 
The Liberal Democrats’ electoral position remains primarily one in competition with the 
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Conservatives, and the party’s proximity to Labour is always a problematic issue. This would 
likely be a much larger problem with a Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Party than at any other 
point in the last thirty years.  
Given the perilous state of both parties’ electoral position, they face huge challenges. 
Overcoming them has the potential to deliver greater electoral benefit than just co-operating 
with each other. Neither party will benefit by just retreating to ideas of a ‘progressive 
alliance’: the argument that if only every non-Conservative voted as they should has little 
going for it. People do not vote rationally, and even if they did there is little that is rational 
about assembling an anti-Conservative coalition devoid of any other purpose. Not being a 
Conservative is not a sufficient foundation for a winning coalition of political parties: co-
operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats only has incentives if both parties 
address their individual challenges. For Labour, this means addressing their perceived 
incompetence on the economy and leadership, and their questionable judgement on 
immigration and welfare. For the Liberal Democrats, this means winning back support at a 
local level, and showing the section of voters in society who might back them in the future 
that it can be trusted to represent them again. If the more fundamental challenges of party 
competition are addressed by each party, then Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation might 
be a successful strategy to defeat the Conservatives in key seats and help both parties achieve 
office. If not, it is likely to further boost the chances of a third consecutive term in office for 
the Conservatives.   
 
5.6 Incentives and obstacles to post-electoral co-operation 
So far, this chapter has addressed the pre-electoral constituency-level considerations for 
Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. This is an important and often overlooked form of co-
operation (Golder, 2005). However, it does not dismiss the importance of considering post-
electoral co-operation, either in the form of coalitions or confidence and supply ‘contract 
parliamentarianism’ agreements, which remain a fundamental part of party co-operation (Bale 
and Bergman, 2006, Debus, 2008, Martin and Stevenson, 2001). This section addresses public 
opinion, both broadly and specifically the attitudes of Labour and Liberal Democrat 
supporters, to post-electoral co-operation generally and between the two parties. If co-
operation is to aid each party’s office-seeking intentions, then understanding public opinion is 
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fundamental to understanding the broader incentives and obstacles for each party. Do the 
electorate support co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats? Do they support 
co-operation between parties more broadly? Are Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters 
likely to support co-operation between the two parties? 
While researchers bemoan the lack of attention paid to pre-electoral co-operation, both 
comparatively and in Britain (Golder, 2005, Wager, 2015), the increased level of attention on 
post-electoral co-operation in Britain since 2010 has fortunately provided more data on the 
subject. The annual Hansard Society Audit of Political Engagement tracks various attitudes to 
political issues, and focused a great deal on coalition government in their 2011 report. Their 
qualitative study yielded mixed responses to coalition. Many felt that coalition would help 
‘defuse extreme situations’ that the country might face at any one time, while others argued 
that coalition would simply provide the governing parties with an easy excuse for not 
delivering on their manifesto (The Hansard Society, 2011: 27-28). Particularly amongst 
Liberal Democrat supporters, a strong argument was that coalition with the Conservatives was 
synonymous with ‘betrayal’. This echoes arguments regarding the Liberal Democrats’ loss of 
electoral support during the 2010 parliament (Dommett, 2013, Johnson and Middleton, 2016).  
This qualitative research can also be complemented by quantitative data on attitudes to 
coalition government. Table 5.4 shows data from the 2015 British Election Study, and it 
shows that voters largely prefer single-party government. Just 8 per cent felt that coalition 
government is more effective than single-party government. Another issue is that parties need 
to be able to show to the electorate that they can deliver policies in coalition (Duch et al., 
2015). Between 2010 and 2015, the Liberal Democrats failed to do this (Johnson and 
Middleton, 2016), and based on the responses in Table 5.4, voters do not think this is possible 
in coalition. Only 21 per cent felt that coalitions were more in tune with public opinion than 
single-party governments, and just 14 per cent felt parties can deliver policies in coalition. 
Nearly two thirds of voters agree that parties cannot deliver on promises in coalition. Finally, 
a key trade-off of being in office is that there are electoral benefits and costs that you receive 
at subsequent elections (Strøm, 1990). The data in Table 5.4 suggests that voters find this 
aspect of party competition harder in coalition; only 24 per cent said it was easier to attribute 
blame in coalitions than single-party government. 
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Table 5.4: Electorate’s views on coalition government 
 Agree (%) 
Coalitions are more effective than single-party governments 8 
Coalitions more in tune with the public than single-party governments 21 
Parties can deliver on promises in coalition 14 
It is easier to attribute blame in coalitions 24 
N: 30027. Source: 2015 British Election Study 
 
Brought together, the results in Table 5.4 suggest a distinct lack of support for coalition 
government. The electorate think that single-party government is more effective, that parties 
do not deliver on their promises in coalition, and that it is harder to distinguish between 
individual parties’ policies. Alongside this, the Liberal Democrats’ collapse at the 2015 
general election might suggest an appetite to return to single-party government. However, 
while the Liberal Democrats suffered, this did not see a large upswing in the two main parties’ 
share of the vote. Indeed, this increased by just 2.3 percentage points, while even after 
accounting for the Liberal Democrats’ decline minor parties just did as well (Green et al., 
2015). Green et al. (2015) go further to suggest that the likelihood of a hung parliament 
incentivised voters to support smaller parties, which increases the likelihood of coalitions in 
the future. While the public’s attitude to it is hardly positive, it does not appear entirely 
dismissive of the idea as a form of government. 
The 2017 general election was a marked difference in this regard.  
With a combined 82.4 per cent share of the vote, the two main parties 
received their largest combined share of the vote since 1970… such trends 
were mirrored in a slump of public support for ‘the others’, with the share 
of the vote going to parties other than Labour or the Conservatives falling 
from thirty-two per cent in 2015 to just 17.5 per cent two years later 
(Heath and Goodwin, 2017). 
 
Heath and Goodwin (2017) are sceptical that this temporary return to two-party politics will 
become permanent. Indeed, scepticism about any aspect of politics in the future is a wise 
course of action. However, while it was a marked rejection of minor parties in comparison to 
previous general elections, it did not yield a return to majoritarian politics.  
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The expected hung parliament ahead of the 2015 general election campaign facilitated some 
surveys that asked voters about their attitudes to different coalition outcomes that might 
happen.31 At this point, a hung parliament and a range of subsequent governmental outcomes 
was forecast by academics and commentators (Monk and Lambert, 2015). Table 5.5 sets out 
public opinion ahead of the 2015 general election to a range of different possible 
governmental outcomes. Firstly, there is a preference for majority government over coalition. 
The most popular responses from the list are a Conservative majority government, followed 
by a Labour majority government. This chimes with the data in Table 5.4, that single-party 
governments are preferred by voters. However if a coalition was to have formed after the 
2015 general election, then the Liberal Democrats appear to be the preferred partner with 
voters. Following the two majority governments, the next preferences are for a Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition or a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. In contrast, when other 
minor parties like the SNP or UKIP were brought in, support fell sharply. This suggests that 
voters in 2015 credited the Liberal Democrats as a potentially moderating force on the two 
major parties. 
Table 5.5: Support for outcomes ahead of the 2015 general election  
 Support (%) 
Majority Conservative government 48 
Majority Labour government 45 
Labour – Conservative coalition 24 
Labour – Liberal Democrat coalition 37 
Labour – SNP coalition 28 
Labour – Liberal Democrat – SNP coalition 28 
Conservative – Liberal Democrat coalition 42 
Conservative – Liberal Democrat – UKIP coalition 28 
Source: YouGov – 21 April 2015. N: 2060.  
 
                                                   
 
31 Errors in sampling and weighting meant that opinion polls did not accurately reflect public opinion ahead 
of the 2015 general election, and the data should be viewed in this context.  
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Using the full data from the YouGov survey on 21st April 2015 allows more detailed analysis 
of attitudes to Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. The next part of this chapter runs a logistic 
regression model, questioning the predictors of attitudes to Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
operation ahead of the 2015 general election. If one party finds co-operation more appealing 
than another then this presents incentives and obstacles that should be examined. It also 
allows analysis of other predicting variables and their effect on support for co-operation 
between the two parties.  
The main independent variables used here are whether people intended to vote (1) or not vote 
(0) Labour or Liberal Democrat in the 2015 general election. The same retrospective variables 
in regard to the 2010 general election are also used. Whether or not people intended to vote 
Conservative in 2015 is controlled for. As well as their expected opposition to coalition 
politics, it is expected that they will be negative about a coalition government not including 
the Conservatives. Given the ‘progressive’ label often attached to the Green Party, whether or 
not respondents intended to vote for them in 2015 is controlled for. The limits of the data does 
not allow attitudes to valence issues like the economy and immigration to be included, but 
whether or not respondents thought David Cameron or Ed Miliband would be the best Prime 
Minister is controlled for, along with socio-demographic variables. 
What results should we expect of Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters? Anything other 
than a positive predictor would be very surprising, since both parties’ supporters should want 
their party to be in government. However, there might be differences between the two parties. 
Liberal Democrat voters should be more supportive of coalition between the two, as the only 
realistic chance of the party experiencing government is with a larger party. The party has 
also conducted a more pluralistic approach to politics, spending the early stages of the 2010 
coalition government prioritising coalition unity and co-operative government (McEnhill, 
2015). However, some Liberal Democrat supporters might prefer a Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition to a Labour-Liberal Democrat one. For Labour, the continued attempts to 
preserve the narrative of a two-party system in Britain suggest that while Labour voters might 
support a Labour-led coalition, they will be less supportive than Liberal Democrat voters 
(Green et al., 2015, Lees et al., 2010, Webb, 2000).   
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Table 5.6 shows a logistic regression predicting support for coalition government.32 As 
expected, both Labour and Liberal Democrat voters at the 2015 general election were more 
likely to support a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition than non-Labour and non-Liberal 
Democrat voters, with large positive odds ratios reported. However, Liberal Democrat voters 
(odds ratio of 4.05) were more likely to support a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition than 
Labour voters (2.59). The same goes for both parties’ 2010 voters, though again larger effects 
are found for the Liberal Democrats (3.43) than Labour (1.94). Other factors are also found to 
be significant. Green Party voters were more likely to support a Labour-Liberal Democrat 
                                                   
 
32 Results here are discussed in terms of odds ratios (eb). The odds ratio shows how changes in the 
independent variable influence the odds of an ‘event’ (Johnson and Rodger, 2015). Odds ratios higher than 
1 show a positive relationship, and lower than 1 show a negative relationship. The further away from 1 an 
odds ratio is, the greater the effect of the independent variable.  
Table 5.6: Logistic regression predicting support for a Labour-Liberal 
Democrat coalition following the 2015 general election 
 β Odds ratio (eb) 
Labour voter (2015) 0.95*** 2.59 
Lib Dem voter (2015) 1.40*** 4.05 
Green voter (2015) 0.90** 2.46 
Best PM – David Cameron -0.75*** 0.47 
Best PM – Ed Miliband 0.36 1.43 
Labour voter (2010) 0.66*** 1.94 
Lib Dem voter (2010) 1.23*** 3.43 
Age -0.02*** 0.98 
Sex 0.23 1.26 
Degree 0.31* 1.37 
Income 0.03 1.03 
Constant -0.89** 0.41 
  
 
Nagelkerke R2: 0.35 
-2 Log Likelihood: 1434.281 
Bold figures denote significant effects: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
Dependent variable: support for a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition or agreement. 
Source: YouGov, 21 April 2015 
N: 1821 
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coalition, highlighting some support from other elements of the ‘progressive alliance’.33 
Those who thought Ed Miliband would make the best Prime Minister after the 2015 general 
election were no more likely to support a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition, though a p 
value of .057 suggests there may be some evidence to support a relationship. Unsurprisingly, 
those who thought David Cameron would make the best Prime Minister were less likely. The 
younger a respondent, the more likely they were to support a Labour-Liberal Democrat 
coalition after the 2015 general election, and those respondents with a degree were also more 
likely to support such a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. A respondent’s sex or income had 
no effect. 
Liberal Democrat voters are amenable to coalition with Labour. This is the case for those who 
voted Liberal Democrat in 2010 too, suggesting that even if the Liberal Democrats manage to 
regain some of their previous support they will still support co-operation with Labour. While 
Labour voters are not as supportive as Liberal Democrat voters, particularly those who 
supported Labour in 2010, the difference between them is not great. This is important. In spite 
of a better than expected performance in 2017, Labour still face electoral challenges that make 
winning a parliamentary majority a difficult prospect (Curtice, 2015, Diamond and Radice, 
2015). As shown earlier in this chapter, they may need the Liberal Democrats to damage the 
Conservatives’ chances of victory in future elections. Beyond that, they need to at least 
contemplate co-operation with other parties to boost their own chances of winning office and 
implementing policy. While the depth of support for broader co-operation cannot be 
examined, based on this evidence, Labour voters are supportive of coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
Given that the expected outcome of the 2017 general election was a working Conservative 
majority, there was much less focus on either a Labour government, or any potential 
                                                   
 
33 The opinions of Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru voters were not available.   
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outcomes resulting from a hung parliament, including Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. 
For example, the British Election Study asked no questions on coalition outcomes in its 2017 
election waves. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be drawn.  
Both parties are at a critical juncture. Both parties lost heavily in the 2015 general election, 
and prepared for the eventualities of a hung parliament after the 2015 general election only to 
find a Conservative majority government elected instead. Labour increased its vote share at 
the 2017 general election to its highest point since 2001, but still finds itself only on 262 
seats. This chapter has shown that the electoral incentives and obstacles to co-operation 
between Labour and the Liberal Democrats are wide-ranging. For both parties, co-operation 
might bring about an opportunity to prevent a Conservative majority government, and 
subsequently a potential Labour-Liberal Democrat or Labour-led government. Given that 
parties are primarily office-seeking, this provides a significant electoral incentive to co-
operation. There are also individual incentives. Labour will be competing against a weakened 
Conservative Party if the Liberal Democrats are stronger. If the Liberal Democrats can count 
on the support of Labour supporters in Conservative-Liberal Democrat marginals then there is 
potential for the party’s electoral prospects to significantly improve, which is crucial for the 
party’s survival in the coming years. 
However, the electoral obstacles are numerous too. In the short term, it is a huge move by 
Labour to change its position on the Liberal Democrats to one of open co-operation. Most 
Liberal Democrat supporters willing to tactically support Labour probably already voted 
Labour in the 2015 general election (Green and Prosser, 2015), and this appears to have been 
echoed in the 2017 general election (Fieldhouse and Prosser, 2017). To co-operate with the 
Liberal Democrats would be to spend political capital on a move that could achieve very little 
electoral benefit in Labour seats, or potentially backfire by haemorrhaging support to the 
Conservatives and other parties. The idea that a strong Liberal Democrat party might damage 
the Conservatives was never given any consideration by the Labour leadership between 2010 
and 2017.  
Prior to the 2017 general election, Labour was the biggest party of a divided centre-left 
political spectrum, and the Conservatives were able to utilise that to great effect in the 2015 
general election (Diamond and Radice, 2015). Whether Labour can adequately translate its 
success in winning votes into seats in Westminster remains to be seen. However for now, 
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should the Liberal Democrats’ electoral prospects not improve, the Conservatives will 
continue to be the beneficiaries of a weak opposition in the south west and south east areas of 
England (Curtice, 2012). Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats are struggling to regain 
electoral ground in Scotland. Labour must respond where it can to try and win back some of 
those seats and improve its own electoral prospects. However, there are some areas that are 
out of Labour’s reach. Throwing a bone to the Liberal Democrats might ultimately be an 
advantage to Labour’s cause. 
For the Liberal Democrats, to co-operate with Labour would be to effectively abandon the 
idea that the Liberal Democrats are open to co-operation with the Conservatives. To co-
operate with Labour could have an immediate and negative impact on some of its more 
Conservative-minded support, and would certainly not automatically heal the wounds of the 
2010-2015 Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition for centre-left voters. However, given 
the perilous state of the Liberal Democrats’ electoral position, co-operation with Labour could 
potentially improve their electoral position and subsequent coalition potential in future hung 
parliaments. Finally, public opinion toward potential co-operation at the 2015 general election 
showed that voters have a clear preference for majority governments over coalitions, but not 
to the extent that it has caused a return to two-party electoral politics (Green et al., 2015). 
While there was a much greater return to two-party politics in 2017, there are reasons to be 
sceptical that this is permanent (Heath and Goodwin, 2017). Both Labour and Liberal 
Democrat voters at the 2015 general election were more likely than others to support a 
Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. 
The electoral incentives and obstacles to co-operation are numerous and complicated, and 
have a substantial impact on the broader decisions that political parties must make about co-
operation. Ultimately, they form part of a process that must be considered alongside other 
incentives and obstacles to co-operation, such as a party’s ideologies and policies, their 
organisations and their leaderships. The electoral and public opinion concerns here suggest 
that there are potential electoral benefits from co-operation between Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats, but big potential costs too. Each party focusing on addressing their individual 
electoral issues, while not completely closing the door to co-operation, might be the best 
course of action.   
140 
 
 
Chapter 6: The influence and attitudes of each party’s members and 
activists on Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation 
 
This chapter assesses the extent to which Labour and the Liberal Democrats’ grassroots can 
influence the potential for the two parties to co-operate with each other, and what form this 
influence might take. Despite a declining activist and membership base for parties across 
Western democracies (van Biezen et al., 2012, van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014), local parties 
remain vital links between state and civil society, and members and activists are still able to 
represent citizens’ interests when engaging in political activity (Clark, 2004, Scarrow and 
Gezgor, 2010). This is for a number of reasons. First, their activists and members provide a 
direct link between parties and voters, communicating national policy directly to the 
electorate through campaigning (Samuels and Zucco, 2015). Second, in Britain and 
elsewhere, political parties heavily rely on members’ subscriptions and donations for financial 
stability and security. Finally, members and activists provide candidates for elections. Even 
where membership is falling, non-member volunteers still contribute to a party’s local 
activism (Fisher et al., 2014, Mjelde, 2015). Specifically in the context of this thesis, the 
importance of members, activists and local parties to both Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
has also been shown (Cutts, 2014, Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 2013). 
It is clear that a party’s organisation matters, and as the ‘basic element’ of a party’s overall 
organisation (Duverger, 1954), the attitudes of a party’s grassroots to its party’s broader 
activity is important. Two broad questions are important in relation to the potential for co-
operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. First, to what extent do the grassroots 
have influence within each party’s organisation? The greater their influence, the greater the 
extent they can affect the potential for co-operation between the two parties. Key texts on 
party organisational influence generally attribute only low levels of influence to a party’s 
grassroots (Kirchheimer, 1966, McKenzie, 1955, Michels, (1915) 1959, Panebianco, 1988). 
However, their contribution to a party’s electoral fortunes and campaigning (Fisher and 
Denver, 2009) suggests that parties cannot simply ignore them. Specific analysis of political 
parties in Britain also shows that the grassroots sometimes have the ability to embarrass a 
party or overturn a decision (Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011), and political party elites 
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often work with different levels of their party’s organisation more than is often given credit 
for (Laffin and Shaw, 2007, Russell, 2005b). 
Second, to what extent does a party’s grassroots agree or disagree with their party elites on the 
issue of co-operation? If the Labour or Liberal Democrat grassroots appear to agree with their 
party elites on co-operation with each other, then they present little obstacle to co-operation. 
Almost amounting to a common wisdom, May (1973) suggests that party members and 
activists are more radical than party elites, and Webb and Bale (2014) draw similar 
conclusions in their study of Conservative Party activists. If this is the case with Labour and 
Liberal Democrat activists, then they might find co-operation disagreeable. However, Norris 
(1995) finds that members and activists are not the most radical stratum of a political party. 
Van Holsteyn et al. (2015) similarly find no evidence of a pattern of radicalism by party 
grassroots. The extent to which members and activists diverge from their party’s elites is 
important.  
This chapter applies the organisational element of the thesis’s theoretical framework: to what 
extent can each party’s grassroots influence their party’s approach to co-operation, and to 
what extent do each party’s grassroots’ attitudes differ from their party’s elites? Throughout, 
the chapter makes use of primary survey data of Labour and Liberal Democrat local party 
chairs, conducted ahead of the 2015 general election, when a hung parliament and subsequent 
Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation was a plausible outcome. While the sample is not 
representative of either party’s members as a whole, nor does it necessarily reflect the 
attitudes of each party’s grassroots in light of recent political events, it is the best obtainable 
data with the resources available. First, the chapter applies arguments from the comparative 
literature regarding the extent of grassroots influence to analysis of Labour and Liberal 
Democrats. This is done by analysing each party’s formal and informal organisational 
structures, as well as analysing party activists’ perceptions of influence within their party. 
Second, the chapter assesses opinion structures within each party’s organisation, by 
measuring ideological radicalism, what the most important issues are in each party, and the 
importance of policy, office and vote-seeking theories to the grassroots. Third, the chapter 
analyses the attitudes of each party’s activists to co-operation with each other and other 
parties. The chapter concludes by assessing the extent to which each party’s grassroots is able 
to provide incentives or obstacles to co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats.  
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6.1 Organisational structures 
6.1.1 Labour 
This section outlines the extent of grassroots influence within Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats. Firstly, what influence do the grassroots have within the Labour Party? Labour 
members and activists have a range of opportunities to get involved and have influence in 
their party. They have rights and representation through their local Constituency Labour Party 
(CLP), which recruits and organises members in each parliamentary constituency in Britain 
(Webb, 2013),34 and local branch parties. CLPs select delegates for annual conference, who 
vote on key policy issues and changes to the party’s rulebook. CLPs are also represented by 6 
delegates on the 33-strong National Executive Committee, which is responsible for party 
governance on a day to day basis. These parties, along with the Parliamentary Labour Party 
(PLP) and other affiliated groups, including trade unions and socialist societies, make up the 
organisational representation that attends annual conference.35 
Through their CLPs and branch parties, members also select candidates for elections to public 
office, and collectively the membership elects the party leader. Since 1993, parliamentary 
candidates have been selected by constituency Labour party members using one-member-one-
vote (OMOV).36 There is also now OMOV in place when electing the Labour Party leader, 
following changes introduced by former party leader Ed Miliband, or more accurately one-
member/supporter-one-vote, as supporters can now pay a one-off fee to vote in a leadership 
election. Labour raised over £4 million from supporters joining to vote in the 2016 leadership 
election between Jeremy Corbyn and Owen Smith.37 In an open contest for Labour leader38, 
candidates for the leadership must have the backing of fifteen per cent of the parliamentary 
                                                   
 
34 In Scotland, CLPs are organised according to Scottish Parliamentary constituency boundaries.  
35 The new Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has signalled changes to Labour’s organisational structure to 
afford the grassroots more rights over candidate selection and policy. Until these changes are outlined in 
any detail, this chapter assumes the current structure for analysis.  
36 Previously, Labour has used an electoral college system, with certain levels of the party organisation 
having more votes and influence than others.  
37 When the window opened for supporters to join, Angela Eagle was also a candidate, but she withdrew to 
support Owen Smith.  
38 The contest between Jeremy Corbyn and Owen Smith in 2016 did not adhere to this rule, as Jeremy 
Corbyn was deemed not to be an ordinary candidate, but the sitting leader.  
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party, but during the previous two Labour leadership elections where this rule has applied it 
has, in practice, been bypassed. Both in 2010 (Diane Abbott) and in 2015 (Jeremy Corbyn), 
candidates unpopular in the parliamentary party have still been nominated to stand in order to 
‘encourage debate’. In September 2015, Jeremy Corbyn was elected Labour leader by the 
party’s members and supporters, much to the chagrin of many of Labour MPs, including some 
who nominated him. 
Members and activists can also join, or stand for election to join (in the case of the PLP), 
other affiliated organisations that afford them rights and influence in Labour. Affiliated 
organisations include Constituency Labour Parties and the Parliamentary Labour Party, but 
also other groups. For instance, affiliated trade unions have long had an important role in the 
Labour Party’s organisation. Whilst any influence they have had has largely been through 
supporting the party’s parliamentary leadership at conference (Minkin, 1991, Shaw, 2003), 
this has often been the result of a process of disagreement, debate and resolution (Laffin and 
Shaw, 2007). Other affiliated organisations and ancillary bodies also exist within the Labour 
Party, such as the Fabian Society and women’s and young people’s sections (Webb, 2013). 
These groups often represent diverse opinion within the Labour Party, and can have important 
influence not just on the party’s organisation but also electoral and policy debates in the party 
(see Roberts et al., 2014). 
It is important to distinguish between formal and informal structures that permit influence 
within a party’s organisation (Heidar and Saglie, 2003). Formally, the grassroots within a 
party have very little influence. However in practice, members and activists may tolerate 
leadership control because the Labour leadership plan policy and strategy in anticipation of 
what their grassroots think. For example, debates for party conference are decided according 
to submissions by CLPs and affiliated organisations, which are then mediated by the National 
Policy Forum (Russell, 2005b). Also, particularly in the New Labour era, affiliated trade 
unions were willing to oppose the leadership where they felt their members’ interests were at 
risk, such as during debates on the Private Finance Initiative, and constituency parties 
occasionally supported this (Laffin et al., 2007). A recent example is the 2015 party 
conference’s decision not to debate Trident renewal, despite Jeremy Corbyn’s express wishes 
to do so. 
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Over half a century ago, McKenzie (1955) argued that power within the Labour Party rested 
predominantly with the parliamentary elite. To what extent has that changed? Webb (2000) 
argues that reforms to the policy making process since 1987, most notably the ‘Partnership in 
Power’ reforms of 1997 which set up the National Policy Forum (NPF), have strengthened the 
hand of the Labour party elite even further, although Russell (2005b: 185-186) suggests that 
reforms have simply confirmed the power structure that had already been established. Indeed 
in the policy context at least, there has not been much dissent from McKenzie’s (1955) thesis 
that power lies with the Labour party leadership. Whilst the reformed organisational 
arrangements still leave the potential for dissent and damage should the collective will of 
party activists and members wish it (Russell, 2005b: 281-283), in practice, members and 
activists are effectively excluded from formally influencing Labour Party policy (Rye, 2015, 
Webb, 2013, Webb, 2000). 
That such rights and responsibilities have ever been associated with membership of the 
Labour Party is questionable. As Drucker (1979: 46) argues, the notion that Labour’s internal 
processes were once democratic was always its ‘central myth’. Why would members and 
activists tolerate this? He argues that a key norm of Labour Party behaviour is ‘loyalty to the 
leader’ (Drucker, 1979: 12-16). Drucker’s argument can be plausibly extended to mean 
‘loyalty to the leadership’. Since 1987, Labour’s organisational reforms, particularly to 
policy-making, have strengthened the party elite and yet members and trade unionists have 
largely supported them. They largely got behind the argument made by party leaders Kinnock, 
Smith and Blair: that some activists who displayed radical tendencies were damaging the 
party’s chances of electoral victory (Webb, 2000). 
The idea that elites dominate a party’s organisation at the expense of a party’s grassroots has 
become an accepted argument in the comparative literature (Clark, 2008). The organisation 
model that has historically been argued to be most appropriate to Labour is Panebianco’s 
(1988) ‘electoral-professional’ model (Russell, 2005b, Webb, 2000). Panebianco’s work 
builds on Kirchheimer’s (1966) concept of the ‘catch-all’ party model, which theorised that 
parties seek to develop electorally popular policies without the constraint of party members 
and activists. However, models are a useful guideline but can never be an exact 
representation. Panebianco’s thesis does not sufficiently address the importance of the 
grassroots in maintaining and strengthening a party’s organisation (Clark, 2004, Duverger, 
1954, Fisher and Denver, 2009, Geser, 1999, LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966, Sartori, 2005). 
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In particular, Labour’s organisational structure is currently being challenged by leader Jeremy 
Corbyn and supporters within the Parliamentary Labour Party. Although the issue of who 
controls Labour structures and policy has always being a contentious issue, fundamental 
questions about Labour’s internal structures have now been opened up, and have yet to be 
resolved at the time of writing (Russell, 2016). For example, the party is currently openly 
debating and disagreeing over reducing the threshold of MP support for any prospective 
leadership election candidate. 
Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership led to huge rises in Labour’s membership and support base. 
Supporters were allowed to join the Labour Party for a tiny fee so long as they subscribe to 
the ‘aims and values’ of the party. Whatever the party’s constitution stated, this was largely 
left to the individuals themselves to define (Watts, 2017) The danger is that, in changing how 
individuals participate in a party without thorough understanding of the consequences, it 
becomes unclear who has authority (Scarrow, 2014). The consequences in Labour have been 
to open up a debate about who parliamentarians are there to represent: people in their 
constituency or people in their party. 
Related to this has been the emergence of the activism group Momentum. Momentum 
evolved from Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership campaign in 2015, and actively supports the 
Labour Party. People can join Momentum so long as they are at least 14 years old, a Labour 
Party member, and agree to its ethical code. This code strongly implies that Labour’s 
intervention in Iraq was an ‘illegal war’, and seeks to work with those Constituency Labour 
Parties that share Momentum’s ‘aims and principles’ (Momentum, 2017). While little has 
changed in Labour’s formal organisational structures under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, 
much has changed informally. The result is a series of different organisations and debates 
about what Labour’s territory and purpose is. As Watts (2017: 15) argues: 
The older and clearer sense of tribalism through which legitimacy amongst 
Labour’s elites over the boundaries of the party was propagated has 
vanished. Notions of the collectivities of class and class experience, once 
central to both policy and party structure, were cast aside by successive 
Labour leaderships in favour of structures which focused to a substantial 
extent on developing Labour as a political mirror of those that inhabited it. 
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At the time of writing, these debates are not being won by the Labour ‘moderates’ that have 
largely led the Labour Party since World War Two. Momentum activists look to play an 
active role in Labour Party politics, and have quite a fractious relationship with many Labour 
MPs. The ‘moderate’ wing of the party has sought to bolster itself through groups such as 
Progress and Labour First.  
However, the more intra-party tensions continue to dominate Labour’s thinking, the less 
appealing the Labour Party is to moderate, centre parties like the Liberal Democrats. Likely 
less appealing are the Liberal Democrats to Labour. While they may share views with the 
Liberal Democrats on issues of defence and military intervention, there is a greater faith in the 
politics of principle, and an opposition to ‘watering down’ principles in order to be 
pragmatically and electorally successful. This newly dominant wing of the Labour Party is 
less disposed to Liberal Democrat co-operation than others.  
Webb (2000: 208-209) summarises his work on Labour’s party organisation by ‘concluding 
that whereas Labour once provided an imperfect example of Duverger’s mass party, latterly it 
has evolved in the direction of the electoral-professional party’. At the time of writing, it is 
unclear in what direction it is now evolving. While the party’s modernisation process in the 
1980s and 1990s prioritised electoral imperatives over democratic and ideological ones, and 
the advance of professional ‘experts’ within the party (Russell, 2005b, Webb, 2000) only 
strengthened links with Panebianco’s thesis, this has now been challenged by the election of 
Jeremy Corbyn as leader. It has not yet been overturned: the party’s leadership retains the 
fundamental final authority, and it might be that Corbyn fails to change the structure. For 
now, this section adopts an admittedly frustrating ‘time will tell’ conclusion. 
 
6.1.2 The Liberal Democrats 
To what extent do the grassroots have influence within the Liberal Democrats? The party’s 
constitution claims that the party is organised along geographically federal lines. Indeed, there 
is a genuine devolution of power from the central ‘federal’ party to the sub-national and local 
levels (Laffin, 2007: 654-655). The English, Scottish and Welsh ‘state’ parties are devolved 
from the British ‘federal’ party, with each state party having the constitutional freedom to 
manage its own affairs, debate and decide policy specific to their constitutional responsibility, 
and select candidates for national and devolved institutional elections. The English state party 
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is divided into twelve regional parties39, each of which has representation on the party’s 
English Council. Devolved from each of the English, Scottish and Welsh state parties are 
‘local parties’, whose constitutional role is to choose prospective candidates for local and 
parliamentary elections.  
The central ‘federal party’ forms the professional aspect of the party. As well as developing 
strategy for national and European Parliament elections, the federal party is also responsible 
for party policy and strategy at the national level, international relationships and the 
presentation and image of the party. Its role remains ambiguous beyond that, with the 
constitution permitting it to ‘do anything else which is incidental to its functions’ (Liberal 
Democrats, 2012: 10). Such ambiguity exists throughout the constitution, and it has been 
suggested that some strata are better placed to exploit their position than others (Russell and 
Fieldhouse, 2005: 58).  
Evans (2007) notes the tension for the Liberal Democrats in trying to become a more 
electorally professionalised party that still adequately represents the interests of its members 
and commits to the rules of its constitution (also see Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005). She found 
that, while members and membership organisations are theoretically able to influence party 
policy via the federal conference, in practice this process is undermined by the vetting of 
motions, and the disregard for motions that are eventually passed. That the Liberal Democrats 
have professionalised and this has impacted upon members and activists is undeniable (Evans 
and Sanderson-Nash, 2011). However, as discussed in the electoral chapter such analysis can 
often be in danger of underestimating the continued importance local parties and members can 
have on political parties and the democratic process. The importance of local parties is 
especially the case for the Liberal Democrats, who have long struggled to achieve and 
maintain national success, and subsequently relied upon establishing themselves in local areas 
first (Johnson, 2014).  
                                                   
 
39 Although representing a body of people as opposed to a geographic region, this list also includes Liberal 
Youth and Students (LYAS). 
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The strength of the Liberal Democrat grassroots is demonstrated in the final period of Paddy 
Ashdown’s leadership, between 1997 and 1999. Ashdown’s support for ‘The Project’, co-
operation with Labour under leader Tony Blair, was increasingly at odds with his party 
membership. They found it harder to accept co-operation when the Labour government failed 
to deliver on electoral reform in Westminster elections and reform to the House of Lords 
(Brack, 2007). In several votes at party conference, both on policy areas and future coalition 
negotiation rules, the membership showed that they did not share his continued enthusiasm 
for co-operation with Labour, and the breakdown in relations between the leadership and 
grassroots ultimately led to his resignation in 1999. His successor Charles Kennedy did not 
continue such a co-operative relationship with Labour leader Tony Blair.  
The most notable vote at party conference during that period was the decision to adopt the 
‘triple lock’. The triple lock was established in 1998 to give the party grassroots a veto over 
‘any substantial proposal which might affect the Party’s independence of political action’ 
(Pack, 2011). The spirit of this ‘lock’ is to include significant pre- and post-electoral co-
operation, i.e. both electoral pacts and coalitions/confidence and supply agreements. The first 
‘lock’ is that a three-quarters majority of the parliamentary party and the Federal Executive 
must support the proposal. Failing that, the second lock stipulates that a two-thirds majority of 
representatives at a specially convened conference support the proposal. Failing that, the third 
lock stipulates that a majority of all members (voting in a ballot) support the proposal. 
The triple lock was partially enacted during the coalition negotiations following the 2010 
general election. The first lock was passed comfortably, with more than three quarters of the 
parliamentary party and Federal Executive supporting the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition. Clegg went further than he was required to, convening a special conference of 
grassroots representatives to request their approval for the coalition. This was granted 
overwhelmingly, but it is unclear what the leadership would have done had they not. 
Certainly, the leadership were getting backing before being forced to do so at a later date 
(Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011). However, the conference has now become mandatory. A 
special article was added to the party’s constitution prior to the 2015 general election, which 
stated that in the event of a proposed coalition, a special conference would be convened 
automatically. 
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The professionalisation of the Liberal Democrats has been widely analysed in recent years 
(Evans, 2007, Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011, Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005, Russell et al., 
2007). Their general argument is that a party previously consisting of a small number of MPs 
deferred to its grassroots less often as the size of its parliamentary party increased. By 2005 
the Liberal Democrats had 62 MPs, increasingly coming from a more professional 
background instead of from the party’s local councillors (Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011). 
The flexible interpretation of the party’s constitution gave much more power to the larger 
group of MPs (Russell et al., 2007). How this will change after the 2015 general election, 
where the party returned just 8 MPs but still has 108 peers in the House of Lords, is currently 
unclear.  
A model of party organisational structure that is most applicable to the Liberal Democrats is 
provided by Ruud Koole (1994). His ‘modern cadre party’ model builds on earlier party 
organisational models to argue that the ‘mass’ label cannot be sustained, given the largely 
continuous declining membership of political parties (also see van Biezen and Poguntke, 
2014, Mair and van Biezen, 2001, van Biezen et al., 2012). Koole characterises the modern 
cadre party as having a predominant professional elite (particularly at the parliamentary 
strata), but one that is accountable to the lower strata in the party, has an electoral strategy that 
seeks a wide pool of voters, but not enough to be ideologically diluted to a ‘catch-all’ party, 
and finally has a reliance on both the state and party members for financial resources. Heidar 
((2001), cited from Heidar and Saglie, 2003: 221-222) adapts Koole’s theory to argue for the 
‘network party’ which, like Evans’ (2007: 100) analysis of the Liberal Democrats, is 
characterised by a mixture of ‘cadre’ and ‘mass’ elements. Alongside Koole’s articulation of 
the modern cadre party’s characteristics, Heidar argues that network parties maintain their 
party organisation as a basis for debating and deciding new policy and recruiting new elites. 
In this sense, party policy and strategy is developed within party networks that are similar to, 
but less formal than, the concept of ‘mass party’ democracy (Heidar and Saglie, 2003). The 
models of Koole, and Heidar and Saglie, provide a reasonably accurate characterisation of the 
Liberal Democrats’ organisational structure. Members and activists continue to have more 
power and influence than their Labour counterparts, yet face a structure which is increasingly 
geared towards professionalisation and adapting their party to an external audience. 
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6.2 Grassroots perspectives on influence  
This section analyses each party’s organisational influence further by establishing grassroots’ 
perceptions of membership influence in each party. In doing so, it applies the Thomas 
theorem: ‘if… [people] define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ (Thomas 
and Thomas, 1928: 572). The grassroots are a party’s voice on the ground (Mair, 1994), and 
the actions that a party’s grassroots might take in a party is dependent upon their own 
perception of their influence. This section measures the perceptions of local party chairs. In 
practice, local party chairs are also among the most likely to be involved in party activity, 
such as candidate selection, leadership selection or submissions and votes in relation to party 
policy. They are well placed to understand the extent of membership influence within a 
political party. Surveys of grassroots have been shown to be a good indicator of party 
organisational influence in the past (Clark, 2008, Fisher, 2000). 
Together, the analysis so far suggests that neither party’s grassroots will feel very influential 
in their organisation, but that the Liberal Democrats’ grassroots will feel more influential than 
Labour’s. This is tested in Table 6.1, which shows local chairs’ responses to statements about 
broad membership influence: namely influence over electoral strategy, party policy and 
whether or not they feel the party leadership listens to members.  
Table 6.1: Perception of membership influence in the Labour and Lib eral 
Democrat parties (%) 
 Disagree Neither agree/nor 
disagree 
Agree 
 Labour Lib Dem Labour Lib Dem Labour Lib Dem 
‘The leadership 
listens to ordinary 
members’ 
54 31 22 20 22 49 
‘Members can 
influence party 
policy’ 
52 11 28 14 21 75 
‘Members can 
influence electoral 
strategy’ 
64 30 21 29 15 42 
N: 101 (Labour); 121 (Liberal Democrat). Don’t knows excluded. 
Source: Survey of Labour and Liberal Democrat constituency parties, 2014-2015. 
   
The main pattern that emerges in Table 6.1 is that Labour respondents do not perceive the 
party membership to have as much influence in their organisation as Liberal Democrat 
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respondents do. Just 22 per cent of Labour respondents agree in some shape or form that the 
Labour leadership listens to party members. This compares with 49 per cent of Liberal 
Democrat respondents. The difference between Labour and Liberal Democrat respondents is 
highlighted even further when considering membership influence over party policy. Here, just 
21 per cent of Labour respondents agreed that the membership had any influence, compared 
with 75 per cent of Liberal Democrat respondents. Far fewer Liberal Democrat respondents 
agree that members have influence over electoral strategy: only 42 per cent of respondents 
agreed with this statement, compared with just 15 per cent of Labour respondents.  
The conclusion that Liberal Democrat respondents perceive party members as very influential 
and that Labour respondents perceive their members as not influential at all would be too 
simplistic. However, the data gives further weight to the analysis so far that the Liberal 
Democrats’ organisational structure permits more grassroots influence than Labour’s. The 
Liberal Democrat data also suggests that to label every party’s grassroots as unimportant parts 
of a party’s decision-making process is inaccurate. However, the perceived lack of influence 
over electoral strategy suggests that Liberal Democrat grassroots might not have influence in 
discussions regarding electoral pacts or other strategies. While members and activists were 
able to achieve policies such as the ‘triple-lock’ to limit leadership power on coalition 
negotiations, it may not be as strong with regard to electoral strategy that affects co-operation. 
The data in Table 6.1 suggests that there will be a difference between the two parties in regard 
to organisational influence over Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. This is tested further 
in Table 6.2, which reports grassroots’ responses to statements about specific membership 
influence: namely influence over the 2010 coalition negotiations. Liberal Democrat members 
were consulted via a special conference convened eleven days after the general election. 
Labour members were never consulted. It is thus expected that Liberal Democrat respondents 
perceive their members to be more influential. It also asks the normative question of whether 
they would have liked the membership to have influence over any coalition negotiations that 
might have happened after the 2015 general election.  
Table 6.2 shows that when organisational influence is applied to specific cases of co-
operation, the Liberal Democrat respondents feel that their respective party’s members have 
more influence than Labour respondents do. Looking back to the coalition negotiations that 
took place after the 2010 general election, 32 per cent of Liberal Democrat respondents felt 
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that members had influence. This is in contrast to Labour, who largely confined discussion to 
a small group of MPs and advisers to then Labour leader Gordon Brown (Adonis, 2013).40 
Not a single Labour respondent felt that party members had any influence over Labour’s 
coalition negotiations following the 2010 general election. While on the one hand this is 
unsurprising, given the lack of planned membership consultation by Gordon Brown had he 
achieved a coalition or agreement with the Liberal Democrats, it still highlights the 
differences between membership influence over co-operation between the two parties. 
Table 6.2: Perception of membership over co-operation (%) 
 Disagree Neither agree/nor 
disagree 
Agree 
 Labour Lib Dem Labour Lib Dem Labour Lib Dem 
‘Members had 
influence in the 
coalition negotiations 
following the 2010 
general election’ 
95 45 5 24 0 32 
‘I would like to have 
greater influence 
over coalition 
negotiations 
following the 2015 
general election’ 
6 3 16 12 78 85 
N: 101 (Labour); 121 (Liberal Democrat). Don’t knows excluded. 
Source: Survey of Labour and Liberal Democrat constituency parties, 2014-2015. 
 
However, while Liberal Democrat respondents gave a more positive response, it is hardly 
overwhelming. More respondents disagreed with the idea they had influence. This supports 
Evans and Sanderson-Nash’s (2011) argument, that the special conference convened after the 
2010 general election served more to tie people in to a potentially unpopular decision, than it 
did constitute genuine engagement with the grassroots.  
                                                   
 
40 The Conservatives adopted a similar approach to Labour. As Kavanagh and Cowley (2010: 221) point 
out, the coalition negotiations on the Conservative side were ‘driven by a handful of Cameron’s close 
confidantes, and involving the shadow cabinet and the parliamentary party only sporadically, and only 
when the leadership needed it’. 
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The difference in influence between the Labour and Liberal Democrat grassroots might in part 
be explained by context as much as organisational structure. Owing to their status as a more 
minor party than Labour and the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats have discussed 
coalitions and co-operation for years, and organisational difficulties in relation to co-operation 
forced the ‘triple lock’ to be added to the party’s constitution (Brack, 2007). Prior to 2010, 
Labour were in government and not thinking particularly strongly about any post-election co-
operation. Indeed, they expected to badly lose the 2010 general election, and it was only 
closer to the election that they thought a Conservative majority could be prevented (Adonis, 
2016). Put in this context, a difference in planning between Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
is unsurprising. However had there been a hung parliament and coalition negotiations after the 
2015 general election, as expected, the Liberal Democrats would have consulted their 
membership via a special conference as they did in 2010. Labour planned no consultation 
with their membership at all (private interview, 2016).  
The data so far suggests that while Liberal Democrat members feel more influential in their 
party than Labour members do in theirs, neither party feels particularly influential in relation 
to affecting the potential for party co-operation. The next question in Table 6.2 asks 
respondents the then prospective question of whether or not they would like influence over 
any co-operation after the 2015 general election, when a hung parliament was deemed likely 
and Labour-Liberal Democrat post-election co-operation was a distinct possibility (Monk and 
Lambert, 2015). It therefore gives an interesting insight into the normative responses of each 
party’s grassroots. Here, both parties’ grassroots wanted members to have influence over any 
potential co-operation, with 78 per cent of Labour respondents and 85 per cent of Liberal 
Democrat respondents agreeing with the statement that members should have a say in any 
coalition negotiations after the 2015 general election. Very few respondents in either party 
disagreed with the statement. There appears a strong disconnect between what each party’s 
grassroots wants to have and what they actually have.  
 
6.3 Opinion structure within Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
The previous section of this chapter outlined the influence that Labour and Liberal Democrat 
local party chairs think their grassroots have, both in general and specifically with regard to 
co-operation. This section analyses the attitudes of each party’s grassroots to co-operation 
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itself. The extent to which each party’s grassroots’ attitudes differ from the party elites has 
important consequences for the potential for co-operation. If they differ greatly, this might 
present an obstacle to co-operation. Comparative literature has broadly assumed the 
grassroots to hold more radical views than the party leadership and the electorate. Such an 
assumption was outlined by May (1973) with the ‘law of curvilinear disparity’. The law can 
be summarised as follows. Voters are argued to be moderate actors and tend to endorse a 
continuation of the status quo. Party leaders, as rational actors, are argued to be keen to 
capture their votes in order to achieve political office, and so will cater to the voters’ views. 
Activists are argued to stand apart, however, and insist upon far more radical programmes 
than most voters would support. Parties are thus successful when their elites are able to pursue 
an electoralist strategy that at the same time does not dissatisfy their activists. How does 
May’s Law apply to the potential for co-operation between Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats? Following the law would mean that Labour activists would be more left-wing 
than party elites and voters, and it stands to reason that they would be ideologically further 
distant from the more centrist Liberal Democrats as well. While the Liberal Democrats are 
often discussed as neither left nor right (Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005), their ideology and 
history, as discussed elsewhere in this thesis, suggest that members and activists might veer 
more to the left than right. 
What is the importance of this for the potential for co-operation between Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats? Both parties co-operating would involve some form of policy agreement, 
likely on a moderate, centrist platform (Diamond and Kenny, 2012, Grayson, 2010, Harrop 
and Lee, 2015). If May’s Law is found to be evidenced in Labour and the Liberal Democrats, 
and each party’s grassroots are more radical than their leaders, then this presents party 
organisation as an obstacle to co-operation. Party elites might be forced to abandon co-
operation, or seek support for policies with which a coalition partner might disagree. 
However, if each party’s grassroots are of similar mind to their leaders, or even more 
moderate, this would suggest that should party elites from both parties find it beneficial to co-
operate with each other, they may not face heavy objection from their own activists and 
members. Indeed, they might face an incentive.  
Evidence suggests that ideological attitudes vary across party strata, and do not uniformly 
conform to a curvilinear disparity. Norris (1995) responds to May’s claims in a study of the 
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various strata of the British Labour and Conservative parties. She finds instead that activists 
and members are ideologically located between party leaders and voters, with leaders 
generally articulating themselves as the most radical. Van Holsteyn et al. (2015) conclude that 
May’s Law should be retitled ‘May’s myth’, with no conclusive evidence that a party’s 
grassroots are more radical than its leaders. However, such findings are not universal. Indeed, 
Webb and Bale (2014) found that Conservative party activists are heavily motivated by 
ideological concerns, and display more radical tendencies. Mair’s (2000: 30) analysis of 
Labour’s party organisation shows the ‘initial resort to plebiscitary techniques within the 
party, aimed at overwhelming the militant activists’, which builds upon Katz and Mair’s 
(1995) ‘cartel party’, which afforded rights to the mass atomised membership at the expense 
of the undercut radical activists.  
When testing May’s Law, Norris (1995: 34) made four demands that should be met in order 
to convincingly test it: all party strata should be included (1); more than one party should be 
compared (2); the dependent variable of radicalism should be clearly set out (3); and groups 
of activists within the party should be specified (4). As Van Holsteyn et al. (2015: 4-5) 
contend, no study has managed to satisfy all four tests. To collect sufficient data from all 
party strata at a similar point in time is a very challenging task. However, the 2014-2015 
survey of constituency party executives collected data that measures the perception of 
radicalism by party activists of each party’s organisational strata. This applies May’s Law in a 
manner that is conducive to addressing key questions of the thesis. This chapter is concerned 
with what each party’s grassroots might do if they disagree with their leaders regarding co-
operation. If they perceive their leaders to be less radical than themselves, then this represents 
perceived disagreement, and subsequently an obstacle to co-operation.  
This survey does not satisfy Norris’s first requirement that all party strata are included, 
although where data on other party strata is available, this is included.41 To be clear, this 
chapter is not setting out to conclusively test May’s Law as Norris specifies, although it still 
                                                   
 
41 Where available, secondary data showing the average left-right positions of other party strata is also 
shown in Table 6.4.   
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makes a contribution to the broader literature on attitudes of different strata within party 
organisations. Instead, it sets out May’s Law in a manner that questions the effect of party 
organisation on co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. To this end, the 
other three requirements are met. To meet Norris’s second requirement, both Labour and 
Liberal Democrat activists are surveyed. To meet the third requirement, radicalism is defined 
as movement towards the left or right as measured by respondent placement on a left-right (1-
10) scale (Norris, 1995: 34). While research has shown that attitudes within the ‘activist’ 
stratum is unrelated to their substantive position within that strata (Van Holsteyn et al., 2015), 
where possible the survey meets Norris’s fourth requirement that a party’s hierarchy needs to 
be more clearly specified than in May’s original paper. To this end, the chapter distinguishes 
between ‘voters’, ‘members’, ‘officers’ and ‘leaders’. How this is defined is set out in Table 
6.3. 
Table 6.3: How party are defined using the 2014-2015 survey 
Leaders A party’s elected MPs 
Officers Local party chairs (respondents to the survey) 
Members Those members not in official party positions 
Voters A party’s voters and supporters 
Source: (Adapted from Norris, 1995)  
 
Using May’s Law as a starting point, we can expect that officers will be the most radical in 
each party (1), voters will be the least radical in each party (2), and Labour will be to the left 
(more radical) than the Liberal Democrats (3). These expectations are tested in Table 6.4, 
which shows the average left-right position of the various strata of Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats, as perceived by the grassroots respondents in the 2014-2015 survey. The first 
expectation, that officers will be perceived to be the most radical, holds in Labour and partly 
holds in the Liberal Democrats. For Labour, officers are perceived to be the most radical, 
followed by members, leaders and then voters. For the Liberal Democrats, officers and 
members are perceived to be jointly radical, followed by leaders and then very closely by 
voters. The second expectation, that voters will be perceived to be the least radical, thus holds 
amongst both parties’ respondents. The final expectation, that Labour will be more radical 
than the Liberal Democrats at all levels, also holds.  
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Table 6.4: Opinion structure within Labour and the Liberal Democrats , as 
perceived by local party chairs 
 Labour Lib Dems 
Leaders  4.11 4.71 
Officers  2.85  4.22 
Members  3.22 (2.17*) 4.22 (3.73*) 
Voters  4.39 (2.93**) 4.77 (4.02**) 
N: 101 (Labour); 121 (Liberal Democrat). Scale of 1 (Left) to 10 (Right) 
Source: Survey of Labour and Liberal Democrat local party chairs, 2014-2015 
Note: *This is taken from the ESRC Party Members project (Bale et al., 2016), showing how 
each party’s members perceive themselves on a 1-10 left/right scale. 
** This is taken from the 2015 British Election Study (pre-election wave), showing how each 
party’s voters perceive themselves on a 1-10 left/right scale. 
 
Some interesting results arise from Table 6.4. Firstly, there is not a big distance between 
Labour and Liberal Democrat perceptions of left-right space. Labour and Liberal Democrat 
respondents perceive their respective leaders and voters to be situated in broadly the same 
place. On the policies parties put forward and where parties need to win electoral support, 
activists perceive Labour and the Liberal Democrats to be in a similar place. The larger gaps 
between the two parties only appear at the member and officer level. Here, Labour 
respondents perceive themselves and party members to be more radical than Liberal 
Democrat respondents perceive themselves and party members. Even then, the gap is not very 
large. Interestingly, data from the ESRC Party Members project (Bale et al., 2016) suggests 
that both parties’ members see themselves as more left-wing than local party chairs perceive 
them to be. This may be due to the influx of new party members following the 2015 general 
election. Overall, at every stratum of their party, Labour and Liberal Democrat officers 
perceive their parties to be on broadly similar ground at the centre-left of British politics.  
Table 6.5: Labour grassroots’ perception of opinion structure within the 
Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat party organisations  
 Labour Lib Dems Conservatives 
Leaders 4.11 5.90 8.47 
Members 3.22  5.09 8.52 
Voters 4.39  5.07 7.43 
N: 101 (Labour); 121 (Liberal Democrat). Scale of 1 (Left) to 10 (Right) 
Source: Survey of Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, 2014-2015 
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Table 6.6: Liberal Democrat grassroots’ perception of opinion structure 
within the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat party organisations  
 Labour Lib Dems Conservatives 
Leaders 3.71 4.72 8.28 
Members 2.84 4.22  8.57 
Voters 3.78 4.78  7.76 
N: 101 (Labour); 121 (Liberal Democrat). Scale of 1 (Left) to 10 (Right) 
Source: Survey of Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, 2014-2015 
 
The next set of data examines how each party’s grassroots perceive other political parties. 
Table 6.5 shows how Labour party chairs perceive opinion structure within the Labour, 
Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties, and Table 6.6 sets out the same data for the 
Liberal Democrats’ party chairs.42 At every stratum, Labour respondents perceive the Liberal 
Democrats as more right wing than Liberal Democrat respondents’ do. Similarly, at every 
stratum, Liberal Democrat respondents perceive Labour as more left wing than Labour 
respondents do. Together, this suggests a greater divergence between the two parties’ 
grassroots than was shown in Table 6.4. This does not provide a strong incentive to co-
operation between the two parties. Nonetheless, the perceived differences are smaller than the 
differences either party is perceived to have with the Conservatives. Both Labour and Liberal 
Democrat respondents place their respective parties, at every stratum, closer together than 
they do either of their respective parties and the Conservatives. Liberal Democrat respondents 
placed Labour and the Liberal Democrats closer together more than Labour respondents. 
Interestingly, Labour respondents felt that Liberal Democrat elites were the most right wing 
within their party (5.90), particularly compared with voters (5.07). Nonetheless, they still 
placed the Liberal Democrats much closer to Labour than the Conservatives. Based on the 
data presented here, the grassroots within Labour and the Liberal Democrats do not hold 
attitudes that represent an overwhelming obstacle to co-operation between the two parties. 
                                                   
 
42 This does not include officers, as the data measures voters, members and leaders.  
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Kitschelt (1989) and Norris (1995) make strong criticisms of May’s Law. Kitschelt in 
particular argues that May’s (1973) conception of opinion structure within political parties is 
based on a fundamentally reductionist psychology. Narud and Skare (1999) suggest that a 
different way to tackle this is to also question the saliency of different issues, and whether this 
differs between party elites and party grassroots. The argument here is that party grassroots 
might have different priorities that are not the concern of voters, but the concern of more 
radical activists. The importance of saliency in public opinion and politics in Britain has long 
been noted (Clarke et al., 2009, Stokes, 1963), but also applies to party organisation 
(Kitschelt, 1989). As before, this is not testing May’s Law in the manner suggested by Norris 
(1995) but instead testing the importance of different policy issues to different strata of party 
organisations. If each party’s grassroots place different emphasis on policy, then this might 
represent an obstacle to co-operation. 
The 2014-2015 questionnaire asked respondents to rank their most important policy priorities, 
and also to rank what they thought their broader party’s most important policy priorities are. 
This serves two purposes. First, it reveals potential differences in priorities between Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats. If the parties are to co-operate, then it will rely on different levels 
of each party’s organisation having some ideological convergence. Second, it reveals potential 
differences in priorities between party elites and grassroots. If Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats find areas of common ground that are not shared by their grassroots, this could 
lead to organisational obstacles to co-operation.  
Party elites might have different priorities to a party’s grassroots. The salience of issues in 
British politics as demonstrated by public opinion is likely to shape, guide and determine the 
issues that political parties will prioritise (Clarke et al., 2009, Muller and Strøm, 1999). In 
recent years, the economy, immigration and the NHS have been the most important issues to 
the British public (Johnson and Rodger, 2015). Political parties will also look to ‘own’ certain 
issues. Labour has long been associated with the NHS and education, and between 2010 and 
2015 the party tried to make living standards a key issue that the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition would be judged on (Bale, 2015a, Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). 
Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats have been associated with education, the environment, 
Europe and constitutional reform (Brack, 1996, Grayson, 2007). However, local parties might 
have different priorities to national parties due to different political contexts. For example, 
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local parties are unlikely to prioritise foreign affairs, and similarly national parties are 
unlikely to prioritise local government.  
Table 6.7 shows each local party chairs’ policy priorities, and their perception of where they 
perceive their national party’s priorities to be. Firstly, two of the most salient issues in British 
politics, the economy and the NHS, are identified as among the most important to each 
party’s grassroots and perceived to be among the most important to the national party. This is 
particularly the case for Labour, with 98 percent of respondents arguing the NHS to be a 
priority for their national party. However, it also ranked jointly second by Liberal Democrat 
respondents, and ranked third in their perception of national elite priorities. However, the 
other main salient issue of immigration is not ranked as a priority by either party’s grassroots, 
nor do they argue it to be a priority for the national party. This is particularly surprising for 
Labour, who made a big effort to prioritise and win support on their immigration policy ahead 
of the 2015 general election (Bale, 2014). However, just eight percent of Labour’s grassroots 
perceived it to be a priority for their national party (seven percent for Liberal Democrat 
respondents).    
Secondly, issues that the party have looked to ‘own’ are shown as priorities in Table 6.7. 
Labour has long argued itself to be the ‘party of the NHS’, and is easily highlighted as the 
most important issue by their grassroots. Living standards are also ranked highly both by 
Labour’s grassroots for themselves and in their perception of their party’s elites, reflecting 
former Labour leader Ed Miliband’s focus on it throughout the 2010 parliament (Bale, 
2015a). Labour’s focus on public services more broadly is also reflected in support for 
education and welfare as a priority for the grassroots and in their perception of national elites. 
For the Liberal Democrats, education and the environment are ranked highly by the party’s 
grassroots and in their perception of national party elites. However, the European Union and 
constitutional reform were largely ignored as priorities for the Liberal Democrats. The lack of 
priority associated with constitutional reform may reflect the defeats in the referendum on the 
Alternative Vote in 2011 and House of Lords reform in 2013, and the acceptance or 
resignation (for now) that those issues are not in voters’ minds. However, support for the 
European Union was a key part of the Liberal Democrats’ differentiation from the 
Conservatives during the 2010 parliament (Goes, 2015), and its absence among Liberal 
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Democrat respondents is surprising. Conducting the survey again in light of recent events 
might have brought about different views.  
Table 6.7: Local party policy priorities, and perception of national party 
policy priorities 
 Labour Liberal Democrats 
 Local 
(%) 
National 
(%) 
Local/national 
gap 
Local 
(%) 
National 
(%) 
Local/national 
gap 
Constitutional 
issues 
4 1 3 10 16 -6 
Economy 50 74 -24 62 78 16 
Education 39 30 9 43 44 -1 
Environment 1 2 -1 34 25 9 
EU 
membership 
0 2 -2 11 22 -11 
Foreign affairs 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Immigration 1 8 -7 5 7 -2 
Law and order 2 0 2 7 4 3 
Living 
standards 
52 61 -9 15 17 -2 
Local 
government 
17 0 17 38 3 35 
NHS 89 98 -9 43 36 13 
Pensions 3 1 2 4 8 -4 
Taxation 3 8 -5 11 26 -15 
Welfare 38 15 23 14 11 3 
Source: Survey of Labour and Liberal Democrat local parties, 2014-2015.  
N: 101 (Labour); 121 (Liberal Democrat) 
Note: Answers ranked 1, 2 and 3 in the list of options are added together to give the total 
shown. 
 
What differences are there between Labour and the Liberal Democrats? Issues that are salient 
to the public are broadly shared, such as the economy and public services. Many issues are 
largely ignored as priorities by respondents across both parties, such as pensions and law and 
order. There is some divergence, however. The NHS is a much more important issue for 
Labour, with nearly all respondents highlighting it as a most important issue, particularly for 
their national party. Welfare and living standards are also more important for Labour 
respondents than the Liberal Democrats. The environment, membership of the European 
Union, taxation and constitutional issues are more important to Liberal Democrat respondents 
than Labour respondents. While these differences also reflect matters of emphasis, they also 
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potentially reflect differences of substance. As shown in the ideological and policy chapter of 
this thesis, Labour and the Liberal Democrats have different policies on some of these issues, 
and that too might represent an obstacle to co-operation. 
Table 6.7 also explores areas of convergence and divergence between party elites and 
grassroots. The data reflects a broad convergence between party chairs and how they perceive 
party leaders. There are differing degrees of emphasis: both parties’ local chairs, particularly 
the Liberal Democrats’, place more importance on local government than they perceive their 
national party to. This has potential implications for grassroots’ support; especially if co-
operation were to have an effect on party support in local government elections. Liberal 
Democrat respondents place more importance on the environment than they think the national 
party does. Labour grassroots place more importance on welfare than they perceive the 
national party to, which may help explain much of the anger with the Parliamentary Labour 
Party ahead of the Welfare Bill in July 2015. Both parties’ grassroots perceive their national 
parties to place more importance on the economy and taxation.  
Altogether though, there is not much to suggest significant degrees of difference between 
each party’s grassroots and how they perceive their national party. Based on this evidence, 
each party’s grassroots do not have substantively different policy agendas to their national 
elite, which contradicts parts of May’s Law as amended by Kitschelt (1989). If the national 
elite in either party can find areas of agreement that might lead to or be a consequence of co-
operation, then their grassroots will broadly agree, based on the evidence from this survey. 
Figure 6.1: Local party chairs' perceptions of policy, office and votes  
 
N: 101 (Labour); 121 (Liberal Democrat).  
Source: Survey of Labour and Liberal Democrat local parties, 2014-2015. 
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One final measure of grassroots radicalism can be tested using the ‘policy, office and votes’ 
triad developed by Muller and Strøm (1999). May’s Law is based on the idea that members 
and activists are more concerned with ideological principles than party elites. May assumes 
that while elites have an incentives to win office, for members and activists the incentive for 
being in a political party is largely to direct policy in a more radical direction (May, 1973, 
Norris, 1995). To test this particular argument, the 2014-2015 survey asked respondents to 
give their thoughts on whether their party should be vote-seeking, office-seeking or policy-
seeking. The questionnaire allowed respondents to agree to all three, so inevitably there will 
be some overlap. The results are shown in Figure 6.1. Both parties’ grassroots suggest the 
importance of office-seeking. If co-operation between the two parties is a necessary means of 
achieving office, this data suggests that each party’s grassroots might not represent an 
overwhelming obstacle. However, Liberal Democrat respondents also stress the importance of 
policy-seeking, which could pose problems if the Liberal Democrats do not achieve certain 
policy goals as a result of co-operation.   
 
6.4 Grassroots attitudes to co-operation 
The next set of questions from the survey tackles the issue of Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
operation directly, questioning whether respondents supported the coalition talks between the 
two parties following the 2010 general election, and whether they would have supported talks 
after the 2015 general election.  Liberal Democrat respondents are expected to support 
coalition negotiations more than Labour respondents. This is for two primary reasons. Firstly, 
the analysis earlier in the paper of opinion structures in each party suggests that Liberal 
Democrat respondents perceive the two parties to be closer together than Labour respondents. 
Secondly, Liberal Democrats are more reliant on co-operation as a means of achieving office 
– Labour respondents might still have hopes of governing alone in a majority Labour 
government.  
Figure 6.2 shows Labour and Liberal Democrat local parties’ retrospective attitudes to 
coalition negotiations following the 2010 general election, and their prospective attitudes to 
coalition negotiations following the 2015 general election had it delivered a hung parliament. 
With both questions, it is important to outline the context. A Labour-Liberal Democrat 
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coalition was always unlikely following the 2010 general election due to parliamentary 
arithmetic (Bale, 2011b). However, Jones (2013) argues that a Labour-Liberal Democrat 
coalition was possible after the 2010 general election, and might have served both parties 
well. Both parties’ negative response to this should be viewed within that context. There is 
also a substantial time lag between the 2010 general election and the survey period (late 2014-
early 2015), which may affect responses. 
Figure 6.2: Local party chairs' support for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
operation, 2010 and 2015 
 
N: 101 (Labour); 121 (Liberal Democrat).  
Source: Survey of Labour and Liberal Democrat local parties, 2014-2015. 
 
Based on the data in Figure 6.2, neither party found a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition in 
2010 particularly appealing. As will be shown later in the chapter, the Liberal Democrats’ 
grassroots supported the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in 2010 more than the 
Labour alternative. However given that a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition would not have 
presented a majority in the House of Commons, there is a substantial percentage of positive 
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responses from both parties’ respondents, which suggests that if the circumstances are right, 
each party’s grassroots might support co-operation.  
What of 2015? This question was asked before the 2015 general election, when a hung 
parliament was deemed likely (Hanretty et al., 2015), and subsequent Labour-Liberal 
Democrat coalition negotiations were a distinct possibility (Harrop and Lee, 2015). Despite 
this, Labour’s grassroots were more negative about a coalition with the Liberal Democrats 
than they had been in 2010. Just 35 per cent of Labour respondents felt their local party would 
have supported a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition after the 2015 general election, 
compared with 66 per cent of Liberal Democrat respondents. There is a strong and positive 
significant correlation (0.547 at the <.001 level) between those Labour respondents who 
supported Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation following the 2010 general election and 
then again following the 2015 general election, suggesting that they maintained their support 
over time. However, there is no relationship in the Liberal Democrats between supporting 
Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation following the 2010 and 2015 general elections, 
suggesting that they changed their mind. This potentially indicates that the difficulties in the 
2010 parliament for the Liberal Democrats made their grassroots more likely to support 
Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation following the 2015 general election.  
Given the perceived likelihood for an electoral outcome in the 2015 general election that was 
more conducive to co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, why might 
Labour’s respondents have been more negative about a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition in 
2015 than 2010? Much has been made of the Liberal Democrats damaging their social 
democratic credentials after joining the Conservatives in coalition in 2010, both in and outside 
of the party (Bale, 2012, Dommett, 2013, Eaton, 2014, Grayson, 2010, Kennedy, 2010). That 
this has influenced attitudes of Labour’s grassroots is a reasonable assumption, and was 
stressed heavily during interviews with key Labour special advisers and MPs. This is 
unpicked further in Table 6.8. When asked if they had more negative opinions of the Liberal 
Democrats since 2010, 93 per cent of Labour respondents agreed that they did. While the 
Labour grassroots’ perception of the Liberal Democrats’ ideological position does not provide 
a strong organisational obstacle to Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation, their changing 
opinion of them between 2010 and 2015 appears to. 
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Table 6.8: Labour local parties’ attitudes to co -operation 
 Agree (%) 
More negative opinions of the Liberal Democrats since 2010 93 
Would support a coalition with other non-Conservative parties 63 
Would rather be in opposition if no overall majority 10 
Source: Survey of Labour local parties, 2014-2015. N = 101 
 
Interestingly, there was greater support among Labour respondents for a coalition between 
Labour and other non-Conservative parties following the 2015 general election than there was 
support for a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition, with 63 per cent supporting a coalition with 
other non-Conservative parties compared to 35 per cent for Labour-Liberal Democrat 
coalition.43 However, there was strong disagreement with the idea that Labour should choose 
opposition over co-operation with other parties: just 10 per cent of Labour respondents said 
that they would rather Labour be in opposition if they had no overall majority. Together, the 
results in Table 6.8 suggest that while Labour’s grassroots are open to their party co-operating 
with others, they are particularly less supportive of co-operation with the Liberal Democrats. 
The argument that the Liberal Democrats have lost trust with their votes on key issues of trust 
and identity also appears to extend to Labour’s grassroots, and presents an organisational 
obstacle to co-operation between the two. However, if faced with the practical choice in order 
to get into office, they might accept it.  
What of the Liberal Democrats? Table 6.9 shows Liberal Democrat attitudes to co-operation, 
and to Labour and the Conservatives. The vast majority of respondents (82 per cent) want the 
Liberal Democrats to be in government again, and 55 per cent of respondents thought that 
being in coalition government was a good experience for the party. Agreement with this 
statement was far from overwhelming, but suggests that they thought the experience 
worthwhile and would like to experience it again. This chimes with evidence from Liberal 
Democrat members more broadly, who supported their party’s efforts in coalition (Johnson, 
                                                   
 
43 The Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru and the Greens were listed as potential parties that could 
partner Labour in coalition. 
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2015), and comments from former Liberal Democrat leader Tim Farron, who has defended 
the party’s coalition with the Conservatives and argued that there is ‘nothing grubby or 
unprincipled about wanting to win’ (Mason, 2015).   
The Liberal Democrats’ grassroots’ want to be in government again, and in any realistic 
circumstance this will be through co-operation with other parties. However, while they 
supported co-operation with the Conservatives in 2010 and supported co-operation with 
Labour in 2015, this does not translate to positive attitudes to either party. As many as 85 per 
cent of respondents said they disliked the Labour Party. For both parties’ grassroots, 
perceptions of ideological and policy convergence between the two parties is tempered by 
negative feelings towards each other. However, if Liberal Democrat respondents dislike 
Labour, they dislike the Conservatives more, with 92 per cent of respondents saying they 
disliked the Conservative Party. Liberal Democrat party chairs might be open to supporting 
co-operation with other parties, but it does not necessarily mean they actually like them.  
Table 6.9: Liberal Democrat local parties attitudes to Labour and co -
operation 
 Agree (%) 
Would like the Liberal Democrats to be in government again 82 
The 2010 coalition was a good experience for the Liberal Democrats 55 
Dislike The Labour Party 85 
Dislike The Conservative Party 92 
Generally supportive of a Labour government 35 
Generally supportive of a Conservative government 18 
Source: Survey of Liberal Democrat local parties, 2014-2015. N = 121 
 
The final questions in Table 6.9 concern general attitudes to a Labour or Conservative 
government. In both cases, responses are mostly negative but there is greater positivity for a 
Labour government (35 per cent) compared with a Conservative one (18 per cent). This 
supports the evidence shown throughout this chapter, and suggests that the Liberal 
Democrats’ grassroots might favour co-operation with Labour over co-operation with the 
Conservatives. While efforts by Liberal Democrat elites to move their party closer to the 
Conservatives (Astle and Bell, 2008, Astle et al., 2006, Laws and Marshall, 2004) might have 
made co-operation with the Conservatives an easier thing to swallow for the party’s grassroots 
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after the 2010 general election, it has not necessarily led them to support the Conservatives 
over Labour generally. 
Table 6.10: Bivariate coalitions between characteristics and support for 
Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition following the 2015 general election  
 Labour Liberal Democrat 
Support Lab-Lib Dem coalition in 2010 0.55*** 0.63*** 
Wants a say on coalition talks in future -0.05 0.19** 
Would support coalition with minor parties, 2015 0.35*** 0.35*** 
Party should prioritise winning seats -0.01 0.11 
Party should be prioritise principles -0.18** 0.24*** 
Incumbent, 2010 -0.02 -0.02 
Incumbent, 2015 -0.06 -0.02 
Local party membership -0.18** 0.03 
Left/Right (Respondent) 0.05 -0.15 
Left/Right (Labour) -0.02 0.06 
Left/Right (Lib Dem) -0.26*** -0.11 
Left/Right (Conservative) -0.22** -0.10 
Would rather be in opposition if no majority -0.15*  
Support Con-Lib Dem coalition in 2015  0.28*** 
Would like Lib Dems in government in 2015  0.27*** 
Would support a Labour government  0.33*** 
Would support a Conservative government  -0.19** 
Source: Survey of Labour and Liberal Democrat local parties, 2014-2015. 
N: 101 (Labour); 121 (Liberal Democrat).  
Bold figures denote significant effects: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
 
The small N of each dataset makes finding statistically significant causal relationships 
difficult to find. Therefore, in order to explore variations in support for Labour-Liberal 
Democrat co-operation across party chairs, Table 6.8 shows correlation coefficients 
measuring the associations between support for a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition 
following the 2015 general election and a series of variables from the party chairs survey.44 
                                                   
 
44 Some results include questions only asked to chairs from one party.  
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Some of the data is not surprising. Chairs from both parties that supported a Labour-Liberal 
Democrat coalition following the 2010 general election were more likely to do so again 
following the 2015 general election. The same applies to those who would have supported a 
‘rainbow’ coalition with any of the minor parties following the 2015 general election. Again 
unsurprisingly, Labour respondents that were happy to go into opposition if their party did not 
win a majority were less likely to support a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. For the 
Liberal Democrats, those who wanted the party in government again were more likely to 
support a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. Likewise, those who would have generally 
supported a Labour government were more likely to support a Labour-Liberal Democrat 
coalition, while unsurprisingly those who would have generally supported a Conservative 
government were less likely. 
However, the data also throws up some interesting and potentially surprising results too. 
Whether or not respondents were policy seeking throws up different correlations in each 
party. Liberal Democrat respondents who prioritise principles were more likely to support 
coalition with Labour after the 2015 general election, suggesting that they potentially see 
Labour as a more principled coalition partner. However, Labour respondents who prioritise 
principles were less likely to support coalition with the Liberal Democrats after the 2015 
general election. This supports arguments that the Liberal Democrats lost trust with more 
‘progressive’ voters following coalition with the Conservatives after the 2010 general election 
(Cutts and Russell, 2015), but has negative implications for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
operation. Those in Labour who want the party to prioritise principles do not support Labour-
Liberal Democrat co-operation. If the Liberal Democrats can change perceptions amongst 
Labour respondents, Labour support might change: those Labour local party chairs that saw 
the Liberal Democrats as more left-wing, and potentially closer to Labour, were more likely 
to support a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. 
Labour respondents that saw the Conservatives as less right wing were more likely to support 
Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. This might suggest that Labour respondents who see 
the Conservatives as moderate are more open to co-operation with other parties. Interestingly, 
chairs of parties with more members were less likely to support co-operation with the Liberal 
Democrats. This might point to chairs of parties in more metropolitan areas, but this would 
need more research with more data. For the Liberal Democrats, those who wanted more 
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influence over coalition talks would have been more likely to support co-operation with 
Labour. Finally, those Liberal Democrat respondents who would have supported co-operation 
with the Conservatives were also more likely to have supported co-operation with Labour, 
suggesting a broad support for co-operation with other parties as a matter of principle 
amongst those Liberal Democrat respondents.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the importance of party organisation to the potential for co-
operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, and shown each party’s structure to be 
an important factor. Formal organisational structures provide the Liberal Democrats’ 
grassroots with more opportunities to support or oppose co-operation with Labour, through 
party conference and policy-making processes within the party. Equivalent rights are not 
afforded to Labour’s grassroots, although the Labour leadership informally take into account 
members and activists’ attitudes in order to avoid confrontation further down the line. 
However, this is the case in both parties and data gathered from the 2014-2015 survey of 
Labour and Liberal Democrat local organisations shows that Liberal Democrat respondents 
feel that they have much more influence than Labour respondents within their party. This is 
shown when applied to specific issues of co-operation, with Liberal Democrat respondents 
feeling they had more influence over coalition negotiations in 2010 than Labour respondents 
did. Nonetheless, both parties’ grassroots retain certain rights of influence. Parties continue to 
value members and activists and are aware that they can leave at any time, and any potential 
for co-operation must take into account their attitudes. This is particularly the case as both 
parties’ grassroots would like more influence in the future. 
Data from the 2014-15 survey also shows attitudes to co-operation within Labour and Liberal 
Democrat local parties. On the basis of the survey data, Labour’s grassroots are not 
enthusiastic. They have more negative opinions of the Liberal Democrats than they did in 
2010, and would have been against a coalition with them in 2015. Alongside this, those 
Labour respondents who prioritised principles were less likely to support co-operation with 
the Liberal Democrats. This suggests that the Liberal Democrats are likely to have a long and 
arduous process to regain the trust and support they had prior to joining the Conservatives in 
coalition (Cutts and Russell, 2015). Labour respondents were less against co-operation with 
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other parties. They showed more support for a coalition with other centre-left parties at the 
2015 general election, and appeared to have a particular issue with the Liberal Democrats. 
They also perceived the Liberal Democrats to be ideologically closer to the Conservatives 
than the Liberal Democrats’ grassroots did.  
The Liberal Democrats’ grassroots do not provide an overwhelming incentive to co-operation 
with Labour either. Their activists on the whole dislike the Labour Party, and preferred a 
coalition with the Conservatives over Labour in 2010. However, they would have preferred a 
Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition following the 2015 general election over a Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition, and are more generally supportive of a Labour government than a 
Conservative one. They also position their party as ideologically closer to Labour than the 
Conservatives. Importantly, both parties’ grassroots also show a willingness to be in 
government that might transcend any negativity about co-operation. Both parties’ activists 
feel that their respective parties should prioritise winning office, and both grassroots reacted 
negatively to the idea of opposition in place of co-operation.  
The thesis’s theoretical framework argued that co-operation relies on an electorate accepting 
it, a policy direction that is open to influence by other parties, and a party organisation at least 
willing to tolerate it. On the basis of the data collected here, each party’s grassroots is at least 
willing to tolerate it in order to achieve office. However, personal negativity and disagreement 
suggests that any organisational support for co-operation beyond that would be more difficult 
to sustain. 
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Chapter 7: Assessing the role of leadership in understanding the potential 
for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation 
 
This chapter analyses the contribution of both party’s leaderships to the potential for co-
operation between the two. This chimes with other analyses of leadership in politics, which 
regard it as a salient matter in electoral politics (Clarke et al., 2009, Whiteley et al., 2013). 
The extent to which party leaders have pursued convergent interests is hypothesised to act as 
an incentive to co-operation between the two parties. However, an entirely agent-led 
framework would ignore the influences and constraints upon party leaders (Strøm, 1990). The 
thesis works from the theoretical and practical position that electoral, ideological and 
organisational concerns are influences on a political party’s leadership. The extent to which 
leaders have authority to act without intervention or constraint is important for the decisions 
parties take, and the nature of competition and co-operation between them.  
Crucial to understanding a leader’s authority within a political party is to have a theoretically 
informed but empirically grounded understanding of leadership performance and institutional 
constraint. As such, this chapter utilises an adapted form of Bennister et al.’s (2015) 
‘leadership capital index’ framework. They argue that a leader’s capital is composed of three 
dimensions: their skills, relations and reputation. The leadership capital index provides a 
‘checklist’ from which to assess a prime minister’s authority, and as such their performance. 
It is adapted here, as this chapter (and thesis) is not primarily focused on assessing their 
leadership performance for its own sake, but more the contribution that a party’s leadership 
makes to the potential for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation.   
Much of the historical context to Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation is set out in the party 
system chapter. This chapter focuses on the recent leaderships throughout the period 2007-
2017, with most research carried out on the leaderships of Gordon Brown, Ed Miliband and 
Nick Clegg through the period 2007-2015, when Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation was 
a distinct and much discussed possibility. This allows investigation over a sufficient period of 
time to identify variations, while still being focused enough to allow precise and detailed 
analysis of the relationship between the two parties. Applying coalition theory to the 2010 
general election, Bale (2011b) argues that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
formed because office and policy-seeking conditions were met. However, this analysis was 
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reached retrospectively; prior to the 2010 general election, any coalition was predicted to be 
Labour-Liberal Democrat (Dunleavy, 2010). Inside accounts from all the Conservative, 
Labour and Liberal Democrats parties all suggest that the working assumption was that 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats could put together an agreement that would pass a Queen’s 
Speech and a Budget (Adonis, 2013, Laws, 2010, Wilson, 2010).  
The chapter argues that existing analysis of this period of party interaction does not give 
sufficient attention to the role of individual leaders and the incentives and constraints by their 
parties. In 2010, while the fact that a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition arguably met 
the office and policy-seeking measures was crucial in instigating its formation, this does not 
mean that the roles of Brown, Clegg and their respective parties were not important. Brown’s 
lack of capabilities as leader and Clegg’s openness to the Conservatives were important. 
Important too was the lack of support from the Parliamentary Labour Party for remaining in 
government, and the enthusiasm with which the Liberal Democrats’ party organisation 
supported working with the Conservatives. Between 2010 and 2015, Miliband’s ambivalence 
to the Liberal Democrats hardly incentivised co-operation and Clegg’s perceived submission 
to the Conservatives fundamentally damaged any possibility of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party supporting efforts to co-operate. These conclusions support analysis of other periods of 
Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation (or lack thereof), where decisions made by party 
leaders have affected party strategy towards each other (Joyce, 1999, Kirkup, 2016).  
Throughout, the chapter makes use of primary interview data with Labour and Liberal 
Democrat MPs, peers and special advisers, as well as polling data. The first section outlines 
how leadership will be understood in this chapter. In particular, it incorporates the ‘leadership 
capital’ framework proposed by Bennister et al. (2015). The second section examines the 
period 2007-2010 and the leaderships of Gordon Brown and Nick Clegg. The third section 
examines the period 2010-2015 and the leaderships of Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg. The 
fourth section analyses Jeremy Corbyn and Tim Farron’s respective leaderships. The 
concluding section brings this together to assess the role of leadership in understanding the 
incentives and obstacles to co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats.  
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7.1 Understanding leadership and co-operation 
This chapter focuses on Labour and Liberal Democrat party leaders, their ability to exercise 
authority and the constraints and influences on them. The framework of co-operation outlined 
in Chapter Two, and applied throughout the thesis, argues that political parties are elite-led 
organisations, but influenced and constrained by their institutional and structural environment. 
Various comparative theories of political leadership accord different roles to structure and 
agency of party leaders. Greenstein’s (2001) work on American presidents focuses primarily 
on individual agency, which has then been applied elsewhere in the USA and also in Britain 
(see Theakston, 2011). Buller and James (2015) argue that this account does not say enough 
about the structural context in which leaders operate, a point also made by Byrne et al. (2016) 
in their analysis of David Cameron’s prime ministerial performance between 2010 and 2016. 
Bulpitt’s (1986) statecraft analysis, primarily of Margaret Thatcher’s leadership has also been 
incorporated into more recent studies, for example of Tony Blair’s leadership (Buller and 
James, 2012).    
In a particularly useful study, Bennister et al. (2015) argue that the success of a leader should 
be judged by the manner and extent to which they can exercise their authority. To do this, 
they bring together the skills and reputation of a leader, along with their relations to networks 
and institutions, to propose a ‘leadership capital index’. It is this framework that is primarily 
utilised in this chapter. While other frameworks and studies look solely to evaluate a leader’s 
performance, Bennister et al.’s framework provides a better understanding of a leader within 
the context of their party. Most important here is not just the actual skills of the leader, but 
how those around the leader ‘confer authority on a particular office-holder who then uses it’ 
(Bennister et al., 2015: 420). Studying leadership in this way permits leaders to be understood 
at once as both powerful and vulnerable (Koole, 1994). As this chapter is interested in a 
leader’s authority in relation to their wider party performance, this is particularly helpful.  
Bennister et al. suggest three ways in which a leader’s ‘capital’ might be understood. First, 
their skills as an individual agent are important. Skills refer to a leader’s perceived personal 
competence. They may be ‘hard’ skills, in the sense that they are transactional or ‘soft’ in that 
they are persuasive. To this end, they highlight Greenstein’s (2001) work mentioned above as 
a starting point, which suggests six characteristics from which leaders might be judged: public 
communication, organisational capacity, political skill, public policy, cognitive style and 
emotional intelligence. A skilled leader can both manoeuvre and respond to the situation they 
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are in to promote or constrain co-operation between parties. The full skills are set out in Table 
7.1.  
 
 
Second, a leader’s skills and agency matter according to their relations with their structural 
and institutional context. As has been shown throughout this thesis, party leaders are 
constrained by their electoral context and public opinion, their histories, organisations and 
institutional environment. A leader might have excellent personal skills and competencies, but 
still be electorally unpopular, or facing a challenge within their organisation. The trade-offs 
between such relations will differ from party to party. Some leaders will have more formal 
constraints, such as organisational rules that limit their capacity to make decisions. This was 
shown in Chapter Six, where the Liberal Democrats’ organisation permits more formal 
grassroots influence than Labour’s, and this is perceived to be the case in practice when 
Labour and Liberal Democrat activists were surveyed. Some leaders will also have more 
informal constraints, such as dissent within their party or a weakened electoral position. How 
a leader is affected by this can have an important effect upon the potential for co-operation. 
In terms of co-operation, relations matter within a political party, but also across parties, 
which brings us to the third and final consideration in Bennister et al.’s framework: 
reputations. As they argue, ‘observers and critics alike all try to distil a narrative about what a 
leader is really like from the pattern of that leader’s behaviour and its observable impact 
Table 7.1: The Leadership Capital Index  
Skills Political/policy vision 
Communicative performance 
Personal poll ratings relative to the opposition 
Time in office 
Re-election margin for the leadership 
Relations Party poll ratings 
Public trust in the leader 
Likelihood of credible leadership challenge 
Reputation Perceived ability to shape platform 
Perceived parliamentary effectiveness 
Source: Bennister et al. (2015) 
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(Bennister et al., 2015: 423, emphasis removed). If a leader develops a reputation that 
suggests they are not only willing to co-operate but are enthusiastic about it; or that they share 
common interests with another party then this is a clear incentive to co-operation. On the 
other hand, if they are seen as divisive and tribal, and their interest in co-operation is a last 
resort to secure only their own ends, it is more likely to act as an obstacle. Brought together, 
these three considerations provide a means of understanding how leaders have or lack 
authority. To what extent do party leaders have the authority to make decisions? To what 
extent to they have the authority to rely on the support of those necessary to make those 
decisions happen? Balancing these trade-offs reflects the complexity of leadership and how it 
is exercised within political parties.  
Bennister et al. bring together their framework to propose a measurable index from which to 
understand a leader’s capital, and compare that with other leaders over time and space (see 
Table 7.1). This study does not utilise the full measurable index, in that it is not looking to 
comprehensively measure a leader’s capital as an end in itself. However, the framework’s 
broader arguments about the importance of a leader’s skills, relations and reputations 
provides a very helpful understanding of a leader’s authority in making decisions in relation 
to each party, and how they might compete and co-operate as a consequence. Throughout, the 
chapter makes use of primary interviews with relevant Labour and Liberal Democrat figures, 
both those close to the leadership and those constraining the leadership in some way. Of 
course, there are limitations to relying on claims made by individuals who perceive the past, 
present and future through their own involvement and their own experience. This is mitigated 
by analysis of party documents and events, as well as using quantitative data where relevant 
and incorporating other cited research in this area.  
Understanding leadership in this manner reflects the framework outlined in Chapter Two and 
employed throughout the thesis in that it recognises both the primacy and vulnerability of 
party leaders (Bennister et al., 2015). Leaders are constrained by their institutional and 
organisational contexts, but to some extent have the agency to restructure or manipulate them 
to their advantage (Riker, 1986). The framework is purposefully broad: while Labour and 
Liberal Democrat leaders face similar problems of electoral, policy and organisational 
imperatives and constraints, they differ depending upon the context. As Bennister et al. (2015: 
426) themselves outline, ‘what are considered assets (skills, achievements or victories) in one 
setting may not be in another setting’. A leader’s capital might also change over time: 
177 
 
 
Breslauer (2002) argues that leaders acquire, manage and then lose leadership capital. A 
leader’s position in time may influence co-operation between parties. A leader might be in a 
position to engender trust and support for co-operation within their party and the public. An 
example of this was David Cameron’s ‘big, open and comprehensive’ offer to the Liberal 
Democrats. Alongside this, the specific perceptions of co-operation will differ in each party. 
For the Liberal Democrats, co-operation has always been a necessary path to national office. 
For Labour, this is a more intermittent and potentially increasing phenomenon. This has the 
potential to affect the different decisions leaders have to take, and the different constraints 
they face.  
The remainder of this chapter addresses leadership and co-operation in the Labour and Liberal 
Democrat parties between 2007 and the present time, and how this aids our understanding of 
the contemporary potential for co-operation between the two. During this period, Labour and 
Liberal Democrat co-operation and potential realignment was nearly realised but ultimately 
defeated (Adonis, 2013, Heppell, 2013). As such, it provides a very useful understanding of 
where Labour and the Liberal Democrats are now, and the potential for co-operation between 
the two. 
 
7.2 2007-2010: Gordon Brown and Nick Clegg 
This section focuses on the period 2007-2010, and Gordon Brown and Nick Clegg’s 
respective leaderships during that time. Gordon Brown became leader of the Labour Party in 
June 2007, having previously served as the MP for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (previously 
Dunfermline East) since 1983. He replaced Tony Blair, who had led Labour since 1994 and 
the country since 1997. Nick Clegg was elected leader of the Liberal Democrats in December 
2007, having previously served as an MEP from 1999 to 2004, and then the MP for Sheffield 
Hallam since 2005. He replaced Sir Menzies Campbell, who had led the party since 2006.  
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Figure 7.1: Best Prime Minister ratings, 2008-2010 
 
Source: Wells (2011), showing polls from the beginning of Clegg’s leadership of the 
Liberal Democrats through to the 2010 general election. 
 
Considering time in office, while Brown only became leader of the Labour Party in 2007, he 
had been Chancellor of the Exchequer since 1997, and arguably one of the most powerful 
Chancellors in modern British history. He had huge swathes of control over domestic policy, 
particularly following the events of September 11th 2001 and the subsequent interventions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. This had positive and negative aspects. Brown was respected, and his 
longevity in office helped him assume the role of natural successor to Blair. In the early 
stages, the likelihood of a credible leadership challenge was low. Throughout though, the 
likelihood increased, and at various points appeared inevitable: a difficulty was whether or not 
Brown could form what appeared a ‘new’ government, one that was his own and different 
from Blair. For the most part he failed, consistently falling behind Cameron for who would be 
best Prime Minister (see Figure 7.1) Theakston (2011) concludes that Brown was ultimately 
an ineffective leader in a difficult context. 
Clegg meanwhile was much more unknown to the public when he became leader: while he 
found it easier to shape his own platform than Brown, he had the perennial problem faced by 
Liberal Democrat leaders of trying to get noticed by the public. Much was made of Clegg as 
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the ‘Orange Book’ liberal who would take the party to the right (Assinder, 2007, Branigan, 
2007). However, it is worth remembering that Clegg wrote his Orange Book chapter on the 
European Union, not on the forces of the market or virtues of economic liberalism, and he 
also wrote a chapter for the Social Liberal Forum’s Reinventing the State on tackling 
terrorism and recognising the limits of the state. His age and his experience marked a change 
from Paddy Ashdown, Charles Kennedy and Ming Campbell, but this was not a radical 
transformation of the party overnight.45 More nuanced analysis rightly recognises the gradual 
attitudinal shift of the Liberal Democrats towards positions more sympathetic to the 
Conservatives (Bale, 2012, Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011). This coincided with a 
professionalisation of the party over time, some of which pre-dated Clegg (see Russell and 
Fieldhouse, 2005). 
With regard to political vision, Brown was keen to show that he was more open in his 
outlook. One of his first acts as Prime Minister was to invite figures outside of the Labour 
Party into his government. These figures would come to be known as ‘GOATS’, or 
‘government of all the talents’, and arguably constituted ‘the greatest import of experts from a 
non-political background since World War Two’ (Watt, 2007). However, alongside 
appointments from a non-political background were attempts to include political figures from 
outside the Labour Party. These included Liberal Democrat peers: Shirley Williams agreed to 
advise the government on nuclear proliferation, Anthony Lester on constitutional reform and 
Julie Neuberger on the third sector (Seldon and Lodge, 2010: 10). However, they did not 
amount to any significant co-operation: Brown was looking to form a government that would 
counter perceptions of his tribal approach to politics (Theakston, 2011). Liberal Democrats 
were invited alongside Conservatives and non-party political figures. 
However, a more significant move was Brown’s invitation to Paddy Ashdown to join the 
cabinet as Northern Ireland secretary. Brown had a long-standing friendship with Ashdown 
and then Liberal Democrat leader Campbell. While friendship is unlikely to be the 
                                                   
 
45 It is worth noting that Clegg’s biographer would disagree with this analysis, identifying Clegg as firmly 
rooted in the Dutch-style economic liberal tradition (Bowers, 2012). 
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determining factor for co-operation, it has been significant in the past. Tony Blair and Paddy 
Ashdown were good friends during the mid-1990s, and James Callaghan and David Steel 
enjoyed a close relationship during the Lib-Lab pact. Its effects can be exaggerated, but 
Brown’s friendship with Ashdown and Campbell may have made him more likely to extend 
an offer to join the Cabinet. However, Brown had approached Ashdown without Campbell’s 
knowledge or approval (Ashdown, 2009). When Ashdown asked him about the range of 
issues the two parties disagreed on, such as civil liberties, Brown’s response was ‘well, 
couldn’t you stay silent?’ (Ashdown, 2009: 386). Ashdown eventually declined the offer. This 
highlights two issues with regard to Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. Firstly, that 
ideological and policy disagreement are still important. Second, that Brown’s communicative 
performance in order to mediate a conflictual situation was lacking.  
Alongside overtures to Liberal Democrat individuals, Brown’s policy vision was also one that 
would be of interest to the Liberal Democrats: constitutional reform. Between 2007 and 2010, 
he made three wide-ranging and policy-heavy speeches on political constitutional reform. In a 
speech to the House of Commons in 2007, he proposed House of Lords reform, proposals to 
establish a codified constitution, a review of the electoral system for Westminster elections, 
devolution and changing the voting age (Brown, 2010: 159-166). Brown’s primary agenda 
was not to win over the Liberal Democrats. In part it was also a reaction to some of Blair’s 
perceived failures: it more reflected Brown’s changing attitude over time that the Liberal 
Democrats were a useful partner to have on board (Seldon and Lodge, 2010). His speeches on 
constitutional reform were important, and led to Labour promising in its 2010 general election 
manifesto to hold a referendum, and support a ‘yes’ vote, on changing to the alternative vote 
electoral system. There was fear within the Conservative camp that Brown would use the 
Liberal Democrats to Labour’s advantage. Like William Hague had feared the consequences 
of Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation in the late 1990s (Richards, 2010), strategists within 
David Cameron’s team feared that Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation would be deeply 
damaging to the Conservatives (Heppell, 2013).  
However, Brown’s communicative performance meant that he was again unable to positively 
change the nature of the Labour-Liberal Democrat relationship. Brown failed to demonstrate 
that he had the emotional intelligence or political skill in his dealings with the Liberal 
Democrats. The same criticism applies to his ability to deal with most people, including in his 
own party (Theakston, 2011). Peter Mandelson (2010: 10) noted his and Blair’s doubt about 
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Brown’s ability to ‘bring people along’, and here was clear evidence of it. Hurst (2010b: 45) 
argues that far from promoting Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation, Brown’s overtures 
towards Paddy Ashdown deeply unsettled the Liberal Democrats, in that ‘it smacked of a 
crude attempt to divide the party’s senior ranks’.  
Clegg’s policy vision was a mix of disagreement with both Labour and the Conservatives. 
Between 2007 and 2010, most of Clegg’s criticism was of the Labour government, be it on 
equality or foreign affairs, or on individual issues such as tuition fees, detention of terrorist 
suspects and rights for the Nepalese Gurkha soldiers. However, the Liberal Democrats 
remained broadly supportive of Labour’s spending record. They attacked the Conservatives 
ahead of the 2010 general election on their plans to cut public spending, arguing instead that it 
should be maintained until the economy is in a better position to manage cuts. 
An innovation of the 2010 general election campaign was the introduction of three debates 
between Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Nick Clegg. It gave Clegg and the Liberal 
Democrats increased media attention, and according to instant opinion polls Clegg was the 
most impressive with regard to communicative performance. Brown sought commonality with 
Clegg, constantly repeating that he ‘agreed with Nick’. Cutts et al. (2010: 691) argue that it 
appeared an attempt by Brown to ‘isolate the Conservatives and create common cause with 
the Liberal Democrats with the type of progressive alliance familiar to students of the Blair-
Ashdown era’. However, Clegg did not appear convinced and was at best reluctant to accept 
Brown’s praises. As David Cameron neatly summarised it in the debate: ‘it's rather difficult, 
because Gordon says Nick agrees with Gordon and Nick says Nick doesn't agree with 
Gordon’. Going into the 2010 general election, Brown’s personal poll rating relative to the 
opposition were poor (see Figure 7.1). Although Brown was often ahead of Clegg, this should 
have been a minimum expectation: Nick Clegg was never going to become Prime Minister. 
Brown was comfortably behind David Cameron on who would be the best Prime Minister.  
Nonetheless, the 2010 general election delivered a hung parliament, and subsequently 
coalition negotiations and the potential for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. Nick 
Clegg’s preparation far exceeded Gordon Brown’s. Clegg appointed four Liberal Democrat 
MPs (Danny Alexander, Chris Huhne, David Laws and Andrew Stunnell) to devise policy 
demands and tactics for any negotiations (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010, Laws, 2010). 
Stunnell had experience of local government and coalition negotiations there, and had also 
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been involved in Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition negotiations in Scotland following the 
1999 elections to the Scottish Parliament. Brown’s preparation largely occurred during the 
election campaign itself, with advisers preparing documents on Liberal Democrat policy and 
areas of agreement. Eventually, the negotiating team was announced, consisting of two peers 
and three MPs (Andrew Adonis, Peter Mandelson, Ed Balls, Harriet Harman and Ed 
Miliband). However, preparation was minimal. As two of Brown’s former advisers told me: 
There were three reasons to explain Labour’s lack of preparation ahead of 
the 2010 general election. Firstly, the pressure of governing, particularly 
during that time. Secondly, the majority view at the top of the Labour 
Party was a heavy defeat. Thirdly, we were concerned about appearing 
disloyal to the party’s history (Adonis, 2016). 
In 2010 that we didn't do much preparatory work. We should have done, 
but we didn't. The main reason was that we thought we were about to lose 
badly, and Gordon was worried about leaks. I think he thought if he 
commissioned work about what we had in common with the Lib Dems, it 
would get out (Wood, 2016). 
 
Brown’s lack of preparation reflects the differing attitudes to co-operation between Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats. As noted earlier, co-operation is always a necessary means to 
national office, while for Labour this has been a more intermittent phenomenon. Despite the 
obvious chances of a hung parliament, Labour appeared to take the view that a bad result for 
them necessarily meant they would be out of government. It was only after the election that 
Brown did any preparation. Adonis’s comments about the party’s history also suggest a deep 
unease about co-operation with other parties, potentially reflecting previous experience with 
the SDP and even earlier to Ramsay Macdonald and the National Government (Joyce, 1999). 
It was also clear that the Conservative and Liberal Democrat negotiating teams had much 
more power over decision-making than their Labour counterparts. Labour’s team continually 
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needed to refer things back to Brown, or Chancellor Alistair Darling.46 Negotiations following 
the 2010 general election were largely led by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, and 
the Liberal Democrat negotiating team were key in persuading their MPs and peers to support 
a coalition (Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011, Laws, 2010). Prior to the election, Clegg had 
set out that in the event of a hung parliament the Liberal Democrats would speak to the party 
with the strongest mandate. While it was unclear whether the mandate was defined by votes, 
seats or a combination of the two, Clegg stuck to the line. In doing so, he disregarded the 
official Cabinet Manual on the subject, and similar actions by Clegg would be described 
during the 2015 general election by a leading academic on constitutional matters, Vernon 
Bogdanor, as ‘absurd’ (Boffey, 2015).47  
No matter how absurd they were, they were clear efforts by Clegg to manipulate the rules of 
the game. The predictions following the 2010 general election were that the Conservatives 
would win a plurality of votes and seats: Clegg’s words on the strongest mandate were a clear 
signal that co-operation after the 2010 general election would be between the Liberal 
Democrats and the Conservatives (Russell, 2010). Cameron’s position as the leader of the 
largest party meant that he had much greater ability to shape the platform than Brown, who 
was mostly side-lined. While it could be argued that Clegg was narrowing his options in an 
irrational fashion, he was being pushed on this issue daily by the media, and it was as much 
an effort to find a satisfactorily vague answer as it was anything else. However, any hopes 
that Clegg would use the Liberal Democrats’ history of co-operation with Labour as a signal 
of intention was forlorn. As one of Labour’s representatives on the coalition negotiations 
Andrew Adonis (2016) told me: ‘it was much harder to put together than I thought. As soon 
as Nick Clegg talked of equidistance I knew it would be incredibly difficult’.  
                                                   
 
46 Much to the dismay of the Liberal Democrat negotiating team, Brown facilitated one meeting between 
Alistair Darling and Vince Cable. However, both agreed that they could do little on their own, and simply 
enjoyed a friendly conversation over a cup of tea instead (Laws, 2010). 
47 The Liberal Democrats were unimpressed by Bogdanor’s description, telling Kavanagh and Cowley 
(2015: 197): ‘thank God constitutional experts don’t run politics… just because it worked like that in 1924 
or whenever doesn’t mean we should still work like that’.  
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This is not to suggest that decisions by party leaders and negotiating teams individually 
determined the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition following 2010. The main reason for 
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition was that they had the numbers in the House of 
Commons to satisfy the requirements to hold office, and had enough overlap in policy terms 
to implement a governmental programme (Bale, 2011b). It is instead to argue that individual 
agency and skills were important as well. Clegg had little trouble working together at an 
individual level with Cameron (Dorey et al., 2011), while he found Brown to be ‘lecturing, 
hectoring and bullying’ (Mandelson, 2010: 550). Leaders might be more effectively 
understood as veto-players: the extent to which they can exercise such a veto depends on 
electoral context and other institutional considerations outlined throughout this thesis, but 
they can exercise it all the same. As Greenstein (2001) argues, emotional intelligence is a 
crucial ability of any leader. Again, this was to Brown’s detriment in relation to Labour-
Liberal Democrat co-operation. Throughout the coalition negotiations, texts and conversations 
between Labour and Liberal Democrat figures centred around Gordon Brown’s inability to 
lead a coalition government. His more tribal reputation belittled any attempts he made at co-
operation. Part of this was due to the apparent rejection of him by the electorate, but also his 
inability to work with others. Brown still labelled the Liberal Democrats the ‘Liberals’48, and 
his friendships with elder Liberal Democrat statesmen did not extend to those elected since 
2001 and 2005. As former Liberal Democrat Cabinet Minister David Laws (2010) has noted, 
every change in leadership between 1997 and 2010 decreased the chances of Labour-Liberal 
Democrat co-operation and increased the chances of Conservative-Liberal Democrat co-
operation. The Liberal Democrats were less likely to work with Gordon Brown than Tony 
Blair, but also more likely to work with David Cameron than William Hague, Iain Duncan 
Smith or Michael Howard. Gordon Brown was simultaneously less likely to work with Nick 
Clegg than Paddy Ashdown, Charles Kennedy, Ming Campbell or Vince Cable (Heppell, 
2013). 
                                                   
 
48 The effect of this is often overstated. For instance, former Conservative minister Ken Clarke regularly 
refers to the Liberal Democrats as ‘the Liberals’, and he was respected and liked by Liberal Democrats 
during the 2010-2015 coalition (Laws, 2016a). 
185 
 
 
Insiders were aware of the problem. Labour peer and member of the negotiating team Lord 
Adonis (2013: 25) labelled it the ‘Gordon issue’: ‘everyone knew that an arrangement with 
the Lib Dems was impossible unless it was [resolved]’. Brown was desperate to avoid the 
Conservatives claiming victory and installing themselves in government (Adonis, 2013). As 
one of Brown’s advisers at the time told me: 
[Gordon] knew himself it wouldn't work… [but] he wanted a Labour 
Government to survive. His logic was if you can bind the Lib Dems into 
some sort of higgledy piggledy clunky minority government, the Tories 
would get rid of Cameron, then euroscepticism takes over and they go 
into meltdown. That was the game. It's hanging on by your fingertips for 
enough time for the Tories to decapitate their leader, because they're good 
at that, and then the eurosceptic leader comes through and says the future 
has to be an anti-European one for the Conservative Party, and then we're 
in business, we can worry about another election and all that.  He was not 
dewy eyed about a progressive alliance - it was a strategy. And he thought 
that if the Tories got in they would be in for 15-20 years and it's to be 
decided if that's true or not. That, for him, was the logic at the time 
(Wood, 2016).  
 
For all the criticisms of Brown’s communicative performance, his political vision was sharp. 
Throughout the five days, Brown strongly urged Clegg not to side with a party he 
fundamentally disagreed with on the European Union. On the Eurozone crisis that was 
beginning to unfold, Brown presciently put it to Clegg that ‘our relationship with Europe will 
be damaged’ if the Liberal Democrats allowed the Conservatives to govern (Adonis, 2013: 
126). In recognising the electoral constraints upon him, he was trying to move the agenda to 
ideology and policy, where Brown and Clegg were still much more aligned than Clegg and 
Cameron. However, demonstrating the strength of concerns other than ideology and policy, 
Clegg’s response to Brown was that this ‘isn’t really about policy’ (Adonis, 2016). Brown’s 
time in office, personal poll ratings and public trust in the leader fundamentally damaged 
him, and he was unable to overcome those obstacles to co-operation. Again, Brown knew this, 
and offered to resign in order to allow a Labour leader more amenable to the Liberal 
Democrats to take charge, but it was to no avail.  
Another Labour leader may have provided greater incentives to Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
operation. David Miliband was often discussed, both pre- and post- Brown, and may have 
been more to the Liberal Democrats’ liking. However, his ardent support of intervention in 
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Iraq would have created problems both within the Labour Party and with the Liberal 
Democrats. Harriet Harman became acting Labour leader after Gordon Brown’s resignation 
as Prime Minister, but was very negative to the Liberal Democrats between 2010 and 2015. 
Alan Johnson was more supportive of the Liberal Democrats, and also strongly supported 
electoral reform, but it is doubtful that he would have wanted to become Labour leader. Also, 
as will be shown in the following section, a leader more ideologically in line with the Liberal 
Democrats does not necessarily make Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation more likely.  
Organisational influences and constraints were also important. As noted in the organisational 
chapter, the Liberal Democrats’ federal structure allows more influence for members, activists 
and the parliamentary party than Labour’s structure does. Demonstrating impressive political 
vision and communicative performance, Clegg continually consulted the parliamentary party 
throughout the coalition negotiations, and then a few days after the agreement was reached 
with the Conservatives, a special conference was held to support the deal. Opposition was 
minimal. Evans and Sanderson-Nash (2011) argue that Clegg and the leadership were taking 
the initiative of consulting the party’s organisation before being forced to do so by more 
rebellious members in the party. This argument has merit. As one of the Liberal Democrats’ 
2010 coalition negotiation team told me: 
Virtually everybody had their hands dipped in the blood from Nick Clegg 
downwards, so it was very difficult for everybody to not feel consulted… 
if people feel they’ve had a say and they own the decisions, then they feel 
a lot different about them… if they’d just said it’s mad, we wouldn’t have 
been able to go ahead… in which case there would be a loose confidence 
and supply agreement, which would have been the minimal we could 
have got away with without pulling the government down and generating 
another election… (Laws, 2016b). 
 
This suggests that consultation with the organisation was still a constraint on the leadership, 
but also an opportunity to win the grassroots’ support. In Labour, Gordon Brown consulted 
his cabinet, but not his parliamentary party and certainly not the party membership. At no 
point, were they ever really discussed during the 2010 coalition negotiations. However, 
Brown knew that relations would be a major issue. He would have struggled to carry the 
parliamentary party on changing the electoral system to the Alternative Vote, and would have 
failed to win support for a proportional electoral system. Significant interventions by co-
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operation-sceptic MPs such as John Reid and David Blunkett served to undermine any 
attempts at agreement (Adonis, 2013, Laws, 2010). Brown lacked the authority within his 
party to carry them with him. Clegg would have faced less hostility from his party in trying to 
win support for a Labour-Liberal Democrat deal. 
As Bennister et al. (2015: 418) argue in relation to a leader’s authority, ‘what really counts is 
not one’s formal position but the informal authority one is granted’. In the context of Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats, the formal institutions of each party were a greater constraint for 
Clegg, but the informal and actual strength of opposition was a bigger constraint for Brown. 
While an informal network structure can limit the strength of opposition to a party leader 
(Heidar and Saglie, 2003), if its opposition and its voice is loud enough it can still weaken a 
leader’s authority. Brown found that as he tried to persuade Clegg of the historic case for 
Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation, he had senior figures in his party saying the exact 
opposite on national television. His authority was fundamentally weakened. Meanwhile, the 
Liberal Democrats were more united. For instance, Paddy Ashdown was crucial throughout 
the coalition negotiations. His authoritative position in the party as a trusted former leader was 
used to persuade others in the party that coalition with the Conservatives was the correct 
decision for the Liberal Democrats. 
Another constraint upon Labour and the Liberal Democrats was David Cameron’s 
Conservative Party. Although he faced an easier opponent in Gordon Brown and a more tired 
Labour Party compared with William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard before 
him, David Cameron showed himself to be a very able and skilled opposition leader (Bale, 
2011a). Between 2005 and 2010, he changed voter perceptions of his party on salient issues, 
and modernised the Conservatives to the extent that they were able to take advantage of 
Gordon Brown and his government’s unpopularity. While he was unable to win a majority 
following the 2010 general election, it is difficult to think of any other Conservative politician 
who would have got as close as he did.  
Heppell (2013) argues that David Cameron manipulated the agenda during the coalition 
negotiations, and knocked on its head the idea that the Liberal Democrats should only ever 
support the Labour Party. Former Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown said following the 
coalition that ‘I am not happy with where we’ve arrived. I am not happy at the death of the 
realignment of the left’ (Heppell, 2013: 277). Leadership and individual agency were 
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important in the process of how it was formed, what structure the eventual government 
actually took and what and how policies would be implemented. Importantly for the next 
period analysed in this chapter, leadership and individual agency also helped to shape and 
change future situations and agenda. 
Brown and Clegg did not solely prevent Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. However, 
they did challenge the widely-held view that the Liberal Democrats were much more likely to 
co-operate with Labour than the Conservatives. The parliamentary arithmetic was vital, but 
had such results followed the 1997, 2001 and 2005 general elections, it is unlikely that the 
same coalition outcome would have formed. Iain Duncan-Smith and Charles Kennedy would 
probably not have attempted to form a coalition. Neither would John Major or William Hague 
with Paddy Ashdown. Brown and Clegg’s leaderships both helped to structure an agenda that 
eventually facilitated Conservative-Liberal Democrat co-operation, with ramifications for the 
2010-2015 parliament and beyond. 
At the relations level, Brown’s authority was severely hampered by the electoral arithmetic 
and a parliamentary party divided on how to respond. At a skills and reputation level, he was 
never able to persuade the Liberal Democrats that he had a genuine commitment to changing 
the dimensions of British politics to one where the Liberal Democrats got a fairer hearing. His 
reputation was as commanding but bullying, and tactical but clumsy. Structurally, Clegg had 
more room for manoeuvre. Although they had lost seats and were deflated after a largely 
positive campaign, the Liberal Democrats remained the most powerful players in the ‘game’: 
without them a majority government would not have formed (Bale, 2011b). They got some 
concessions from the Conservatives in return for their strength, but while Clegg ‘won’ his 
party a referendum on the Alternative Vote, it was a superficial victory, and one that would be 
ultimately defeated by the electorate in 2011. More broadly throughout the 2010 parliament, 
Cameron and the Conservatives were held responsible by the electorate for the government’s 
achievements in office, while the Liberal Democrats were ignored (Bale and Webb, 2015, 
Cutts and Russell, 2015). He did not shape the agenda in a way that benefitted his party. 
While some have labelled it ‘the right thing to do’ (Bowers, 2015), it serves to show how the 
coalition was a big advantage for the Conservatives and a big disadvantage for the Liberal 
Democrats (Bale and Sanderson-Nash, 2011).  
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7.3 2010-2015: Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg 
This section focuses on the period 2010-2015, and Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg’s respective 
leaderships during that time. Ed Miliband became leader of the Labour Party in September 
2010, having first been elected as the MP for Doncaster North in 2005. As such, Miliband’s 
time in office had been short: he had a much lower profile than Gordon Brown. Indeed, he 
began his leadership in difficult circumstances: his victory over David Miliband in the Labour 
leadership contest was as a result of trade union affiliate votes, and his victory owed more to a 
ruthless charm offensive of enough parliamentarians to win their second preferences, 
combined with anti-New Labour rhetoric, than it was a united party seeking to support him. 
As a consequence, his re-election margin for the leadership was small and he struggled for 
authority with the parliamentary party from the beginning. His personal poll ratings relative 
to the opposition were also poor (see Figure 7.2). He was dogged throughout his premiership 
by accusations of underperformance and comparisons with his older brother (Bale, 2015b). 
By this point, Clegg had led the Liberal Democrats for over two years, and was now Deputy 
Prime Minister. The Liberal Democrats were in government for the first time in their party’s 
short history, and Clegg opted to place representatives from his party in every ministry, 
aiming for breadth rather than depth in government. While this might have diluted his 
perceived ability to shape platforms, the electoral defeats that were inflicted upon the Liberal 
Democrats between 2010 and 2015 suggests that having one or two more powerful ministries 
might not have made much difference. 
During the early years of the 2010 parliament Labour targeted the Liberal Democrats as much 
as, if not more than, the Conservatives. This was based on the Labour view that in 
Conservative-Labour marginals, there were enough Liberal Democrat voters that, if they 
converted to Labour, could swing those seats. Indeed, during the Labour leadership election 
campaign Ed Miliband set out his political vision as different from New Labour, and as a 
progressive that could win Liberal Democrat voters. During the Labour leadership election 
contest, he tried to court 2010 Liberal Democrat voters into joining the Labour Party in order 
to support him: ‘your leadership has sold out and betrayed your traditions. I ask you to look 
again at Labour’ (Miliband, 2010). Miliband’s approach is interesting in that Chapter Five set 
out a co-operative approach to winning Liberal Democrat support in Labour-Conservative 
marginals; Miliband opted for a competitive approach. It was not successful.  
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Figure 7.2: Best Prime Minister ratings, 2010-2015 
 
Source: YouGov (2017b), showing opinion polls from the beginning of Ed Miliband’s 
leadership to the 2015 general election.  
 
The strength of negative feeling between the Labour and the Liberal Democrat leaderships 
had its roots in events that took place prior to and following the 2010 general election. As 
argued earlier, while the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition that formed after the 2010 
general election was more a result of the parliamentary arithmetic than the interplay of 
personal relationships; individual decisions taken during that time still had a knock-on effect. 
As an adviser to the Labour leadership told me:  
For the people particularly close to the view that Labour should co-
operate with the Lib Dems, the Brown/Clegg experience in 2007-2008 up 
to 2010 was quite significant in that post-2010 period. At the top of the 
party, you’ve got Ed Miliband, Ed Balls, Yvette Cooper and Andy 
Burnham: they had all seen Gordon court Clegg quite assiduously during 
the pre-2010 period… Brown knew that he might need the Lib Dems. 
Many around Gordon were keen on Lab-Lib co-operation… [but] their 
experience was of Clegg keeping his distance. For that four… the extent 
to which Clegg kept his distance was telling. They basically took the view 
that the ‘Orange Book’ Lib Dems running the party did not want to work 
with Labour (Private interview). 
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As shown above, the extent to which Brown ‘quite assiduously courted Clegg’ is certainly 
open to question, but the argument stands that the 2007-2010 period had a knock-on effect on 
leadership relations between Miliband and Clegg after 2010. There was very little 
communication between the two leaders, and public relations were poor. This was relayed to 
me by a former adviser to Ed Miliband:  
Clegg-Ed relations were bad in the first two years. Ed was putting the 
boot in a lot and Clegg was putting in the boot back, and was being used 
as the front man to attack Labour's record. For all those reasons, it got a 
bit unpleasant for a while (Wood, 2016). 
 
The Liberal Democrats were hostile to Labour for many reasons. The two parties were further 
apart both in relation to policy but also in personal relations in 2010, compared with 1997. 
While in 1997, both parties’ political vision was more united in being anti-Conservative, the 
Liberal Democrats now found themselves in coalition with the Conservatives. As such, they 
were also very keen to stress the positive effects of coalition as a form of governance in 
Britain, which meant prioritising unity with the Conservatives rather than any distinctive 
agenda that might ease relations with Labour (McEnhill, 2015). Labour’s negative approach 
to the Liberal Democrats also made it very easy for the Liberal Democrats to return the 
favour. In the early months of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, Clegg (2010) 
argued that while the Conservatives had ‘embraced two-party working with integrity’, Labour 
‘are still struggling to come to terms with it’. He particularly accused Labour of practicing 
‘cry foul’ adversarial politics, a point which one former Liberal Democrat cabinet minister 
agreed with:  
Labour were very aggressive about us and about Nick and others. They 
could have taken a different line… where they sought to divide us from 
the Conservatives and be very pleasant and tolerant but disappointed, and 
finding those cracks. I think David Miliband would have taken that 
course. As they didn’t, they took a very tribal approach, that exacerbated 
our tendency to then have to justify what we were doing… by pointing to 
Labour’s record… we didn’t feel very positive about Ed Miliband. On 
various encounters we had with him, he wasn’t coming across as 
somebody who could compete with Cameron as a Prime Minister in 
waiting (Laws, 2016b). 
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Labour and Liberal Democrat relations were rotten in the early years of the 2010 parliament. 
While Miliband remained keen to demonstrate that he was a social liberal, this appeared 
driven more by attempts to win back former Labour voters than it was setting out a policy 
vision more aligned with the Liberal Democrats. He told The Times in 2010 that the ‘Miliband 
re-alignment is that you put together social democratic Labour combined with the liberal 
tradition of civil liberties and other issues’ (Treneman, 2010).  
However as the 2010 parliament went on, the extent of hostility between Miliband and Clegg 
eased. The collapse in the Liberal Democrat vote meant that there were not many votes left to 
chase, and Miliband’s changing approach was as much an organic development as it was any 
change in political vision. Nevertheless, it had two main consequences. First, it served to 
show the Liberal Democrats that, in the event of a hung parliament, the two parties could be 
partners in coalition. Miliband looked at the Liberal Democrats as a party he could work with. 
As one Miliband adviser told me:  
He was quite happy having a progressive alliance of some sort. He 
thought there was enough there for a common agenda on Leveson issues, 
to common approaches to internationalism, to social liberal policies on 
domestic affairs, crime, prison reform, all sorts of things for a common 
cause (Wood, 2016). 
 
Second, Miliband’s more friendly relationship with the Liberal Democrats was in part an 
effort to move the agenda in his own party towards a policy vision he supported himself; 
particularly on civil liberties. Cameron executed a similar strategy during the 2010 coalition 
negotiations. Prior to the 2010 general election, the Conservatives had yet to really modernise 
their party in the same way that Labour had ahead of the 1997 general election. Bale (2009) 
argues that while New Labour was reengineered, the Conservatives were merely re-styled. 
However following the 2010 general election, Cameron was able to use the Liberal 
Democrats to further his own ambition of the Conservatives as a moderate, centrist party in 
government (Hayton, 2012), although the extent to which this was a successfully executed 
strategy or a fortunate side effect is questionable. During the 2010 parliament, Ed Miliband 
increasingly saw the Liberal Democrats as a potential moderating force to his own 
parliamentary party, who were more socially authoritarian on home affairs and social policy. 
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As one adviser to the Shadow Cabinet who was involved in preparing Labour for coalition 
negotiations after the 2015 general election told me: 
The areas where I would have been worried were defence, civil liberties 
and surveillance powers, things like that, where my instincts are closer to 
mainstream Labour than the Lib Dems or frankly Ed Miliband. The worry 
was that he would have an ally he would use to tip the balance within the 
party away from a sensible policy (private interview).  
 
This was supported by one of Ed Miliband’s advisers, who outlined to me:  
I think Ed was quite a shy social liberal… There's a streak in the PLP that 
hates, more than anything else, fluffiness on social issues. It's a difficult 
thing to really capture - even people who were sceptical of Blair liked his 
putting physical security, ASBOs, etc. on a par with economic security 
stuff. That was the thing about Ed that many inside the PLP didn't like the 
most about him - the sense that he was too liberal on issues of crime. He 
never did a crime speech or police speech, or not really on national 
security, other than when discussing Libya. We didn't take that agenda 
seriously enough. A sense that our voters, especially working class voters, 
like that 'tough on crime' dimension, and that many found the Liberal 
Democrats hypocritical on those issues after they joined the coalition 
(Wood, 2016). 
 
On social liberal issues, Miliband knew that his policy vision was different from many in his 
parliamentary party, shadow cabinet and broader party. Miliband knew that co-operation with 
the Liberal Democrats offered an opportunity to restructure the debate in a way that suited 
him. As his adviser told me:  
If you talked to Ed a year ago about the Lib Dems, he'd very privately say 
that part of him quite liked the idea of a Lib Dem coalition because he 
thought along the lines of the Steve Hilton logic, that the Lib Dems forced 
Tory modernisation that they failed to do themselves over 20-25 years 
ago... Of course Ed would have preferred a single party government. But 
Ed liked the idea of having the Lib Dems as balance on social liberal 
issues and constitutional reform issues, against a party many of whom 
thought that was nonsense…  It's not just a clichéd metropolitan, liberal, 
fluffy granola-eating vs gritty, working class, feel the coal dust on the 
chest sort of thing, it's not that. It's more complicated than that… It's 
really to do with how you see the electorate. How much you think they 
care about those issues (Wood, 2016). 
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To have simply advocated a more liberal approach would have brought about a lot of intra-
party opposition. By restructuring the situation to one of appealing to Liberal Democrat 
voters, and then trying to win Liberal Democrat support for potential post-election co-
operation, Miliband was trying to structure the situation to support his own interests. Just as 
Cameron managed to placate the Conservative right during the early stages of the 2010 
parliament by using the Liberal Democrats (Lee, 2011), Miliband saw an opportunity to use 
the Liberal Democrats to do the same to Labour.  
The Miliband camp also appeared to place more importance on individual actors in each party 
than Brown had prior to 2010. From interviews with Miliband’s advisers, it is clear that they 
recognised that the parliamentary arithmetic would be the main, predominant factor in 
determining the outcome of the next government, but they also thought that co-operation with 
some Liberal Democrats would be easier than with others. Miliband met a number of times 
with Vince Cable during the parliament, as well as Lord Oakeshott, the former Liberal 
Democrat peer who had run a series of polls in order to undermine Nick Clegg’s leadership. 
While Clegg and Miliband’s relations healed during the 2010 parliament, there was still a 
clear sense that Clegg lacked the trust and authority of the Labour Party to have a major role 
in a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. There was a strong preference within the Labour 
leadership for a Cable-led Liberal Democrat party that Labour could co-operate with more 
effectively (private interview, and Wood, 2016).  
Nick Clegg was not especially keen on Ed Miliband either. Throughout the five years in 
coalition, Clegg found Cameron difficult and disagreeable on many issues, but ultimately a 
reasonable colleague to work with. Whenever he needed to work with Miliband, he was not 
impressed and doubted his ability to shape the platform. As he conveyed to David Laws: 
It’s interesting that big, controversial stuff like this [Syria] always brings 
Cameron and me together… I am afraid Ed Miliband is totally unreliable. 
I am fast losing respect for him. Every time there is a big decision – 
Alternative Vote, Lords, Syria – Miliband has the chance to act big, but 
he always, always acts small… if there is a hung parliament after the next 
general election, and there is a possibility of a Lib-Lab coalition, 
Miliband’s weakness would be a real problem in working together (Laws, 
2016a: 322). 
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Once the short campaign began ahead of the 2015 general election, predictions across the 
media and academic community were that the Conservatives would win roughly 300 seats, 
with Labour winning approximately 275, the Scottish National Party 50-55 and the Liberal 
Democrats 20-30 (Monk and Lambert, 2015). While this would not have given a Labour-
Liberal Democrat coalition a majority, the commonly-held view was that the Scottish 
National Party would not be able to prop up a Conservative-led government, and would have 
to back Labour in a budget or vote of no confidence. There is disagreement amongst different 
advisers to the Labour leadership as to what sort of arrangement the Labour leadership would 
have liked with the Liberal Democrats.  
If there'd been a hung parliament, and the numbers would have made it 
work, we'd have offered a coalition with the Lib Dems. A formal 
coalition, rather than confidence and supply… And Lib Dem members, 
Cable, in the cabinet. Almost certainly. That was our plan (Wood, 2016). 
The basic… plan in the event of a hung parliament was for a minority 
Labour government. The question was how that would secure its 
majority, and there was a plan to run it differently to the 2010 coalition. 
The 2010 coalition had functioned by a series of deals. ‘You give us this, 
and we’ll give you that’… and trade away things they stood on. You 
could see the Tories and Lib Dems getting ready to do that again… and 
we talked a lot about that sort of problem. We didn’t want to run a Labour 
government on that basis. The basic approach would be to bring issues to 
parliament and say this is where we stand. Support us or not, we’re not 
going to trade things through… Ed was saying ahead of the election that 
he had a plan for government, and making the arguments for his 
programme, rather than a deal-by-deal government.  If the Liberal 
Democrats had come into government, it would not have been a 
universally agreed programme with Lib Dems taking big cabinet 
positions (private interview).  
 
Labour prepared for potential coalition talks with the Liberal Democrats through a series of 
negotiations between Lord Falconer and a series of advisers to Ed Miliband, Ed Balls and the 
rest of the shadow cabinet. The general mood amongst different people was that Labour 
would be able to do a deal with the Liberal Democrats that would not involve them giving 
much ground on policy. Labour felt that the Liberal Democrats did not gain much from the 
Conservatives in coalition, a point made in academic analysis too (see Bale, 2012). One 
Labour adviser was quite disdainful about the potential influence the Liberal Democrats might 
have over Labour in any coalition negotiations, telling me: 
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Basically if Clegg could stay on with us and salvage his reputation for 
basically being a Tory, he’d have loved it. If the Lib Dems could stay in 
government and survive after their Tory colleagues had fucked off, they’d 
have loved it. If you imagine a world in which Danny Alexander is still in 
the Treasury and George Osborne is booted out, they’d have absolutely 
loved it. They’d have begged for it… the idea that they were ever going 
to be tough negotiators… they weren’t in 2010 and they wouldn’t have 
been in 2015. In coalition preparation, it boiled down to: are the Lib 
Dems going to be funny about this? Well, they’re gonna have to lump it 
(Private interview).  
 
The Liberal Democrats prepared for potential coalition talks with Labour much in the same 
way they had ahead of the 2010 general election. The big difference was the expected change 
for the party in votes and seats. The Liberal Democrats’ poll ratings were dire, and they knew 
that, at best, they would have half the votes and seats they had in 2010.49 This was a bit of a 
double-edged sword. From one perspective, their reputation would be heavily weakened: they 
would lack the same ability to shape the platform and their parliamentary effectiveness would 
be much weaker with a reduced group of MPs. They would be unable to be as important to a 
government in passing votes in parliament, and would be going into coalition negotiations 
having lost badly. However, they would have also been accountable to a much smaller aspect 
of the electorate. As one former Liberal Democrat cabinet member told me, ‘the risks are 
considerably less than if you’re going in with 23 per cent of the vote’ (Laws, 2016b). Within 
the leadership team, there was a definite sense that once sections of their former electorate 
had rejected them, they would not be an electoral constraint upon the party if they were in 
government after the 2015 general election.  
Again, Clegg appointed a team of people to lead the preparation and negotiations for post-
electoral co-operation: Danny Alexander, Sal Brinton, Steve Webb, Lynne Featherstone and 
David Laws. Laws and Alexander had both been involved in 2010. Webb provided a social 
democratic liberal response to Laws and Alexander, while Featherstone brought individual 
expertise from local government, as well as the internal party relations. As party president, 
                                                   
 
49 As it happened, they had roughly one third of the vote and one seventh of the seats they won in 2010. 
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Brinton provided a useful understanding of the party’s organisation and intra-party relations. 
The Liberal Democrats’ party organisation continued to act as a constraint on Clegg. As noted 
in Chapter Six, a special article was added to the party’s constitution prior to the 2015 general 
election, which stated that in the event of a proposed coalition, a special conference would be 
convened automatically. The coalition negotiating team would also consult an appointed 
reference group, consulting of nine representatives equally formed from the party’s Federal 
Executive, Federal Policy Committee and the parliamentary party.  
Labour had no such formal plans for consultation with the parliamentary party and 
membership. As one Labour MP told me, ‘there wasn’t very much scrutiny [of Labour/Lib 
Dem negotiations]. There was a lot of nervousness about things coming out… most of the 
PLP in that time were in election mode…’ (Twigg, 2016). One (now former) Labour MP was 
angry at the lack of consultation by the Labour leadership following the 2010 general election, 
and would have wanted more consultation following the 2015 general election. In particular, 
he pointed out Labour’s lack of consultation in stark contrast to the Liberal Democrats’ more 
open procedures. 
Going back to 2010, where I got angry with Labour was in learning that 
these attempted deals [with the Liberal Democrats] were tried to be made, 
which I think I would have supported. Contrast that with the way in 
which the Lib Dems undertook their negotiations… in terms of the way 
the Lib Dems were updated on a regular basis, so the body of their 
opinion could shape negotiations. The PLP was never afforded that, and 
that made me really angry (Reed, 2016). 
 
Formally, Miliband could enter into a coalition agreement with the Liberal Democrats without 
a lot of constraint. However, parties cannot be sure that whatever agreements they reach will 
be respected by their institutions and organisations (Strøm and Muller, 1999a: 272). The 
attitudes to the Liberal Democrats within the Parliamentary Labour Party were mixed, but 
were mostly very negative. Behr (2012) said that Labour’s attitudes to the Liberal Democrats 
amounted to ‘tribal loathing’ and ‘unending spite’. 
Labour MPs’ perception of Liberal Democrats, like Labour’s grassroots as highlighted in the 
organisational chapter, was one of betrayal and dislike. One Labour MP told me that 
following the 2010 general election, the parliamentary Labour party ‘never knew whether to 
hate them or hug them. That duality just persisted all the way through’ (Reed, 2016). Another 
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Labour MP was less complimentary, arguing that there is no point ‘pretending the party of 
Clegg, Laws and Alexander is a progressive force… the only value they hold is that of 
survival’ (Danczuk, 2012). Many Labour MPs represented constituencies that had faced 
strong Liberal Democrat competition prior to 2010, and happily witnessed the Liberal 
Democrats’ decline in successive local council elections between 2010 and 2015. Many will 
have spent countless hours at constituency party meetings listening to members and activists 
berate the Liberal Democrats’ actions in government. Eaton (2015a) argues that some within 
the parliamentary party and shadow cabinet would never have countenanced a deal with the 
‘yellow bastards’. Unite leader Len McCluskey also warned that there would be financial 
ramifications if Labour co-operated with the Liberal Democrats (Helm, 2014). Admittedly, 
McCluskey not warning of financial ramifications would have been more surprising.  
Miliband did not seem worried about opposition to a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition or 
arrangement after the 2015 general election. This appears naïve: while a credible leadership 
challenge never emerged throughout Miliband’s time in office, he was never fully respected 
or revered by the PLP, and any increased co-operation with the Liberal Democrats would 
have tested the relationship even further. One of Miliband’s key advisers felt it would be a big 
issue. Similarly to 2010, informal hostility and the actual strength of opposition would have 
likely been a bigger constraint on Miliband than Clegg. One adviser told me: ‘perhaps Ed was 
a bit cavalier about the ease with which he thought he could do a deal with the Lib Dems’ 
(Wood, 2016).  
Clegg’s leadership had suffered badly during the 2010 parliament, and there was a real sense 
he lacked the authority among Labour MPs to be part of any Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
operation after the 2015 general election. While he managed to overcome challenges his 
leadership, his communicative performance and perceived ability to shape the platform was 
severely weakened. His credibility as a virtuous leader of a party of protest was always going 
to suffer in coalition with the Conservatives (Cutts and Russell, 2015). It is very difficult for 
leaders of ‘radical’ parties to try and disassociate themselves from a perception of betrayal. 
Being in coalition with a party with a different ideology or policy mindset is likely to 
undermine a smaller party leader over time (Dunphy and Bale, 2011).  Clegg became a figure 
of hate to many Labour MPs over the course of the parliament. Miliband recognised this, and 
while again co-operation after the 2015 general election would have ultimately depended 
upon parliamentary arithmetic, the importance of individual party figures was still important.  
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His argument was that 'it all depends on whether Clegg goes'. It's a 
different ball game with Cable compared with Clegg... And you can't 
underestimate the hostility to Clegg inside the PLP at the time. It was 
really personal for a lot of Labour MPs, and I think they saw that when 
they went back to their constituencies, where many Labour activists hated 
Clegg so much (Wood, 2016). 
 
Together, the hostility to Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation within the parliamentary 
Labour party suggests that it would not have been easy for Ed Miliband had he tried to co-
operate with the Liberal Democrats. As highlighted in Chapter Four, had the numbers worked 
out Miliband and his negotiating team would have been able to put together a coalition policy 
document without too much difficulty. Like Cameron did successfully in 2010 (Heppell, 
2013), Miliband may have been able to manipulate his party into supporting co-operation with 
the Liberal Democrats in order to win office. However, he would have faced challenges to 
keep his party united over a parliament.  
As with Brown in the period 2007-2010, Miliband faced a lot of hostility to any idea of 
Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. Attitudes within the Parliamentary Labour Party to 
the Liberal Democrats were very negative, and while Miliband would have probably been 
able to persuade them of the merits of co-operation in order to win office, maintaining a 
unified government would have been a big challenge. He was also caught between attacking 
the Liberal Democrats to satisfy his (flawed) strategy of winning their voters, but feeling that 
he could use their MPs to win office after the 2015 general election. Such a strategy did not 
incentivise co-operation between the two parties. Clegg was severely weakened by his 
participation in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, and became a figure of hate/fun 
to many in Labour. In his own party, he would not have faced much constraint had he looked 
to co-operate with Labour after the 2015 general election. Together, Miliband and Clegg’s 
relations and reputations both in and across each party provided more obstacles than 
incentives to co-operation. Miliband might have been more open to it at a policy level than 
Brown, but his skills as a leader of the opposition did not enamour him to the Liberal 
Democrat leadership. Clegg approached Labour in much the same way that he had in 2010: 
open to co-operation, but with no discernible preference in comparison with co-operation with 
the Conservatives. There was little effort or success in shaping an agenda that promoted co-
operation between the two parties. 
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7:4 Post-2015: Farron and Corbyn 
The failures of Labour and the Liberal Democrats at the 2015 general election led to Ed 
Miliband’s and Nick Clegg’s respective resignations. In the summer of 2015, Tim Farron was 
elected leader of the Liberal Democrats, having been the MP for Westmorland and Lonsdale 
since 2005. He resigned following the 2017 general election. In the autumn of the 2015, 
Jeremy Corbyn was elected leader of the Labour Party, having been the MP for Islington 
North since 1983.  
Corbyn’s political vision is notably different from any previous Labour leader in the post-war 
period. Miliband was a minimal departure from New Labour compared to Jeremy Corbyn. 
Russell (2016) argues that for the first time in British political history, Labour has a leader 
that does not have the most basic support of its parliamentary party. Indeed, a credible 
leadership challenge was almost inevitable as soon as he was elected, although in the end 
Owen Smith’s campaign against him was not especially shrouded in credibility. Nonetheless, 
Corbyn remains unpopular with the majority of the Parliamentary Labour Party. While the 
differing attitudes of the PLP compared to the grassroots might negate the chances of actual 
challenges to his leadership, his perceived ability to shape the platform and his perceived 
parliamentary effectiveness are low within the PLP.  
This changed at the 2017 general election. Prior to 2017, MPs and peers criticised and derided 
Corbyn’s communicative performance, and his personal poll ratings relative to the opposition 
(or any other party leader in recent history) prior to the 2017 general election campaign were 
dire (see Figure 7.3). While the PLP still criticise him, their primary challenge to Jeremy 
Corbyn was his inability to win an election. The Owen Smith campaign in 2016 was 
presented as embodying the best of Jeremy Corbyn – principles and policy – with the electoral 
credibility to achieve. There was little challenge to Corbyn on the differences in policy vision 
between him and the PLP, albeit there was some focus on the European Union. Labour 
winning 40 per cent of the vote and 262 seats at the 2017 general election now weakens any 
potential PLP challenge to Corbyn. All the same, much of Labour’s current debate remains 
focused on intra-party conflict. Many of the people surrounding Corbyn are more concerned 
with transferring power to elements of the party more in line with their way of thinking than 
they are looking to win office and implement policy (Bale, 2016).  
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Figure 7.3: Best Prime Minster ratings, 2016-2017 
 
Source: YouGov (2017b). Data issues with YouGov prevent data being available for 
September 2015 to June 2016.  
 
Tim Farron led a reasonably united parliamentary party, but then there were fewer people to 
unite after 2015 than before it. The Liberal Democrats won just eight MPs at the 2015 general 
election, although this increased to nine following the by-election in Richmond Park in 2016. 
As such, his ability to shape platforms and his parliamentary effectiveness was weak. An 
example of this is that a Liberal Democrat leader is no longer considered worth putting into 
the YouGov political tracker polls on who would make the best Prime Minister. As one 
adviser to Ed Miliband told me: 
You can’t underestimate how irrelevant the Lib Dems are now after 
2015. The dislike of the Lib Dems is still there in Labour ranks, but it’s 
now a historical and local issue… The irrelevance of the Lib Dems since 
2015 is now immense (Wood, 2016). 
 
Farron’s political vision became dominated by Britain’s vote to leave the European Union, 
which he strongly opposed. Since that vote, he was possibly the loudest critic of the 
government’s plans and strategy, and while their national poll ratings remained stubbornly 
low, for a time the party’s performance in local and parliamentary by-elections has been 
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impressive, especially in areas that voted ‘Remain’ (Johnson, 2016). They were not able to 
capitalise that, and Farron’s communicative performance during the 2017 general election 
campaign was weak. He refused to answer questions about sexuality that would have been 
straightforward for any previous Liberal Democrat leader, and became very defensive as the 
campaign went on. He resigned after the 2017 general election.  
Vince Cable now leads the Liberal Democrats, elected unopposed, with 12 MPs in the 
parliamentary party. He will continue to question Britain’s exit from the European Union, and 
like Farron will try to get attention for individual policy issues. Cable has been referenced 
throughout this chapter as somebody with whom Brown and Miliband may have favoured co-
operation. However, Labour is in a very different position under Corbyn’s leadership. Should 
public opinion to Britain leaving the European Union change, there is potential for Corbyn to 
join Cable in opposing Britain leaving, but Cable is certainly closer to many others in the 
Parliamentary Labour Party on this issue than Jeremy Corbyn. 
This chapter has covered the period 2007-2017. Both parties are in a very different position at 
the end of this period than at the beginning. This presents potential incentives to co-operation 
in that it could make both parties rethink their electoral position, and there remains much in 
common between the two parties in terms of policy. However, Corbyn’s election as Labour 
leader departs from many of the norms that both parties have followed. Farron sought to 
deride Corbyn’s leadership, and the changing nature of the Labour Party throws up an 
opportunity that he is looking to use to his advantage. At the Liberal Democrat 2015 party 
conference, he argued that Jeremy Corbyn’s election as Labour leader meant there is ‘a 
massive space in the centre ground of British politics for sensible, moderate, progressives 
who are opposed to what the Conservatives are doing, but cannot bring themselves to support 
a party of the hard left’ (Perraudin, 2015). Farron remained open to co-operation with the 
Labour Party itself. In particular, he attempted to ‘woo’ Labour MPs to the Liberal 
Democrats. As he told me at an event in early 2016: 
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My view is there needs to be a fundamentally progressive, and I’ll use 
the phrase ‘centre-left’, alternative to the Tories that is credible, that is 
electable, that can challenge them and replace them... Model 1 is that 
the people in the Labour Party come over and join the Liberal 
Democrats as we are now. Or Model 2, famously, is the SDP. They 
decide to set up their own party, and we come to some sort of 
arrangement with them. 
 
However, no matter how distressed Labour parliamentarians might be, Farron was met with 
the cold shoulder, with one Labour MP telling The Guardian that ‘every Labour MP I 
know… despises Tim Farron as being slippery and untrustworthy’ (Perraudin, 2015). The 
party’s sheer weakness following the 2015 general election has made it very difficult for them 
to capitalise upon any opportunity, and the party’s reputation within much of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party continues to be one of betrayal and contempt. 
Nonetheless, there were media reports of discussions about electoral reform between Tim 
Farron and an aide of Jeremy Corbyn in 2016 (McTague, 2016). Corbyn is unlikely to find the 
moderate, centre-ground Liberal Democrats as appealing a partner as Tony Blair did in the 
mid-1990s, or even Gordon Brown and Ed Miliband between 2007 and 2015, but it suggests 
that he is open to a fundamental reform of the British political system. When asked if he 
would be open to electoral reform, Corbyn responded, ‘obviously’ (McTague, 2016).  
However, the strategy for the Liberal Democrats appears to be to build resources and 
momentum again in areas where they can challenge the Conservatives. If the Conservatives 
face electoral difficultly following the European Union referendum and the pressures of 
governing without a Liberal Democrat shield, then this could reap reward for Farron and the 
Liberal Democrats. Co-operation with Labour might not be a pressing priority. 
Bennister et al.’s leadership capital index shows Corbyn to be lacking in many areas. His 
skills are low, save for the re-election margin for the leadership: his political vision is 
markedly different from New Labour and any other post-war Labour leader, yet his practical 
policy vision is markedly indifferent from Ed Miliband’s. While his personal poll ratings are 
better than they were, they are still poor, and his communicative performance is strong within 
his party but weak outside of it. His relations are low, although the likelihood of a(nother) 
credible leadership challenge is lower than it was. His perceived parliamentary effectiveness 
is also low: despite spending over thirty years in parliament, he has never placed much faith in 
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the parliamentary process, focusing much more on raising issues in campaigns outside of 
parliament.  As Helen Lewis (2016) argues: 
He has signed early day motions on everything from using pigeons as 
suicide bombers (anti) to Arsenal (pro). But throughout his time in 
parliament he has refused to chair a single select committee… [yet] he 
has purchased his power at the expense of damning the parliamentary 
system…to buy into Corbynism you have to reject the idea of parliament 
as a place where real change can be achieved. 
 
However, his party’s poll ratings and reputation are much better than they were. Corbyn has 
been credited with running a very good campaign in the 2017 general election. Corbyn 
managed to shape the platforms on which the campaign was fought, and largely deflected 
negative campaign efforts by the Conservatives. For Cable, it is too early to tell what shape 
his leadership will take.  
 
7:5 Conclusion  
Using the leadership capital index provides a helpful means of understanding each party 
leader’s ‘stock of authority’, and question what their leaderships mean for co-operation 
between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Between 2007 and 2010, Gordon Brown showed 
signs that he wanted to reformulate the political agenda so that Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats were together natural opponents of the Conservatives, and manoeuvre a situation 
where the Conservatives go into meltdown over the European Union. However, this was as 
much a response to the previous Blair government as it was a move towards the Liberal 
Democrats. He largely failed: that this happened highlights how leadership is at once both 
strong and fragile. Structural factors weakened Brown’s position, while his own lack of 
leadership weakened him further.  
At a structural level, Brown was defeated by the electoral context he was in: following the 
2010 general election, Labour and the Liberal Democrats could not command support in the 
House of Commons over an entire parliament with any confidence. Cameron was in a 
position to offer the Liberal Democrats something Brown could not: stable government. 
Brown was also constrained by his party’s position. Brown could not shake off the perception 
that Labour had ‘lost’ the 2010 general election, either to the Liberal Democrats or his own 
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parliamentary party, who went on the airwaves to rubbish Brown’s attempts to stay in 
government. However at an agential level, Brown also failed. His attempts to encourage co-
operation were not viewed by the Liberal Democrats as genuine engagement with Labour-
Liberal Democrat co-operation, but as strategic manoeuvring.  Conversations between Brown 
and Clegg showed Brown’s knowledge and intelligence, but also that he was unwilling to 
listen to those he was seeking to persuade. At no point did he appear a genuinely pluralist and 
co-operative figure (Rawnsley, 2010, Theakston, 2011). Brown was hampered by the 
structure around him and his own political skills.  
Clegg’s leadership between 2007 and 2010 was to further move the Liberal Democrats away 
from being seen as Labour’s natural partners, and open up the prospect of co-operation with 
the Conservatives. While Clegg agreed with Brown that Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
were well suited on most policy issues, this did not extend to any substantive preference for 
co-operation with Labour. This highlights the insufficiency of ideological and policy concerns 
in predicting co-operation. While former Liberal Democrat leaders would speak openly of 
their preference for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation, Clegg was more openly hesitant 
(Adonis, 2013, Laws, 2010). His position that the Liberal Democrats would look first to co-
operate with the party with the strongest mandate ended up as an open invitation to the 
Conservatives and a clear obstacle to co-operation with Labour. Once that statement had been 
made, it would have been very difficult for Clegg to have then co-operated with Labour 
instead (Russell, 2010: 512) .  
The period 2010-2015 highlighted Ed Miliband’s failure as party leader. Early on in the 
parliament, Miliband had a clear sense that former Liberal Democrat voters were there for the 
taking, and enough of them in the right constituencies would reap electoral reward for Labour. 
Whatever the electoral problems of such an argument, it also damaged the prospect of co-
operation with the Liberal Democrats. By attacking them so viciously early on, it made the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats appear the natural co-operators rather than Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats. While this might have been Miliband’s intention, it did little either for 
his electoral fortunes or the potential for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. Later in the 
parliament, he saw the Liberal Democrats as an option to win office and to also shield him 
from the more socially authoritarian elements of his party, but at no point did this amount to a 
successful strategical effort. While Cameron successfully used co-operation to his and his 
party’s advantage, Miliband adopted a mixed and confused approach that ultimately failed. 
206 
 
 
Had the 2015 general election resulted in a hung parliament, Miliband would have needed to 
persuade his party of the merits of co-operation through rhetoric, manipulation and, if 
necessary, punishment (Strøm and Muller, 1999a). Based on his leadership between 2010 and 
2015, it is unclear if he would have achieved this.  
Clegg was in a very difficult position following the formation of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition. The Liberal Democrats were always going to lose voters due to co-
operation with the Conservatives, and they failed throughout the five years to appear a 
credible and distinctive force in British politics. This in part reflects the structural difficulties 
for a junior coalition party in British politics (Bale, 2012), but also Clegg’s failure to 
distinguish himself and his party from the Conservatives between 2010 and 2015 (Cutts and 
Russell, 2015). For Labour MPs, Clegg became a figure of hate and disdain, potentially more 
disliked than the Conservatives. Electoral arithmetic would ultimately determine whether or 
not Labour and the Liberal Democrats could have co-operated after the 2015 general election, 
but Clegg’s position as Liberal Democrat leader would have made it harder for Miliband to 
sell to his party. Between 2007 and 2010, Clegg was not keen on co-operation with Labour. 
Between 2010 and 2015, Labour was not keen on co-operation with him. 
Following the 2015 general election, most within both Labour and the Liberal Democrats’ 
parliamentary parties treated Corbyn with contempt, and co-operation was much less likely. 
Farron ruled out a coalition with Labour after the 2017 general election, and Corbyn was not 
particularly interested in the Liberal Democrats.  
For the most part, leaders and their individual actions are not as important as the electoral 
factors that might affect co-operation. Labour and the Liberal Democrats did not co-operate 
following the 2010 and 2015 general elections because they did not have the numbers in the 
House of Commons. However, decisions taken by each party’s leaders were still important. 
Between 2007 and 2010, 2010 and 2015, and 2015 and 2017, the Labour and Liberal 
Democrat leaderships appeared to have divergent interests, and this was to damage the 
potential for co-operation between the two. Brown was never able to convince the Liberal 
Democrats that his idea of co-operation was ever going to advantage anybody but the Labour 
Party. Clegg was never as keen as previous Liberal Democrat leaders on Labour-Liberal 
Democrat co-operation. Miliband saw the Liberal Democrats as a goldmine of voters that 
would help him become Prime Minister in 2015, and not as a party he could co-operate with 
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to manipulate a situation to his advantage. Corbyn barely thought about the Liberal 
Democrats, and Farron saw more use in competing with Labour than co-operating.  
For both Brown and Miliband, co-operation seemed an option that appeared as a last resort. 
While this is often the case for most party leaders, it meant that when they actually came 
around to realising the benefits of co-operation, they and their party were in a position of 
weakness rather than strength. It also meant that the Labour leaders faced greater hostility 
from their parliamentary party: while co-operation is always the end-game for a Liberal 
Democrat leader, this is not the case for a Labour leader. This fundamental question may need 
to be addressed by Labour leaders in future.  
This is possible, with a majority Conservative government following the 2015 general 
election and another Conservative government following the 2017 general election, and the 
still pressing need for Labour and the Liberal Democrats to recover their electoral position. 
However, the potential for co-operation will depend on both parties identifying convergent 
interests, and then having the political skill, manoeuvrability and context to see it through. 
The indications are that both parties have a long way to go before this is realised.    
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has analysed the potential for co-operation between the British Labour and Liberal 
Democrat parties, with an objective of contributing to our understanding of how parties 
interact and why. This chapter aims to bring together the previous chapters’ findings and 
conclusions. The first section addresses the main findings of the thesis in the context of the 
theoretical framework. The second section examines the implications for Labour, the Liberal 
Democrats and how parties interact in British politics. The third section extends the findings 
of this research to comparative perspectives of party interaction. Finally, the chapter discusses 
the implications for further research that might arise from this thesis.  
 
8.1 Theoretical framework and context 
Addressing how co-operation might be understood between Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats, the thesis has drawn on a series of literatures. Existing analysis of party co-
operation has been of enormous benefit to the discipline. However, it has commonly 
understood co-operation in discrete forms, and the comparative interest in predicting the 
general likelihood of certain coalitions or pacts does not provide sufficient analysis of 
individual party characteristics. In understanding co-operation in a more nuanced and flexible 
fashion, this thesis takes into account the numerous forms that co-operation can take, and the 
incentives and obstacles that might promote or constrain it. 
It reaches some interesting conclusions for both parties. Firstly, co-operation relies on 
compatible interests being jointly pursued by both parties. This is difficult to achieve. For all 
the discussions over a long period of time of a progressive alliance opposed to conservatism, 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats are different parties with different identities, interests and 
objectives. Co-operation relies on the admission that a party’s interests cannot be achieved 
alone: the adversarial nature of party competition in Britain makes this a very difficult 
prospect, and it is not clear that either party is in a position to be comfortable with such an 
admission. In theory, that should be blindingly obvious to the Liberal Democrats, but even 
that is unclear. Secondly, it relies on a series of considerations aligning themselves to promote 
co-operation, or at least not actively obstruct it, at any one time. For example, electoral 
imperatives are crucial, but if they promote co-operation between the two parties, the two 
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parties’ ideologies and policies are also important, as are the organisational imperatives. At 
each point, these factors are interacting with each other, and it is not merely the case that one 
particular set of incentives will bring about co-operation between the two parties. Finally, co-
operation relies on these considerations aligning themselves in both parties simultaneously. 
The incentives and obstacles to co-operation are different in each party, yet they rely on each 
other for it to be realised.  
It is clear that for Labour and the Liberal Democrats, co-operation is not a priority. 
Throughout this thesis, co-operation has been referred to as a ‘paradox’: it is difficult to 
contemplate co-operation in a context so geared towards competition. Even the Liberal 
Democrats, who in their existence have never been in a position to govern alone, continue to 
prioritise competitive and adversarial politics over co-operative interaction. This is perfectly 
sensible: evidence suggests that smaller parties suffer most when they co-operate (Duch et al., 
2015, Johnson and Middleton, 2016). Nonetheless, there are ways and means in which co-
operation can help parties in their office, policy and vote-seeking objectives, yet co-operation 
is usually an afterthought. 
One example of this is the manner in which Labour and the Liberal Democrats have 
contemplated post-electoral co-operation much more than pre-electoral.  It remains the case in 
British politics that prior to an election, competition is the only means of interaction between 
political parties. Pre-electoral co-operation is discussed, but often only in principle. 
Meanwhile, post-electoral co-operation, often in the event of a hung parliament, is becoming 
almost routine in British politics. The 2010 and 2017 general elections resulted in post-
electoral co-operation, as did the 1999 and 2003 Scottish Parliament elections and the 2003, 
2007 and 2016 Welsh Assembly elections. Co-operation becomes more of a possibility once 
electoral competition has finished.  
This is a paradox that is particular, in part to Britain. While Wager (2015) argues that Britain 
provides many examples of pre-electoral co-operation, it does not provides many successful 
examples. For the most part, it provides discussions of it. Bardi and Mair (2008) discuss the 
‘embedded’ nature of the UK party system, in that its competitive and adversarial history 
helps to sustain it as competitive and adversarial in the present. The introduction of 
devolution, with more proportional electoral systems and multi-party interaction, has 
challenged this in recent years, and it might be that this becomes less of a paradox in time.  
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8.2 Office-seeking and policy-seeking concerns 
The theoretical framework sought to identify a series of rational choice and institutional 
factors that might provide incentives and obstacles to co-operation. Chapter Four analysed the 
extent to which two parties had compatible ideological and policy programmes that might 
incentivise co-operation. Debates abound within each party about the extent to which there is 
a ‘progressive alliance’ between the two. It is indeed the case that at various points in their 
histories, each party has held very similar ideological positions on the role of the state and 
market, and the individual and society. Labour’s overlap with social liberalism has been 
evident throughout the 20th century, and its socialism has always been in an evolutionary, 
reformist form. The Liberal Democrats, even under Nick Clegg’s leadership, have prioritised 
social liberalism more than typical continental understandings of liberalism. However, 
differences remain regarding the two parties approaches to equality and freedom, and in both 
parties there are ideological traditions that might pull the parties further away from each other.  
It is also the case that ideological and policy concerns might be overridden by electoral and 
public opinion considerations. With regard to pre-electoral co-operation, Chapter Five showed 
that while there are some incentives, it is a very risky strategy. Labour’s electoral prospects 
have been damaged by a weaker Liberal Democrat party, and losing Labour-leaning 
supporters cost the Liberal Democrats at the 2015 and 2017 general elections. However, for 
Labour, co-operation with a social and economic liberal party is likely to further alienate 
Labour’s former core, more socially conservative vote. For the Liberal Democrats, co-
operation with a social democratic party that has recently failed to convince the electorate that 
it can be credible and competent in government risks losing Conservative-leaning voters. 
There are more reasons for optimism regarding post-electoral co-operation. Coalition 
outcomes involving the Liberal Democrats were more popular than any other multi-party 
outcome, suggesting that voters are more amenable to the Liberal Democrats being in 
government than other smaller parties. Labour and Liberal Democrat voters were also more 
likely to support a coalition outcome between the two at the 2015 general election. However, 
while the clear office-seeking incentives of co-operation remain, both parties’ precarious 
electoral positions mean they have potentially overwhelming challenges to address before 
thinking about coalition negotiations. Brought together, these conclusions show that there is 
potential for co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats based on electoral 
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concerns, but there are big risks too. Without a big change in each party’s thinking there are 
more reasons to be pessimistic at present. 
 
8.3 Organisational and institutional considerations 
Chapters Six and Seven considered the importance of each party’s organisations. Chapter Six 
analysed the extent and nature of influence of each party’s grassroots, arguing that member 
and activist influence and attitudes to co-operation are important. Formal organisational 
structures provide the Liberal Democrats’ grassroots with more opportunities to support or 
oppose co-operation with Labour, through party conference and policy-making processes 
within the party. Equivalent rights are not afforded to Labour’s grassroots, although the 
Labour leadership informally take into account members and activists’ attitudes in order to 
avoid confrontation further down the line. Data from the 2014-15 survey also shows attitudes 
to co-operation within Labour and Liberal Democrat grassroots. Labour’s grassroots do not 
give much enthusiasm. They have more negative opinions of the Liberal Democrats than they 
did in 2010, and would have been against a coalition with them in 2015. This is not to say that 
they were against any form of co-operation with any party. They showed more support for a 
coalition with other non-Conservative parties at the 2015 general election, and had a 
particular issue with the Liberal Democrats. They also perceived the Liberal Democrats to be 
ideologically closer to the Conservatives than the Liberal Democrats’ grassroots did. The 
Liberal Democrats’ grassroots do not provide an overwhelming incentive to co-operation with 
Labour either. Their activists on the whole dislike the Labour Party, and preferred a coalition 
with the Conservatives in 2010. However, they would have preferred a Labour-Liberal 
Democrat coalition following the 2015 general election over a Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition, and are more generally supportive of a Labour government than a 
Conservative one. 
Chapter Seven analyses the elites within each party’s organisation, and the role and effect of 
leadership on the potential for co-operation between the two parties. For the most part, leaders 
and their individual actions are not as important as the electoral factors that might affect co-
operation. Labour and the Liberal Democrats did not co-operate following the 2010 and 2015 
general elections because they did not have the numbers in the House of Commons. However, 
decisions taken by each party’s leaders were still important. The two party’s recent 
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leaderships had interests that made co-operation a more difficult prospect than it might 
otherwise have been. For recent Labour leaders Gordon Brown and Ed Miliband, co-operation 
seemed an option that appeared as a last resort. While this is often the case for most party 
leaders, it meant that when they actually came around to realising the benefits of co-operation, 
they operated from a position of weakness rather than a position of strength. While Corbyn 
has shown his support for electoral reform, and there have been occasional reports of 
discussions between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, he has never expressed any wish to 
work with the Liberal Democrats. Clegg was never as keen as previous Liberal Democrat 
leaders on Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation. While former Liberal Democrat leaders 
would speak openly of their preference for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation, Clegg was 
more openly hesitant (Adonis, 2013, Laws, 2010). Clegg was in a very difficult position 
following the formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, and struggled to 
distinguish himself from the Conservatives. This in part reflects the structural difficulties for a 
junior coalition party in British politics (Bale, 2012, Johnson and Middleton, 2016), but also 
Clegg’s failure to distinguish himself and his party from the Conservatives between 2010 and 
2015 (Cutts and Russell, 2015). Farron was a campaigning leader that kept the party going, 
but was unable to win back enough of its 2010 or 2015 support.  
 
8.4 Implications for Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation 
Both parties have many reasons as to why they should consider co-operation. Both can 
currently be argued to have a series of compatible interests. A strong Liberal Democrat party 
in the past has damaged the Conservatives more than it has Labour, and as a consequence the 
Liberal Democrat collapse largely served to benefit the Conservatives at the 2015 general 
election (Johnson and Middleton, 2016). For example, there was very little seat change 
between Labour and the Conservatives at the 2015 general election. Labour gained eleven 
seats from the Conservatives, and the Conservatives gained eight in return. The seats that won 
the Conservatives a majority were mostly at the expense of the Liberal Democrats. In total, 
the Liberal Democrat collapse gave 27 seats to the Conservatives, 12 to Labour and 10 to the 
Scottish National Party. Furthermore, research by Green and Prosser (2015) suggests that 
voters switching from the Liberal Democrats to Labour helped the Conservatives win some of 
those 27 seats.  
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Both parties recognising their electoral position and finding ways in which they might co-
operate to get each other out of it might be a sensible option. There are questions both parties 
should at least privately consider. Do Labour need to stand candidates in certain 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat marginals in England? Richmond Park is a useful example. 
Labour’s lacklustre campaign in the Richmond Park by-election in 2016 resulted in Labour 
losing polling just 3.6 per cent, and the Liberal Democrats won the seat by nearly 2000 votes. 
In the 2017 general election, Labour’s more successful national campaign led them to polling 
9.1 per cent in Richmond Park, and the Liberal Democrats lost to the Conservatives by 45 
votes. Research by Fieldhouse and Prosser (2017) suggests that Labour won some of the 
Liberal Democrats’ 2015 voters in 2017, as well as winning most of the ‘Remain’ vote. 
Labour standing a candidate in Richmond Park in the 2017 general election probably did the 
Liberal Democrats no favours. It would help Labour’s cause if they can realise that in certain 
seats they are not competitive, and should question whether they would rather see a Liberal 
Democrat elected, or a Conservative.  
In the 2017 general election, their national vote share fell even further from their already 
paltry 2015 performance. From the Liberal Democrats’ point of view, do they gain anything 
by losing deposits in Conservative-Labour marginals? Financially at least, they would save 
£500 each time they stand down a candidate in those seats. Particularly in light of Britain’s 
exit from the European Union, the Liberal Democrats might consider whether standing 
against pro-EU Labour MPs or candidates in Labour-Conservative seats is a sensible strategy. 
It might be that both parties have a long term view, that by contesting every seat they might 
increase their competitiveness over time. Nonetheless, if this is not based on a rational 
consideration of the potential for winning the seat in the short or medium term, then at least 
considering co-operation should be preferable. Short of a pact, each party could encourage 
tactical voting in key constituencies, which has served both parties well in the past (Herrmann 
et al., 2015, Johnston and Pattie, 2011a). Chapter Seven uses qualitative data to show how 
negatively the two parties viewed each other between 2010 and 2015, and Chapter Five 
showed the damaging electoral effects of this. At the very least, a more conciliatory tone 
might help both parties in the future. 
Is this likely? A more conciliatory tone probably is. The Liberal Democrats are no longer in 
government, and their sheer electoral weakness at least means they are no longer so much of a 
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scapegoat for Labour attacks. However, Labour (and other parties) are not so much adopting a 
more conciliatory tone towards the Liberal Democrats, as much as adopting no tone at all. The 
Liberal Democrats are routinely ignored in parliament and in the national media. In 2011, 
Labour MP John Mann asked in parliament: what is the point of Nick Clegg? At the time of 
writing, one could reasonably ask the same of the Liberal Democrats. They have still been 
combative towards Labour. This has mostly regarded Labour’s direction under Jeremy 
Corbyn, and the potential electoral benefit this might bring to the more centrist Liberal 
Democrats. Even so, Farron repeatedly signalled his willingness to work with Labour to 
oppose the Conservatives, Cable has done so in the past, and a more conciliatory tone ahead 
of the next general election appears likely. To this end, the two parties have occasionally 
voted together against the government in parliament, and have occasionally campaigned 
together in support of Britain’s membership of the European Union, and in opposition to 
Theresa May’s Conservative government following the referendum. 
It is also premature to entirely write off the Liberal Democrats as an electoral force in British 
politics. They are in deep trouble, and at the 2017 general election they could not build on 
their earlier reasonable performances in local elections and by-elections. Nonetheless, new 
leader Vince Cable remains one of their more well-known figures, and they remain the main 
competitor to the Conservatives in many seats where Labour is far back.  
A more conciliatory tone is thus likely. However, whether this develops into co-operation in 
some form appears unlikely, short of a hung parliament at the next general election forcing 
coalition negotiations. Barring a discussion about electoral reform (see McTague, 2016), the 
two parties have signalled little intention of entering into a pact, encouraging tactical voting or 
working together at an elite-level on policy issues. Labour’s parliamentarians and intellectual 
groups have formed any number of working groups and discussion bodies in light of the 2015 
general election: there has been little mention of the Liberal Democrats. While Compass 
strongly advocated a progressive alliance between non-Conservative parties, Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats largely stayed out of this debate, and any deals were restricted to small 
numbers of local parties. A book edited, highlighted in Chapter Four, by Liberal Democrat 
parliamentary candidate Chris Bowers, Green Party MP Caroline Lucas and Labour MP Lisa 
Nandy suggests some potential scope for co-operation, but there is little suggestion this will 
lead to anything more substantive yet. Between 2010 and 2017, qualitative data from Chapter 
Seven shows that there was little feeling in either Labour or the Liberal Democrats that co-
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operation between the two might lead electoral benefit. This idea did not advance after the 
2015 general election. 
Attitudes in both parties might be different if they are in a position to co-operate after a 
general election in coalition or some other agreement. For example, even with the negativity 
between the two parties that contributed to electoral damage at the 2015 general election, they 
would have had little difficulty in forming a coalition. As shown in Chapter Four, the two 
parties’ policy programmes were sufficiently compatible, and over time their policy directions 
have been more aligned than with the Conservatives. Chapter Seven also showed that both 
parties’ leaderships were open to a coalition or parliamentary agreement after the 2015 
general election. Chapter Six used survey data to suggest that the Liberal Democrats’ 
grassroots would have preferred a coalition with Labour than the Conservatives, and Labour’s 
grassroots would have tolerated it to win office, although co-operation with other centre-left 
parties would have been preferred. They may be more positive about the Liberal Democrats 
presently, following the referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union. 
However, Chapters Four, Six and Seven also showed that any agreement might have been 
more difficult to sustain in the medium and longer term, due to differing ideological outlooks 
and intra-party disagreements, particularly in the Labour Party.  
Both parties also need to be aware that while co-operation between them might bring some 
electoral benefit, this might be outweighed by big electoral risks. Both in interviews 
conducted for the research and utilised in Chapters Five and Seven, and in interviews 
elsewhere (see Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015), Liberal Democrat elites spoke of how effective 
the Conservative campaign about fearing Labour-Scottish National Party co-operation was, 
and how badly this affected them in Liberal Democrat-Conservative seats. While quantitative 
data is mixed, and definitive conclusions cannot be drawn from it, the qualitative data 
overwhelmingly suggests that the prospect of Scottish National Party influence on a Labour-
led government after the 2015 general election did the Liberal Democrats great electoral 
damage (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). In the weeks during the run-up to the 2015 general 
election, Nick Clegg spoke with Ed Miliband about it and voiced his concerns, and ahead of 
the election Clegg even contemplated ruling out any co-operation with Labour afterwards, to 
try and stop the narrative that a vote for the Liberal Democrats was a vote for Ed Miliband’s 
Labour Party (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015).  
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It may be the case that the Liberal Democrats’ electoral success depends, in part, on the nature 
of the Labour Party at any given time. The Liberal Democrats have long needed to balance the 
interests of a wide range of supporters. In any seat they are looking to win, they have had to 
satisfy the Liberal Democrat voter who would support them anywhere, the Conservative-
leaning voter or Labour-leaning voter who like the local Liberal Democrat candidate, and the 
distrustful, angry voter who thinks the Liberal Democrats are the best anti-establishment 
party. The last group of voters have largely gone now following the Liberal Democrats’ 
participation in government between 2010 and 2015, with quantitative and qualitative 
evidence suggesting that a large amount of the Liberal Democrats’ 2010 and 2015 support 
went to UKIP and the Greens (Chapter Five, and Green and Prosser, 2015). This might 
change as the Liberal Democrats continue to protest government actions with regard to 
leaving the European Union. Nonetheless, both the Conservative and Labour-leaning voters 
remain crucial. As discussed, most of the seats in which the Liberal Democrats’ are 
competitive are Conservative-facing, and Labour-leaning voters leaving the Liberal 
Democrats was damaging to the party in 2015 and 2017. However, so was an Ed Miliband-led 
Labour Party. The Liberal Democrats have long relied on Conservative-leaning supporters 
(Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005). They did very well in Conservative-facing seats between 
1997 and 2010 when a moderate, centrist Labour Party was in office, and potentially 
presented less of a concern to Conservative-leaning supporters than Ed Miliband’s Labour 
Party in 2015, or Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party in 2017 or the next general election. While 
Labour is not addressing its fundamental reasons for defeat in the 2010 and 2015 general 
elections (and to some extent 2017), the Liberal Democrats might be well advised to tread 
carefully with regards to co-operation with them. 
Labour must also be careful with regard to co-operation with the Liberal Democrats. Labour 
has struggled to maintain its former core, more socially conservative vote in recent years 
(Roberts et al., 2014). In particular, many Labour parliamentarians and commentators are 
beginning to focus on Labour’s issues with identity politics and nationalism (see Hunt, 2016). 
Co-operation with the Liberal Democrats, a socially liberal party focused on issues such as the 
environment, the European Union and constitutional reform, might be detrimental to 
rebuilding support with voters concerned about identity and nationalism. Academic research 
has suggested that the rise of the radical right party UKIP is not just a threat to the 
Conservatives but also to Labour (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Some Labour figures have 
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suggested that Labour-Liberal Democrat co-operation is the best means of improving 
Labour’s electoral prospects (Greenwood, 2015). Such suggestions need to take into account 
the potential negative consequences of co-operation as well.  
 
8.5 Applying the framework to other examples 
One of the interesting developments throughout the life of this research is the number of other 
examples of co-operation (or potential co-operation) that have arisen. For example, the issue 
of co-operation between Labour and the Scottish National Party dominated the 2015 general 
election, while more recently the Conservatives and DUP have entered into a formal 
parliamentary agreement. While the same level of detailed analysis cannot be given here as 
given to the case of Labour and the Liberal Democrats, the framework can be briefly applied. 
 Labour and the Scottish National Party 
This example was one barely discussed by the Labour Party ahead of the 2015 general 
election, but it was talked about by everybody else. In terms of co-operation in the 
electorate, the obstacles outweigh the incentives for both parties. Electorally, in all of 
Labour’s seats, the SNP are the primary challengers. Withdrawing their candidates in 
those seats would make little sense, as there is very little benefit for them. For Labour, 
aligning with the SNP ahead of a general election would fuel the Conservatives’ argument 
in England that a vote for Labour was a vote for left-wing government propped up by 
Scottish Nationalism. Both Cowley (2015) and Fielding (2015) suggest that this badly 
damaged Labour’s electoral prospects in England after the 2015 general election.  
In terms of co-operation in government or in parliament, there are significant ideological 
and policy differences between them too: the parties disagree on independence, and it is 
the most important issue for the Scottish National Party. However, there is less 
disagreement on many other policy issues, and both share a rhetoric that is anti-
Conservative, and might be labelled as ‘progressive’. While it would fuel a Conservative 
Party electoral argument, if both parties perform sufficiently well to form some form of 
coalition government or parliamentary agreement together, then there are more incentives 
than co-operation in the electorate. Also, as shown in Chapter Six, Labour’s grassroots 
may not be strongly opposed to co-operation with the SNP as a means of winning office. 
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 Conservatives-DUP 
Following the hung parliament at the 2017 general election, the Conservatives and the 
Democratic Unionist Party announced a confidence and supply agreement, with extra 
money for Northern Ireland public services and infrastructure in return for DUP support 
for the Conservative government in the House of Commons. The agreement is initially for 
two years, being reviewed at the end of the parliamentary session (in 2019). The 
incentives and obstacles are different in this case, as the Conservatives are not electorally 
competitive in Northern Ireland, nor do the DUP stand candidates outside of Northern 
Ireland. In recent years, the Conservatives have either stood unsuccessfully alongside the 
Ulster Unionist Party, or unsuccessfully on their own.  
There are ideological obstacles to co-operation. While the DUP’s opposition to extending 
abortion rights and same-sex marriage will not formally change any legislation in 
England, Scotland or Wales, it will still be difficult for some Conservatives to accept 
(although not all). Indeed, Scottish Conservatives leader Ruth Davidson has publicly 
pressured Theresa May on this issue. It may present some electoral obstacles in time, as 
some Conservative voters might not approve of co-operation with a more socially 
conservative party. There are also electoral obstacles relating to spending. While the £1 
billion pledged for Northern Ireland is not actually a large pot of money, when the 
Conservatives have spent seven years insisting on spending restraint, it has the potential to 
upset voters in England, Scotland and Wales. The overriding incentive for the 
Conservatives is that it satisfies the office-seeking tendency. The Conservatives might 
struggle to pass votes of no confidence or a Queen’s Speech/Budget without the DUP’s 
support. Whatever the costs of co-operation, the Conservatives get to stay in government.  
There are a lot of incentives for the DUP. They strongly dislike Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour 
Party, and would find it difficult to vote in parliament in a way that might bring about a 
general election that Labour could win. In this agreement, they have secured extra funds 
for their country with not a great deal given in return. They also have the organisational 
incentive that by remaining outside of government, they get to keep the short money 
afforded to opposition parties. The Liberal Democrats lost out financially because of 
entering government in coalition between 2010 and 2015. There may also be electoral 
gain for the DUP from angering voters in England, Scotland and Wales. Any public anger 
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from the Scottish or Welsh governments might only serve to highlight the canny hand that 
Arlene Foster played for Northern Ireland.  
As with any co-operation in parliament, the role of parliamentarians will be crucial. Even 
with the two parties joining forces, the ‘government’ only has a majority of six. Kirkup 
(2017) argues that trust will be crucial, as will the role of the Leader of the House and the 
whips in each party, to try and ensure that government can adequately function throughout 
the parliament. Each party’s leadership will also be important: just as Callaghan and Steel 
helped to ensure the longevity of the Lib-Lab pact, Theresa May, Arlene Foster and Nigel 
Dodds will be very important in ensuring the success of this arrangement. This will not 
just be in ensuring good relations between the two parties, but in ensuring the continued 
support of backbenchers in each party. The nature of interaction between opposition 
parties will also be crucial: for the government to be defeated, all of the opposition 
parties’ MPs will need to cooperate – this, in part, explains why the 1974 Labour 
government was able to remain in office for as long as it did. 
 Co-operation in devolved administrations 
Scotland has had its own parliament and government since 1999. Labour has governed in 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats (1999-2007), and the Scottish National Party has 
governed as a minority government (2007-2011 and 2016-present) and as a majority 
government (2011-2016). As in Wales (see below), the electoral system for the devolved 
administration is more geared towards generating hung parliaments, which has often made 
co-operation in government and parliament necessary. The first eight years of the 
parliament also coincided with Labour and the Liberal Democrats agreeing on many 
devolved issues, which mainly focus on public services. The case of the Liberal 
Democrats in Scotland is interesting, in that they did not electorally suffer as a result of 
being the smaller party in coalition between 1999 and 2007. Their electoral performances 
in Scotland fell apart only after their participation in coalition with the Conservatives in 
Westminster. Much of this may be down to the sense of betrayal at co-operating with the 
Conservatives (Johnson and Middleton, 2016), but also the difference between governing 
as a centre-left socially progressive party in good economic times and during time of 
significant public spending restraint. It also suggest implications for how voters’ perceive 
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different levels of government, and there may be bigger ramifications of co-operation and 
competition in Westminster than there is in Holyrood.  
Labour has been in government in Wales since the introduction of Welsh devolution in 
1999. Sometimes, it has officially governed alone (1999-2000, 2003-2007 and 2011-
present) and on other occasions in full coalition with the Liberal Democrats (2000-2003) 
or Plaid Cymru (2007-2011). However, in the periods where it has governed alone it has 
still relied on the support of other parties. Kirsty Williams AM, leader of the Welsh 
Liberal Democrats, is Education Minister in the Welsh Government, but both Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats insist that it is not a coalition. Labour has 29/60 seats in the current 
Welsh Assembly and runs a minority government, and alongside relying on the support of 
the sole Liberal Democrat AM in the Assembly (Williams), they also rely on the support 
of Plaid Cymru to pass legislation.  
Open discussion of party co-operation is much more prevalent in the Welsh Assembly 
than in Westminster. Prior to Labour and Plaid Cymru joining in coalition in 2007, the 
Conservatives, Plaid Cymru and Liberal Democrats held discussions about a coalition, 
while Plaid Cymru have spoken openly about the difference between government and 
parliamentary arrangements with Labour in light of the 2016 Assembly election. More 
open discussion reflects a number of factors. First, the Additional Member electoral 
system is less likely to result in majority government, which makes coalition and 
parliamentary negotiations more common. Second, the Assembly is a newer entity, and 
having coalitions and co-operation from the outset potentially reduces the nature of 
adversarial politics. Third, the nature of party interaction is different. While the 
Conservatives have continually had representation in the Welsh Assembly, and UKIP 
currently do, representation in the Assembly has been overwhelmingly centre-left, either 
through Labour, Plaid Cymru or the Liberal Democrats. This presents fewer policy 
obstacles in Wales compared with in Westminster. Devolution also means that there are 
fewer policy issues to negotiate, and policy discussions tend to focus on public services, 
where centre-left parties may find more common ground.  
 
Focusing on the electoral, ideological and organisational elements that impact the potential for 
co-operation in these examples is helpful. In particular, they highlight that understanding how 
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parties interact is more than just understanding coalitions but understanding the benefits of 
different co-operative arrangements depending on circumstances (Boston and Bullock, 2012).  
 
8.6 Contribution to comparative research 
The answers to the research questions in this thesis complement and challenge some of the 
existing literature on party interaction, both in Britain and comparatively. In Britain, pacts, 
tactical voting, parliamentary co-operation and coalitions have existed in Westminster and 
elsewhere at the local and sub-national level for a long period of time (Bennie and Clark, 
2003, Dunleavy, 2005, Lynch, 2007). In Westminster, the hung parliament at the 2010 
general election was the culmination of a long period of changing support for political parties 
in Britain (Curtice, 2010). Nonetheless, that event has triggered more research into smaller 
parties, the effects of party competition and co-operation, and the changing nature of the party 
system in Britain (Lees, 2011, Curtice, 2012, Brandenburg and Johns, 2013, Ford and 
Goodwin, 2014, Green et al., 2015). This thesis has shown the different considerations that 
might be understood in how parties respond to the changing party system. 
Comparatively, the thesis provides an application of the literature on party co-operation to a 
country that has often been (reasonably) ignored. The gradual change in the party system and 
the events following the 2010 general election mean parties have had to openly consider co-
operation alongside competition. This thesis, alongside other studies of political parties in 
Britain since 2010, helps to provide further evidence and analysis for this comparative 
literature. The continuing likelihood of hung parliaments and multi-party competition in 
British politics means that further study should not stop following the Conservatives’ majority 
following the 2015 general election. The hung parliament at the 2017 general election 
supports this argument. How parties interact with each other, and the competitive and co-
operative actions they take, are going to be important in coming years.  
Analysis of office and policy-seeking concerns applied to a specific case also allows the 
specific indicators of co-operation identified in the comparative literature to be tested in a 
detailed fashion. A brief glimpse at the two parties suggests many incentives for the two 
parties to co-operate, but delving deeper into each individual party, their electoral context, 
their base of support, their ideological history and identity and their policy priorities 
demonstrates the more nuanced factors at hand in understanding Labour-Liberal Democrat co-
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operation (or lack thereof). The electoral chapter demonstrated that new considerations of 
incentives and obstacles to co-operation are needed beyond merely arguing that two 
progressive parties can line up to defeat a conservative one. The ideological chapter 
demonstrated that to have two policy-seeking parties with a great deal of alignment is not 
sufficient on its own, but needs to be considered not just alongside other considerations, but 
also differing ideological views in each party.  
This thesis has also demonstrated the importance of in-depth studies of party organisation to 
better inform how parties interact. Previously, parties’ grassroots have been given too little 
attention in academic analysis (Clark, 2004). This has since changed in British politics, with a 
lot of focus on the contributions and attitudes of party members and activists (Cutts, 2014, 
Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 2013, Webb and Bale, 2014), with more research currently 
taking place of members in across a number of UK political parties.50 However, the specific 
influence and attitudes of party grassroots on party interaction remain under-researched and 
under-theorised, and this thesis has made an important contribution. Using primary data from 
constituency parties allows comparative theories to be examined in detail: the primary data 
from the grassroots survey shows that activists perceive themselves as more radical than their 
party’s voters and MPs, presenting an interesting angle when testing May’s Law. However 
they are not necessarily less office-seeking, and appear pragmatic in accepting the idea of co-
operation as a means of entering government.  
This thesis also makes an original contribution to the role of leadership in political parties. It 
accepts the argument that office-seeking considerations were the primary influence on the 
formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in 2010 (Bale, 2011b). However, it 
does not accept that leaders are therefore redundant in how parties interact, and Chapter Seven 
shows the importance of leaders’ qualities and decisions in directly and indirectly affecting 
the potential for co-operation. Actions by Gordon Brown, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg 
                                                   
 
50 For example at the 2016 Political Studies Association Annual Conference, research was presented on 
surveys of the party memberships of the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP, the Greens and 
the SNP.  
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significantly damaged the potential for co-operation between the two parties, at a time when 
co-operation originally appeared likely.  
 
8.7 Implications for further research 
This thesis has made a significant contribution to the literature on political parties and their 
interaction, and provided findings based on quantitative and qualitative data that inform our 
understanding of the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties and their interaction. Nonetheless, 
this has been an exploratory case study, and further research could inform this literature and 
the broader literature on party competition and co-operation. 
The co-operation framework provides many research opportunities. In this instance, it has 
been applied in a fashion analysing why co-operation has not taken place. Application to other 
case studies, contemporary or otherwise, that have provided more success will help illuminate 
the incentives and obstacles to co-operation. Furthermore, the framework theoretically 
assumed equally powerful different incentives and obstacles, and then uncovered unequal 
relations as each consideration of incentives and obstacles was analysed. It also prioritised 
electoral, ideology and policy, organisational and leadership considerations above others, such 
as the role of the media or of interest groups. This is not intended to eliminate or ignore those 
other considerations, but to identify and prioritise aspects that were deemed important and 
could be applied and measured in the specific context of Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 
Future research can hopefully identify generalise variables and how they differ across case 
studies of co-operation.  
More survey data on organisational attitudes to party interaction would benefit the discipline. 
Data collection in this field of research remains sketchy, although this is beginning to change, 
with significant funding for party membership studies in Britain (Bale et al., 2016). This 
thesis has drawn interesting conclusions from a postal survey of party activists in 2014-2015. 
Repeating this would allow more detailed analysis of grassroots’ attitudes and how they differ 
over time, and the influence of different events and actors. While a body of survey data is now 
in the field regarding political party members, this could do more to distinguish between party 
strata, and their attitudes on how parties interact.  
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This thesis relied on qualitative data with regard to party leaderships, and as shown above 
drew interesting conclusions. It was also able to make use of voters’ attitudes to party leaders, 
which is crucial in understanding party elite behaviour. However, it would have been very 
helpful to complement this with quantitative data of party elites. The absence of this data in 
recent years has been to the detriment of the discipline, and while voter surveys like the 
British Election Study and Hansard Audit of Political Engagement rightly go from strength to 
strength, it is a pity that data such as the British Representation Study does not receive similar 
attention and support. This research could tell us more about attitudes to party interaction, and 
the potential causes of support or opposition to party co-operation. Put together with other 
organisational data, it could also make a greater contribution to theories such as May’s ‘Law 
of Curvilinear Disparity’ (May, 1973).  
Finally, building a base of knowledge regarding attitudes to party co-operation would also be 
of benefit to future research in the area. Surveys by individual polling companies between 
2010 and 2015 illuminated our understanding of public opinion towards coalition. However, 
more could be asked about voter attitudes towards co-operation. Johnston and Pattie (2011a) 
have used the British Election Study to test theories regarding tactical voting, but questions on 
issues like pacts, and how this affects voter behaviour in Britain, would be very useful for 
future research. One of the understandable priorities for polling organisations is repeating 
questions to allow comparison over time. However, this presents a problem when trying to 
understand new phenomena, and questions about different types of co-operation in major 
surveys remains limited. In particular, survey data that allows analysis of the relationship 
between the various indicators of co-operation outlined here would be very useful. For 
instance, with such data it would be possible to study the relationship between the ideological 
and policy congruence of parties and voters’ willingness to switch support strategically, as 
well as the influence of party leaders, coalition activity and identification with relevant 
political parties. This is an ambitious set of research agendas, but the changing nature of 
interaction in British politics and elsewhere warrants rigorous attention. Hopefully, this thesis 
has made a contribution to that objective.  
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Appendix 1: 2014-2015 survey of activists  
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c/o Jenny Dawley 
School of Geography Politics and Sociology 
5th Floor Claremont Tower 
Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne  
NE1 7RU  
 
Telephone: 0191 222 5973 
Email: craig.johnson1@newcastle.ac.uk 
Academic supervisors: Dr Alistair Clark and Dr Nick Randall 
 
Wednesday 21st January 2015 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
The activities and opinions of political parties and their members continue to 
be important yet remain largely ignored in British politics. I am a PhD student 
in British politics at Newcastle University, and my current research seeks to 
contribute towards redressing this balance.  
I would be very grateful if you could complete the enclosed questionnaire, 
which aims to understand more about the activities and opinions of party 
members and activists. This questionnaire is intended to be filled out by 
Constituency Labour Party Chairs. Other local party executive members 
may also fill it out if they are unavailable.   
You have either provided your address to me upon request, or it has been 
obtained from your local party’s website. Neither your private details nor your 
individual replies will be passed onto anybody else at any time. Any analysis 
and conclusions will be reported purely in summary form, and not until after 
the next general election.  
The survey itself is easy to fill out, and I hope you find answering the 
questions within it interesting. Most questions involve crossing a box, 
although in some cases you may be asked to provide figures. In such cases, 
approximate estimates are fine. If you would prefer to not answer a question, 
please leave it blank. The questionnaire should take no more than 15 minutes 
to complete, and should be returned in the stamped addressed envelope. Any 
answers you provide will be invaluable to my research. If you have any 
questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you in advance for 
your help. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Craig Johnson  
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Political attitudes 
1. People often talk of left and right in politics. Please look at the 
following list of political parties and politicians. For each, 
consider where you would place them on a scale of 1 (left) to 10 
(right). Place an [x] on each line to indicate your answer.    
 
 Left  Right 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Labour           
Conservatives           
Liberal Democrats           
UKIP           
SNP           
Ed Miliband           
David Cameron           
Nick Clegg           
Harriet Harman           
Chuka Umunna           
Ed Balls           
Yvette Cooper           
Andy Burnham           
Tony Blair           
Gordon Brown           
Diane Abbott           
Andrew Adonis           
Jon Cruddas           
George Osborne           
Danny Alexander           
Vince Cable           
Nigel Farage           
Nicola Sturgeon           
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2. Using a scale that runs from 1 to 10, where 1 means strongly 
dislike and 10 means strongly like, how do you feel about each of 
the following parties/politicians? Place an [x] on each line to 
indicate your answer.    
 Dislike  Like 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Labour           
Conservatives           
Liberal Democrats           
UKIP           
SNP           
Ed Miliband           
David Cameron           
Nick Clegg           
Harriet Harman           
Chuka Umunna           
Ed Balls           
Yvette Cooper           
Andy Burnham           
Tony Blair           
Gordon Brown           
Diane Abbott           
Andrew Adonis           
Jon Cruddas           
George Osborne           
Danny Alexander           
Vince Cable           
Nigel Farage           
Nicola Sturgeon           
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3. Consider again the case of ‘left’ and ‘right’ in relation to the 
Labour Party specifically. Using the scale of 1 (left) to 10 (right), 
please answer the following questions by placing an [x] on each 
line to indicate your answer. 
 
 
 
 
Where would you place the 
following on a left-right 
scale? 
 
 
Left 
  
Right 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
Yourself.           
The typical Labour voter.           
The typical Labour member.            
The typical Labour councillor.           
The typical Labour MP.            
The typical Labour MSP/AM*.           
 
 
* If in Scotland, provide an answer for MSP. If in Wales, provide an 
answer for AM. If in England, please leave blank.  
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4. Now think about ‘left’ and ‘right’ in relation to other parties. Using 
the scale of 1 (left) to 10 (right), please answer the following 
questions by placing an [x] on each line to indicate your answer. 
 
 
Where would you place the 
following on a left-right 
scale? 
 
 
Left 
  
Right 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
The typical Conservative 
voter. 
          
The typical Conservative 
member.  
          
The typical Conservative 
councillor. 
          
The typical Conservative MP.           
The typical Conservative 
MSP/AM*. 
          
The typical Liberal Democrat 
voter. 
          
The typical Liberal Democrat 
member. 
          
The typical Liberal Democrat 
councillor. 
          
The typical Liberal Democrat 
MP. 
          
The typical Liberal Democrat 
MSP/AM*.  
          
 
* If in Scotland, provide an answer for MSP. If in Wales, provide an 
answer for AM. If in England, please leave blank. 
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5. Please look at the following list of issues in British politics today. 
Consider what you think is important to your local Labour 
party. Please rank each of them in order of importance (1, 2, 3, 
4 etc.), with 1 being the most important. Please fill in as many 
numbers you can.  
Constitutional issues  
Economy  
Education  
Environment  
EU membership  
Foreign affairs  
Immigration  
Law and order  
Local government  
NHS  
Pensions  
Standard of living  
Taxation  
Welfare  
 
6. Now, consider what you think is important to the Labour Party 
nationally. Please rank each of them in order of importance (1, 
2, 3, 4 etc.), with 1 being the most important. Please fill in as 
many numbers you can. 
Constitutional issues  
Economy  
Education  
Environment  
EU membership  
Foreign affairs  
Immigration  
Law and order  
Local government  
NHS  
Pensions  
Standard of living  
Taxation  
Welfare  
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Local Party Opinions 
In this section, please think about the opinions of members in your 
local Labour party.  
7. Thinking of your local party organisation, how many members do 
you currently have? If you do not know the exact number, please 
provide an estimate. Please write your answer in the space 
provided.  
 
 
 
8. On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), state 
how you think members of your local Labour party would feel 
about the following statements. Place an [x] on each line to 
indicate your answer.    
 
In this section, please think about the opinions of members in 
your local Labour party.  
  
Disagree 
  
Agree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
The Labour leadership listens to 
ordinary party members. 
          
Labour members have a real 
opportunity to influence their party’s 
policy.  
          
Labour members have a real 
opportunity to influence their party’s 
electoral strategy. 
          
The relationship between political 
parties in my local area is competitive. 
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9. On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), state 
how you think they would feel about the following statements. 
Place an [x] on each line to indicate your answer.  
  
 
 
 
Members of my local party… 
 
 
Disagree 
  
Agree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
…felt that they had influence over 
Labour’s decision to try and form a 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats in 
May 2010. 
          
…would have supported a coalition 
with the Liberal Democrats in May 
2010. 
          
…would have supported a ‘rainbow’ 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats, 
Greens, SNP and Plaid Cymru in May 
2010. 
          
…have more negative opinions of the 
Liberal Democrats now than they did 
in May 2010. 
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In this section, please think about the opinions of members in 
your local Labour party.  
10. On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), state 
how you think they would feel about the following statements. 
Place an [x] on each line to indicate your answer.    
 
  
 
 
 
Members of my local party… 
 
 
Disagree 
  
Agree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
…would like a say on any coalition Labour 
might form after the next general 
election. 
          
…would support a coalition with the 
Liberal Democrats after the next general 
election. 
          
…would support a coalition with the 
Scottish National Party/Plaid 
Cymru/Greens after the next general 
election. 
          
…would support a Labour minority 
government after the next general 
election. 
          
…would prefer Labour to stay in 
opposition if it does not win a majority at 
the next general election. 
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11. On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), state how 
you think they would feel about the following statements. Place an 
[x] on each line to indicate your answer.    
 
  
 
 
 
Members of my local party… 
 
 
Disagree 
  
Agree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
…think that Labour should prioritise 
winning as many votes across the country 
as possible. 
          
…think that Labour should prioritise 
winning as many constituencies as 
possible in order to be in government 
again. 
          
…think that Labour should stick to their 
principles, even if this comes at the cost 
of votes or being in government.  
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Do you have any additional comments that you were unable to make 
in the survey? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………… 
 
 
237 
 
 
Please return the survey in the enclosed 
postage pre-paid envelope.  
 
If you are happy to be contacted further about 
the research, please write your name and 
email address below. 
Name: 
Email: 
 
Thank you for your help. 
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Appendix 2: Details and more data from the 2014-2015 survey of 
constituency parties 
 
Table 1: Respondents to 2014-15 survey of constituency parties, by region 
Region Labour (%) Liberal Democrats (%) 
East Midlands 9 18 
East of England 10 11 
London 10 6 
North East 2 4 
North West 16 10 
Scotland 6 7 
South East 20 18 
South West 11 11 
Wales 4 3 
West Midlands 8 7 
Yorkshire & Humber 5 6 
 
Table 2: Respondents to 2014-15 survey of constituency parties, by 2010 and 2015 
incumbency and membership 
 Labour (%) Liberal Democrats (%) 
Incumbent in 2010 23 5 
Incumbent in 2015 18 1 
Average membership 310 98 
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Appendix 3: Component selection for two-dimensional policy scale 
 
Component selection for two-dimensional policy scale 
 
Economic left-right 
Left Right 
403 Market Regulation: Positive  401 Free Enterprise: Positive 
411 Technology and Infrastructure 407 Protectionism: Negative 
412 Controlled Economy: Positive 414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive 
413 Nationalisation: Positive 505 Welfare State Limitation: Positive 
503 Social Justice 507 Education Limitation: Positive 
504 Welfare State Expansion: Positive 702 Labour Groups: Negative 
506 Education Expansion: Positive   
701 Labour Groups: Positive   
    
Social liberal-conservative 
Liberal Conservative 
105 Military: Negative 109 Internationalism: Negative 
106 Peace 302 Centralisation 
107 Internationalism: Positive 305 Political Authority: Positive 
201 Freedom and Human Rights 601 National Way of Life: Positive 
202 Democracy 608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
301 Decentralisation   
416 Anti-Growth Economy   
501 Environmental Protection   
502 Culture   
602 National Way of Life: Negative   
607 Multiculturalism: Positive   
704 Middle Class and Professional Groups   
705 Underprivileged Minority Groups   
706 Non-economic Demographic Groups   
    
Source: Prosser (2014: 99) 
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